

GRABERT

After his fundamental works on contemporary history and
especially
on the causes of the Second World War, the American
historian David L. Hoggan, the founder
scientific revisionism in contemporary history presents
here his most important thoughts and judgments on German
European history of the last 100 years prehistory of both world
particular
detail, and it is shown how the U.S. Presidents Wilson
Roosevelt forced the U.S. war against the will of their people in
1917
1941, and thus prevented a peace of understanding in Europe in
each case
This last
the now deceased historian
also Germany from the still raised accusation
mainly responsible for the world wars

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GRABERT

David L. Hoggan

MY COMMENTS ON GERMANY

The Anglo-American Crusade Thought in the 20th Century

More than 50 years after the beginning of the Second World War, research into its causes and reasons - and thus also into the question of who was to blame for this struggle between nations - has not yet concluded consensus. The West German historians' dispute beginning in 1986 brought about the long overdue demand of numerous historians for an unprejudiced view also of the Third Reich period and for the replacement of the previous one-sided moral judgments by objective findings. Since numerous Allied sources in both the West and the East still kept under lock and key material incriminating Germany has been published, revisionism in contemporary history against the anti-German historical image of the re-educators made only slow progress.

In the present work, which he was able to complete shortly before his death in 1988, Hoggan has compiled thoughts and judgments on the history of Germany and Europe over the last 100 years providing a wide-ranging show of events since 1871 Germany's position and possibilities under the various forms of government since the Bismarck era are compared, and the major events are presented with great background knowledge of the U.S. presidents Wilson and Roosevelt is emphasized, intervened in the world wars without any threat from Germany thus prevented a peace of understanding in Europe, so that Bolshevism could spread to the Elbe. Surprising perspectives are also offered the coming reunification of Germany and its significance as a new overall state.

GRABERT-VERLAG-TÜBINGEN

DAVID L. HOGGAN, born March 22, 1923, in Portland, Oregon; served in the U.S. Army during World War II, then studied history; received Harvard University 1948 with a dissertation on the German-Polish negotiations of 1938-39; after a brief teaching career at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Boston. 1949-52 assistant professor and associate to the rector at University of

Munich, then professor of history at the Universities of Berkeley, Carthage (Illinois), and San Francisco, and at Menlo College. Because of his revisionist stance, his employment contracts were eventually not renewed and he was unable to find an academic position, causing him economic hardship. He died unexpectedly on August 7, 1988, after a heart attack.

Book publications in German: *The Forced War*, 1961, ¹⁴1990; *France's Resistance to World War II*, 1963; *The Unnecessary War*, 1976, ²1977; *The Blind Century*, Part 1: *America - The Messianic Calamity*, 1979; Part 2: *Europe - The Lost World Center*, 1984; *My Notes on Germany* 1990.

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David L. Hoggan

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Introduction

The German state in the 21st century could play the creative role that the German Empire of the 20th century played after the German liberation of Kiev from Bolshevik rule in 1918. That event, the liberation of Kiev, was praised by such diverse anti-Bolshevik Russian leaders as Generals Wrangel and Krasnov. opening prospects were ruined by a second-rate political shyster, third-rate teacher and fourth-rate political writer, who was, however, a first-rate salon Bolshevik and favorite child of subversive rich Jews, such as Bernard Baruch, Louis Brandeis and Henry Morgenthau, Sr. This is U.S. President Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924).

His most important disciple, Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882- 1945) was, including Marx, Lenin and Stalin, the greatest promoter of communism of all times and also the greatest militarist, even if one includes Churchill, Stalin and Emperor Hirohito (for this see Leonard Mosley, *Ein Gott dankt ab, Hirohito, Kaiser von Japan*, Oldenburg 1967).

The conditional surrender of Japan in World War II of August 1945 - in contrast to the unconditional German surrender in May 1945 - stipulated that Hirohito would not be treated as a war criminal. Japan had imposed this condition when it first offered surrender to Roosevelt (FDR) in December 1944(!). No one, including the Japanese leaders of 1944-45, denied that the emperor, who had carried out brutal military purges in Japan itself and personally ordered the sacking of Nanking (1937), would fall under Allied charges for countless outrages that had no legal basis. The sacking of Nanking was worse than the violent riots by the Italians in Addis Ababa in 1936 after two Eritreans tried to assassinate General Rodolfo Graziani. It was almost as atrocious as the sacking of Peking by the British in 1860 (see D. Hoggan, *Das blinde Jahrhundert*, vol. 2, Tübingen 1984, pp. 235ff.).

The fact that the Japanese emperor managed to maintain good relations with Jewish circles, including world-wide Zionist imperialism, as part of his World War II policy - among other things, he allowed the tens of thousands of Central European Jews who had come to Japanese-occupied Shanghai continue to live their lives of luxury while countless American and British prisoners of war were maltreated and beaten right before their eyes - in no way diminishes the finding that Hirohito was sometimes a brutal and ill-tempered ruler (see John Dos Passos, *Wilson's Lost Peace*, Vienna 1964).

When, one year after his victory over the German Confederation founded by Metternich, Bismarck declared before the North German Reichstag that Germany, which he had finally put back in the saddle in 1871 after the fall of the First Empire in 1806 (i.e. nine years before Bismarck's birth), would show that it could also ride, he was a great prophet. His Kaiser Wilhelm II would have succeeded in liberating Russia from Lenin's terrorists in 1918 if Germany had not been constantly stabbed in the back during the First World War. This began with Wilson's neutrality violations in 1914 and 1915. It continued with his spurious Sussex Declaration of 1916 to reach a negotiated peace. It continued with his distorted congressional representations that earned him the desired declaration of war in 1917. It all ended in his fraudulent 14 points - the Armistice swindle of 1918, at the end of which the first man of the United States had publicly proved that he was not a man of honor but a liar and docile stooge of British imperialism (see Gene Smith, *When the Cheering Stopped*, New York 1964; Mathew Josephson, *The President Makers 1896-1919*, New York 1940).

After the Weimar Republic had successfully held Germany together against repeated attempts to dismember it, Hitler's subsequent attempt to save Europe from Bolshevism, again leading a strong Germany, was undermined and defeated by FDR, with Halifax and Churchill acting only as abettors. FDR had let Stalin know as early as 1933 that he preferred him to England (W. C. Bullitt, FDR's first envoy to the USSR, in a conversation with the author).

The main victims of U.S. imperialism in the 20th century were the Germans, and this independently of the five forms of government to be dealt with here

(a sixth, that of Austria since 1955, should also be noted). But America, with its outdated 18th century ideas and corruptionthe past, or to its original provincialism Germany, on the other hand, with its 20th century heritage, belongs to the future.

"How fast does Germany's heart beat?"

An editorial in a 1950 issue of *Quick read*, "How Fast Does Germany's Heart Beat?" It referred to the transitions from the Kaiserreich to Weimar, to the Third Reich, and to the FRG and GDR within the short span of 50 years, from 1900 to 1950. A film from the same year entitled *Herrliche Zeiten (Glorious Times)* described in some detail the authoritative public events during those fifty years. To the attentive observer, the question naturally arose whether it was the German people who were so extraordinarily restless during those fifty years, or whether all the restlessness was primarily the German response to the influence of global forces.

In short, in the national context, it was the perennial question of heredity (disposition) or environment (influences), with the international Anglo-American hypocrites laying all the blame on Germany as the alleged international *troublemaker at Versailles* in 1919, at Nuremberg in 1946, and with the Treaty of Paris in 1948, which combined World War I and World War II.

When the Marxist SPD politician and philosopher Karl Kautsky began to examine the German documents on the causes of World War I, he expected to find a considerable German share of his bias against German world power aspirations on sea and land He was surprised to find that the Germans were free of guilt, while the British and French had driven the Russian czar into the foolish mobilization of 1914. Later, the 48-volume work of Dr. Thimme and his associates on *The Great Politics of the European Cabinets absolved* Germany entirely. This was followed by the publications of such outstanding authors as Sidney Bradshaw Fay with *Der Ursprung des Weltkrieges* (2nd ed., Berlin 1930) and Hermann Lutz with *Lord Grey und der Weltkrieg* (Berlin 1927).

Germany's acquittal was completed with the work of M. H. Cochran, *Germany not Guilty in 1914* (Boston, 1931).

The transition from the Empire to Weimar was presented solely as the result of Woodrow Wilson's manipulation and the unfavorable outcome of the war, which was primarily the fault of the Allies. Wilson demanded revolution in return for moderate peace terms. And then he refused to give them to a republican Germany. Moreover, these moderate peace terms had been promised in a solemn armistice treaty

Economic crisis destroys Weimar Republic

a speech in Berlin in 1928, the Social Democratic Reich Chancellor Hermann Müller declared that the Weimar Republic, after the turbulent early years typical of all states emerging from revolutions now rested on solid ground

But as early as 1927, Montagu Norman, the president of the Bank of England, had traveled to the U.S. and persuaded Secretary Mellon to lower the Federal Reserve Bank's interest rates appreciably to help English exports, which were suffering from Churchill's overvalued British pound. The result was market-busting speculation and an economic collapse that wiped out a third of jobs in the U.S. as many as half in Germany. One fell all as a result of high U.S. investment in previous years. A London, not a Berlin, action caused the U.S. leadership to make the mistake that led to the collapse. Müller had assumed another upswing, which most people expected in 1928. His prediction would have come true if, as economists say, other factors had remained the same. For example, in *Speaking Frankly* (New York 1933), FDR tried to place all the blame for the collapse on Herbert Hoover, who was only Secretary of Commerce at the time of Mellon's miscalculation. FDR himself had proclaimed that the market was fixed when Hoover became president of the United States in March 1929. Unlike FDR, Hoover had declared in March 1929 that the market was too inflated. Neither FDR nor Hoover, however, had recognized the problem that had loomed since early 1929. Müller's prediction went unchallenged as far as the stability of the Weimar Republic

was concerned.

It is clear that the Great Depression of 1929 hit Germany far worse than any other industrialized country, including the instigator, England, and the instigator, the United States. Although Galbraith, FDR's former economic adviser, may be right that, with the exception of France's belated economic revival in 1938, Hitler's system was the only one coping without resorting to artificial production of military goods and corresponding adventures, the fact remains that the 2.8 per cent, Hitler received in the 1928 Reichstag elections would hardly have made possible the extraordinary increase in votes in the 1930 and 1932 elections - which indirectly led to Hitler's appointment as Reich Chancellor in 1933 - had it not been for the U.S. economic crisis of 1929, which caused severe unemployment in Germany, and this, moreover, shortly after the crisis years of 1914-24. In this respect, the second change of government and system was the result of a worldwide development of the situation, and not a wish on the part of the Germans. The Germans supported and appreciated Hitler only after they had become the victim of the US-made misfortune.

Hitler- FDR-Stalin

No normal person would claim that the third German form of government in the period 1900 - 50, the Third Reich, was accidentally set aside by a capricious German people. There are still two completely different ways to fathom the person Hitler. One claims that he was only concerned with war, and this included the extermination of the Jews. It also claims that he was a liar when he talked about his personal experiences of the horrors of the First World War. The other way, which I set forth in my book *Der erzwungene Krieg* (Tübingen 1990, 14th edition) and which is contained in countless other books, for example, Ziegler, Degrelle, Giesler, Kubizek, and Birkenhead (many, such as John Toland's biography of Hitler, are expressions of soul-searching), sees Hitler as the sensible and in many respects handed-down German statesman, as described by A. J. P. Taylor in *The Origins of World War 2* (Gütersloh 1962) and by Francis Neilson in *The Tragedy of Europa* (5 vols.,

Appleton 1940 - 46).

As everyone knows, Hitler was an artist, painter and, above all, an architect. He was not some bank robber like Stalin, who amused the doltish and mediocre FDR. And that FDR owed it only to his parents' fortune that he did not have to leave Harvard without a degree. After only one year of study, he managed to get a position in the judiciary thanks to his parents' wealth. Francis Perkins, FDR's Secretary of Labor in 1933, mentioned that John Maynard Keynes, during his only visit to the U.S., told reporters that FDR did not understand a word of what he said about economics. And it was that FDR had theology professors Taylor and Murphy from Columbia University in Springfield, Missouri, so that Murphy became permanently insane. And it was that FDR who allowed the alcoholic English dictator Churchill* to imprison a distinguished U.S. career diplomat (Tyler-Kent) without a judicial

See D. Irving's investigation of Churchill's alcohol addiction in *Journal of Historical Review*, 1986-1987.

to be thrown into an English prison for five years. And it was that FDR who in 1942 had hundreds of thousands of U.S. citizens sent to concentration camps without regard to the law. Despite his Chicago quarantine speech against Hitler on October 5, 1937, dripping with morality, FDR was more on the level of a Stalin and Churchill than an Adolf Hitler. FDR, not Hitler, was the calamity for the 20th century. FDR claimed that Germany's behavior in 1938 was a calamity for civilization, and the New York *Times* magazine on January 2, 1939, portrayed Hitler as a man who played the anthem of hate.

The key to understanding the decline of the British Empire and the defeats of Poland, France, Italy and Germany in World War II is the secret Roosevelt-Stalin Pact of 1933. This pact still exists, even though Truman declared the Cold War in 1947 at the request of a group of English imperialists who hoped in vain that England could again replace the U.S. worldwide, which is actually phony. The U.S.-Russian alliance is the fatal result of FDR's wicked thinking. Long before his presidential campaign against Hoover in 1932, FDR had planned with Harry Hopkins, his adviser

on social issues during his New York governorship, a large-scale campaign for social and welfare spending if he were to become president (see R. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, Hamburg 1950). However, he had run his campaign against Hoover on the false charge that President Hoover had spent too much money (FDR, *Speaking frankly*, op. cit.).

FDR was not only a cynical and mediocre liar, but also, like Churchill with his area bombings (Lindeman Plan) and Stalin with his massive purges, a criminal on a world scale. Lenin once remarked that using criminals for political ends was good; but Stalin, with these

CHURCHILL on STALIN (Nov. 12, 1942): "This great, rugged man of war... an extraordinary personality, in keeping with the dark and stormy times that shaped his life ..."

ROOSEVELT(5/28/1939): "I think the United States will also have to enter the war in any event."

elements preferably on a large scale. One does not have to be a Trotskyist to realize that Stalin, whose role as a double agent in the tsarist empire was exposed after the documents of the *Ochrana* (tsarist secret police) were transferred from Paris to the Hoover Institute at Stanford, was an international criminal. After playing cat and mouse with the exiled Trotsky in various countries, he had him assassinated in Mexico in 1940.

The FDR-Stalin Alliance of 1933

The facts of the FDR-Stalin alliance of 1933 have never been publicly admitted by the official representatives. Queen Elizabeth I of England centuries ago rejected an offer of marriage by Ivan the Terrible as a bad joke (Ivan the Terrible: "If my people overthrow me, we live in England; if your people overthrow you, we live in Russia."). But Ivan the Terrible with his *oprichini* (the police guards) was a respected and lawful ruler compared to Stalin and his *Cheka* as well as the NKVD (the secret police) early years of Bolshevism; on this see Walter Duranty, *Stalin's Russia*, New York 1944).

From 1917 onward, four U.S. presidents in succession had refused to diplomatically recognize the Bolshevik regime under Lenin and Stalin, even though such a repeatedly affirmed refusal meant challenging international law, especially when the Bolsheviks had become the undisputed rulers of Russia.

The secret of the 1933 FDR-Stalin alliance was personally confirmed to me in 1947 when I was a guest at Bullitt's home in Washington, DC. I was introduced to Bullitt by my most distinguished Harvard professor, William Langer (1896 -1977). Langer was chief of the historical division of the OSS, then the CIA, during World War II. Bullitt was Wilson's chief diplomatic troublemaker in Russia at the end of World War I - he also served as the model for the progressive novelist Upton Sinclair's worldwide traveling diplomat in a series of novels. As I pointed out in my book *The Forced War* - (op. cit.), Bullitt (to his later chagrin) served as FDR's principal war fomentor - Western Europe, from the Munich Conference in September 1938 until the

outbreak of war between Poland, France, England, and Germany in September 1939. Bullitt's book, which condemned FDR's alliance with Stalin as a whole, did not appear until 1943. Bullitt served as FDR's ambassador of choice in Moscow from 1933 to 1936, but was then transferred to the embassy in Paris at his own request. In his last report from Russia, Bullitt made no secret of the fact that he was glad to leave Moscow because he despised, even hated, Stalin and his aides and methods. That he continued to serve Stalin's ally FDR in Paris shows that he was far from being able to think and act logically at this point. Despite his increasing disdain for the FDR-Stalin alliance, he was still willing to serve, as were William Donovan and Joseph Kennedy (ambassador to London), as part and tool of Harvard's established Grenville Clark/James Conant clique. This circle the legacy of the J.P. Morgan/John D. Rockefeller clique from the First World War. And this circle had never been willing to acknowledge the 1934 Nye Report to Congress on the nefarious crimes of the >dealers with death< of 1914 - 18 in officially neutral America.

It was not until 1943 that Bullitt published his book *The Great Globe Itself*. That same year, Joseph Kennedy, father of future President John F. Kennedy, began to oppose FDR's pro-Stalinist foreign policy. In 1940, Kennedy had advised FDR to pressure Churchill to make a compromise peace with Hitler. Kennedy also urged Pope Pius XII to do something about Stalin's growing influence in Europe. The Pope informed Kennedy that FDR and Churchill had tried in vain to get him on their side in the early stages of the war against Hitler and Mussolini. He also let him know that his efforts to take FDR against Stalin had not been successful. FDR was so committed to the priority alliance with Stalin at that time that not even Churchill was able to influence him.

Bullitt also told me of his conversations with Soviet leaders after his arrival in Moscow in 1933. Stalin, the top Soviet *voshd* (leader), had just managed, with the help of the Gosplan and his brother-in-law in the Supreme Soviet, Lazar Kaganovich, to destroy millions of Ukrainian peasants - under the pretext that food supplies needed to be gathered for the Soviet Far East troops facing Japan (see Robert Conquest, *Die Ernte des Todes*, - Munich 1988). He let Bullitt know he loved to keep the British and French

ambassadors waiting endlessly. However, as FDR's envoy, he, Bullitt, could reach him at any time of the day or night at his Kremlin apartment. The U.S. envoy, including the German envoy, was the number one diplomat agreeable to the Kremlin.

Hitler had only recently come to power, and the secret military as well as economic agreements of the German-Soviet Treaty of Rapallo as well as the Berlin Friendship Treaty of 1926 were still being fulfilled (see Gordon Lang, ... *die Polen verprügeln*, Lindhorst 1989). Stalin himself then denounced them. In his 1933 negotiations with Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov in Washington over international debt and diplomatic recognition, FDR had fought through a U.S.-Soviet alliance whose duration would depend on how long FDR or an appointed successor, such as Henry Wallace, could remain in power. All this was done without informing the U.S. Congress and is comparable to the Iran Contra affair of the Reagan administration of the 1980s. Churchill discovered only in 1942 that he played second fiddle to FDR with Stalin. Ex-President Herbert Hoover's attempt to mobilize public opinion and Congress in 1941, before Pearl Harbor, to prevent the FDR-Stalin alliance from going into effect after the outbreak of the German-Russian war was a complete failure. Even the highest U.S. judge, Charles Evan Hughes, a Republican still appointed by Hoover, refused to go along with what he contemptuously called a lost cause. Thus habit makes compliant creatures of us all: having surrendered to FDR in office four years earlier, Hughes was now unwilling to oppose FDR in a cause with worldwide implications, even though Al Smith, FDR's predecessor as the Democratic presidential candidate in 1928, was willing to publicly call FDR a "stooge of the Communists."

Bullitt mentioned to me an incident with Litvinov on the Europe Express (Litvinov's real name was Finkelstein, and before joining Lenin he had been selling ladies' underwear in London). This man had initiated the FDR-Stalin alliance. Litvinov was Soviet foreign minister from 1929 to 1939; his predecessor was Chicherin and his successor Molotov. He mentioned to Bullitt that the city of Bialystok, which was in central Poland between 1922 and 1939, was his birthplace. When Bullitt then interjected that he had not

known that the Jewish foreign minister of the Soviet Union was Polish, the latter had shouted that the city would not remain Polish for long. Bialystok is today a Polish border town, although it was annexed by Stalin in the fall of 1939. Only later was it returned to the "Lublin Poles," who were the faithful governors of Soviet interests in Poland during and after World War II.

The same Stalin had told Churchill and Truman at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 that the Silesians were no longer wanted in Silesia (!) (on this see Helmut Sündermann, *Potsdam - ein kritischer Bericht*, Leoni 1962). Stalin had also allowed Litvinov to end up as a Polish Jew from a Polish town. He had done this as casually as FDR allowed Earl Warren appointed chief U.S. judge by Eisenhower in 1953(!) imprison U.S. citizens of Japanese descent in 1942 at the instigation of Eleanor Roosevelt Can there be anything more ironic than the fact of appointing to the highest judicial office someone who was known for his unconstitutional policies?

Bullitt reported to me in 1947 that he had broken with FDR and openly opposed his policy after the decisive battle of Stalingrad in 1942-43, when he realized that FDR not only saw the 1933 alliance with Stalin as suitable to serve U.S. world power policy, but also that this alliance was above all else to him. FDR was also prepared to use this alliance to destroy British imperialism, which Churchill had found out at the White House in Washington in 1942 (see also Elliott Roosevelt, *As he Saw It*, New York 1947).

The front against Hitler

One is reminded of that remark by former U.S. Ambassador to England Joseph Kennedy to former Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal on the golf course. FDR had instructed Kennedy to strengthen Chamberlain's backbone to the point of readiness for war against Hitler. At that time, Hitler's only goal was to have friendly relations and even an alliance with England. And at that time it was also clear to all attentive observers that the rest of Europe had not come under Stalin's thumb only because of Hitler (see *The Forrestal Diaries*, New York 1951).

Hitler, the necessary and indispensable antithesis and opponent of Bolshevism in the Europe of the thirties, was therefore presented by Roosevelt, acting in the spirit of Stalin - the greatest mass murderer of all times - as the man to attack. And he offered all his forces to convince the corrupt-decadent conservative circles of England of this. And indeed, in 1939, they attacked him on the weakest pretext imaginable. When 1939 began, Hitler had not the remotest intention of waging war, especially with those three countries which eventually became his adversaries: England, France and Poland. That Hitler's Germany, despite being less armed than the smaller England, would have been more than a match for these three countries had it not been for the massive illegal support of England by the United States goes without saying. After the outbreak of war in September 1939, FDR even made the cowardly and corrupt U.S. Congress complicit in violating international law. FDR wheedled Congress into changing the official U.S. neutrality legislation of 1934 to 1937 in England's favor, even though since the Paris Conference of 1856 international law had stipulated that a neutral state could not change its neutrality status after the outbreak of war.

Adolph Ochs, the Jewish editor of the predominantly Jewish *New York Times*, told the eminent American historian Charles Beard in 1934 that his newspaper and he had supported Hitler's path to power despite some disadvantages to the Germans because Hitler was the only and therefore the indispensable savior of Europe and possibly the United States from Bolshevism (see Clyde Miller's tape in the Columbia University library and an Ampex copy in my possession).

The Initial Situation in the Bismarck Empire

"May the restoration of the German Empire be for the German nation also inwardly the emblem of new greatness, may the German Imperial War, which we fought so gloriously, be followed by a no less glorious Imperial Peace, and may the task of the German people henceforth be resolved in proving themselves victors in the contest for the goods of peace."

Otto von Bismarck at the opening of the 1st German Reichstag on
21.3.1871

To the Bismarck Empire

If one wants to find the essential difference between the Bismarck Empire and the Third Reich, one does not have to look far. As for Bismarck, his draft constitution was completed during the months following the decisive victory over the Habsburgs at Königgrätz. Bismarck, who knew his Germans well, said in his memoirs in a well-known and often quoted passage that the old women in Germany would have had the right to beat him with a broom if Moltke had lost the battle. Or, to put it another way, like the ancient Khazars whose leaders were executed after losing a battle, the Germans demanded success from their leaders and would not tolerate failure, whether it was heroic, idealistic, or selfless. Bismarck knew this. Nor was he surprised by the opposition from the circles of the Prussian nobility - for example, from the Gerlach brothers and from Harry von Arnim, to name just a few from the 28-year reign (1862-1890). Nor was he surprised when the Reichstag, by majority vote and despite Bismarck's successes and merits, refused to congratulate him on his 80th birthday in 1895, three years before his death. Meanwhile, foreign politicians from China and Brazil came to ask him for political advice during the last three years of his life. Bismarck knew the history of the Germans. He knew about the betrayal of Frederick Barbarossa after twenty years of success in 1167 and again at the time of the Third Crusade in 1190. Even when German leaders succeeded, they were not universally recognized, let alone when they failed.

Everyone knows that Bismarck had to retreat to his beloved Baltic Sea island of Rügen for six weeks in order to recuperate after he had pushed through the constitution for the North German Confederation with its universal suffrage after much opposition and debate. In America at that time, this right had not yet been fully achieved, and in England only 5 percent of the English people at that time were entitled to vote.

Unhappy US leaders

Before we turn to the constitutional problems that were not solved by Bismarck, let us turn once again to the considerations that the old women would have beaten Bismarck with a broom if he had not been victorious against the great Bohemian cavalry and if the Habsburgs had deployed their best general not in Italy but in Bohemia. If Bismarck had been defeated, he would have taken sole responsibility, and all his idealism and all his dreams would not have saved him.

Let us take a look at one of the greatest defeats of modern times, the destruction of the Confederate States of America at the end of a four-year war, which at that time was the greatest of all wars to date. This war practically began with the Missouri Crisis of 1819. The defeat of the Southern states was finally sealed in 1865.

Due to the devastation and scorched earth tactics, the worst of modern times, famine prevailed in many areas for forty years after the war ended. Except for Texas, the entire South was subjected to military occupation for fifteen years. And Georgia was even threatened with depopulation of all whites in favor of black settlement. Throughout the South, Negroes sang their song, "Forward whites. You're too late. We're the color that's winning!"

Both Southern President Jefferson Davis and Southern Commander-in-Chief Robert E. Lee took full responsibility for the defeat, including many individual actions for which neither of them was responsible. And yet, from the day of defeat to the present, they remained the two most admired Southern leaders. A New Yorker visiting Richmond, Virginia asked a black cab driver to drive him to the house where "that damn scoundrel Jeff Davis" lived. The Negro immediately slammed on the brakes, pulled over to the curb and said, "If you and I want to get out alive, please forget what you said right now." There are still many areas in Italy today where it becomes dangerous to insult Mussolini. And in Japan, of course, it is dangerous everywhere to insult the emperor despite his terrible defeat in 1945.

Bismarck-Stresemann

Before dealing with constitutional issues, let us take a look at religious traditions. Bismarck, who was married to a Pietist, was a normal Lutheran tolerated Catholicism as well as Judaism. Hitler emphasized positive Christianity from the point of view of a Catholic who showed good will to Protestants but rejected Judaism in Germany because of its harmful influence in the economy, society, and politics. This point of view was also shared by Eleanor Roosevelt in a letter to Mrs. Hicock in 1939.

According to the Scriptures, Jesus ended up nailed to the cross between two thieves. And this was the greatest possible symbol of failure in the ancient world, regardless of later interpretations of the event. The Khazars were not Christians, and therefore it was none of their business. But shouldn't one be able to expect from people living in the Christian tradition that they show to honorable failure the respect they show to their later Savior and Redeemer? And is there not also a practical reason to see a failure positively, if one can learn from it? If one concentrates only on doing exactly the opposite of what the Kaiser or Hitler would have done, this can lead both to success and to disaster.

Success of Gustav Stresemann and his Jewish wife, both of whom were still supporters of territorial cessions in favor of Germany during the war, greatly exaggerated in the media. Although he succeeded in getting Germany a seat in the League of Nations before his death in 1929, he was unable to make any progress on more important issues, such as the question of armaments equality or the reduction of reparations payments. And even the Locarno Treaty of 1925 was only a partial success, and moreover it recognized the cession of Eupen-Malmedy to Belgium, without at the same time succeeding in persuading the Poles and the French to talk about a German-Polish border adjustment.

This can be compared with Hardenberg's inability to regain Alsace-Lorraine at the Congress of Vienna in 1815; but also with Bismarck's difficulties after the reacquisition of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, as well as the failure of his plan for a European confederation of states, of which Kant and Fenelon had dreamed 18th century. The willingness of the Weimar National

Assembly accept immediately the harsh peace terms, made worse by Allied behavior on the occasion of 1921 Upper Silesia vote and Stresemann's inability to achieve a serious review of the German-Polish border settlement at Locarno and even later, left the problem to Hitler in 1933. It should be noted that none of the 21 Weimar governments was willing to recognize the border between Germany and Poland established in the Versailles Dictate.

Hitler got off to a good start in 1933. After the French rejected Polish proposals for a preventive war, Hitler readily responded to Pilsudski's offer of reconciliation with Poland. And there is no doubt whatsoever that Hitler sought long-term cooperation with Poland. He was also certainly not wrong in assuming that, but for Pilsudski's untimely death in 1935, England would not have succeeded in using Poland to start a war in 1939 in the same way that it used Belgium in 1914. With considerable diplomatic skill, Bismarck had managed to avoid a European war at least twice (in 1878 and 1887) during his nineteen-year reign as Reich Chancellor.

German constitutions

Bismarck, who intended to draw up a federal constitution for the whole country, provides satisfactory solutions of cooperation between Prussia and other German states, was not in a position to change anything in the electoral law of the existing modern Prussian constitution of 1850. This constitution had been drawn up by the moderate opponents of the 1848 revolution after the Frankfurt parliament, which had worked out various draft constitutions, had been forcibly dissolved and driven out without being able to finish its work. Although it was a universal suffrage and in technical terms it was one—it was in practice only slightly more comprehensive than the existing English one. After the English suffrage reform of 1885, which followed Bismarck's general suffrage draft, English suffrage was more comprehensive than the German three-class suffrage, which was based on three tax groups. Kaiser Wilhelm II hoped to deal with this anachronism, which lasted until September 1918.

The important point to keep in mind when discussing the three German systems of government (Kaiserreich, Weimar Republic and Third Reich), and which makes a comparison between the Bismarck and Hitler Empires difficult, if not impossible, is the fact that the Weimar Constitution of Dr. Hugo Preuß was in force until the end of the Third Reich on May 23, 1945 (Dönitz government). It was in force including that Article 48 which later gave Hitler the special powers to the same extent as he had given them to the Reich Chancellors Heinrich Brüning, Franz von Papen and Kurt von Schleicher. Not only that, but also the nonsense that there were two executive powers with comparable power in the Reich President and Reich Chancellor (in the 3rd French Republic there was a strong Prime Minister and a President who had only representative duties) prompted Hitler to have a law passed in the Reichstag at the end of 1933 to end this state of affairs when Reich President von Hindenburg, who died in early August 1934, was to leave the political stage.

The fact that the armed forces took a personal oath to Hitler after Hindenburg's death on August 2, 1934, which Preuß should actually have written into the Weimar Constitution according to the prevailing custom in most other states, is less important than the fact that in August 1934 Hitler, as the executor of Article 48, secured not only eligibility but also the prestige of office. Thus, in terms of power politics, he had roughly equaled American president Hitler, however, could by no means have simply dismissed Grand Admiral Raeder even in wartime as Roosevelt had done with Grand Admiral Richardson in peacetime, when the United States was officially neutral. Later had accused Roosevelt of warmongering because he had acted illegally toward Japan and then concentrated the entire U.S. Pacific fleet in a single Pacific port, Pearl Harbor, into challenge the Japanese to an attack. Thus Roosevelt got the war he wanted so much: the war against Hitler. It was not until very long after the war, and then in a tendentious manner, that reasons for the dismissal of Grand Admiral Richardson were given to naval officers and the American public. Had Hitler attempted to act in the same way against Raeder, it would have resulted in the closed resignation of all his senior naval officers. The amount of power that an American president has is

difficult to imagine.

When Churchill asked Roosevelt in Tunis in 1943 why he could make such a simple-minded man as Eisenhower the commander of the so-called second front in France the next year (the instructions for this plan were given by FDR even before the Japanese attack; see Sherwood, op. cit. and Wedemeyer, *Der verwaltete Krieg*, New York 1958), FDR reassured Churchill that Eisenhower was a good "public relations" man with decent political ideas. Although Roosevelt knew that Eisenhower had no military talent whatsoever, he had promoted him from major to four-star general within two years. He had appointed him to annoy Hitler with Eisenhower's German name without having to worry much about his political views, as was the case with the capable German-American general Albert Wedemeyer. Roosevelt further reassured Churchill by letting him know that he had given General George Marshall an absolute right of appeal on all military decisions made "Ike" (Roosevelt's and his daughter's favorite name for Eisenhower). Eisenhower, moreover, was involved in so many sex and bribery scandals that he would not dare resist any pressure. Churchill allowed himself to be reassured, but nevertheless wondered how military matters were regulated in a presidential system. In contrast to Churchill's formally declared autocracy, Roosevelt's dictatorial powers as president meant that he did not need to have his dictatorial powers officially confirmed.

In Tunis, Roosevelt also gave Churchill a brief test on his knowledge of American history. FDR said he knew that Churchill knew the names of the leading American front-line officers of the Civil War. But he doubted whether he knew the names of the staff officers. Churchill did not know them, although he boasted of his good knowledge of American history and kept referring to the fact that he was a "quarter" American from his mother's side.

In his speech to the German people on the evening of July 20, 1944, Hitler reminded them that the Weimar Constitution, drafted by the Jew Dr. Hugo Preuß, was still in force in Germany, that the original enabling laws agreed to by a multi-party Reichstag to combat the economic crisis, had been extended, and that he was still the legally elected representative of the German people.

Hitler had never thought of a lifelong term in office, as this emerges from the "table talks" of 1942 and 1943 and is confirmed by his architect Hermann Giesler (*Ein anderer Hitler*, Leoni 1977); unlike FDR, Churchill and Stalin, though only Roosevelt and Stalin, unquestioned to the last, died quietly in office. Churchill was booted out in 1945 by a large majority in the first election after 1935. At the age of 76, he managed to come to power once again in 1950, but he could not hold on. Nor did his favorite and successor, Anthony Eden.

It is further known from the same sources that Hitler had no intention of seeing his beloved Germany governed in perpetuity by an emergency constitution, a constitution that had, however, become necessary to deal with the crisis Germany had faced since 1918. Hitler spoke frequently and with commitment of a constitution that would establish a lawful Senate and return the country to normal. The Stauffenberg assassination came about the time Hitler was planning to retire to Linz and marry Eva Braun after he had relinquished the burden of state leadership and his succession was firmly in

Political scientists like to make fun of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution because it facilitated the transition to an emergency constitution with presidential powers. But wasn't this article a necessity for Prussia in order to cope with Germany's internal crisis caused by the Dictatorship Peace of Versailles?

With the exception of the treacherous years 1925 to 1929 in the Weimar Republic, the years 1936 to 1941 in the Third Reich, from the victory over unemployment to the burden of war in 1941, when the United States and Russia entered the war, the period in the FRG and GDR since 1949, and in Austria since the 1955 treaty, there was no normal state of affairs in Germany at all, despite the economic growth: in the latter period, especially because the country was divided, as was its capital, and Germans were expelled from their ancestral lands.

In this respect, the postwar years represent a continuation of the German crisis through the 1950s to the present day. And thus almost the entire 20th century becomes a century of crisis for the German people. And if one goes beyond Wilson to the "Entente Cordiale" of 1904, this means a period of more

than 83 years, and this although the goal of both Bismarck and the Kaiser was friendship with the English

Due to the exchange of Heligoland for Zanzibar (1890), the German colonial empire was smaller in 1914 than at the time of Bismarck's resignation in 1890. Irrespective of the debates about territorial appropriations in the course of World War I, it remains to be stated that Germany appropriated one square meter of land even after the March 1918 treaty with defeated Russia (Brest-Litovsk). What Germany hoped to gain economically and politically from the liberation of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine is another matter. The government had also adopted the 1917 peace resolution of the Reichstag, which ruled out any acquisition of territory. The Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy benefited from certain minor border adjustments vis-à-vis Romania. The English, on the other hand, appropriated one million square miles of land as an indirect result of World War I; this is equivalent to five times the area of France.

After the Second German Empire was proclaimed in 1871, Bismarck's creation of an empire became the strongest pillar of peace and stability not only for Germany but for the whole of Europe. And Bismarck constantly opposed the outbreak of any kind of war in Europe. Various processes led to a certain common ideological orientation at that time, which was not insignificantly influenced by the constitutional German monarchy. What attitude Bismarck would have taken toward the Bolshevik colossus facing the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich is also another matter.

The harsh peace terms of Versailles, as well as terrible Allied pressure, prompted Prussia to impose Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution in 1930. But the constant recourse to this Article 48 since 1930 under the Reich Chancellors Brüning, von Papen and von Schleicher allowed the parliamentary system of government to continue to function, even though Article 48 created a kind of presidential dictatorship temporarily or even permanently. Its application was not the result of the Allied occupation of the Ruhr or the Young Plan, but clearly of the effects of the U.S.-made Great Depression. Behind the facade of this presidential dictatorship, the Reich government led by Franz von Papen which could only rely on the 8 percent of

the Reichstag, the deputies of the DNVP (German National People's Party), was a joke. The end of the Weimar Republic was foreseeable. Only choice was between the Communists and the National Socialists. Hindenburg finally decided in favor of the latter at the end of January 1933. Initially, however, Hitler's cabinet was a coalition government of the NSDAP and the DVNP. There was no third option.

The Reichstag elections of 1930 would never have taken place at all - the last ordinary election was in 1928 - if the Social Democrats not left the governing coalition. The reason for their departure was solely due to the harsh measures taken to combat the economic crisis. The government at the time believed that further increases in spending, especially in the social sector, would lead to an additional increase in the rate of inflation. The Reichstag elections of September 1930 held some ten months after the New York stock market crash and related economic and political problems death blow to the Weimar Republic. The constant use of Article 48 itself indicated that the liberal-democratic parliamentary system, as it had been created by Preuß, had long since ceased to function. Had this not been the case, it might have been possible after these elections for the parties regroup purpose of forming new government govern properly instead of by decree. Attempts were made in this direction, but they were unsuccessful. Independently of the antagonism between the KPD and the NSDAP, both of looking for solutions outside the Weimar system, there were also other antagonisms example between the DNVP and the SPD, which ruled out a coalition. Of course, in the context of the next Reichstag elections due, forming a government excluding the DKP and NSDAP was out of the question. Both parties, although outside the system, were nevertheless ready to come to power legally and to take power legally on their terms.

The period between the Kapp Putsch of 1920 and the failure of the Weimar government coalition of 1930 is not long. If U.S.-born Wolfgang Kapp, who had been forestry director in East Prussia under the Hohenzollerns, had possessed the tactical skill of a Hitler or Lenin, he could have brought down the Weimar Republic in its early years with the help of the Freikorps flocking to him. He had been able to take Berlin without

difficulty soon became apparent that neither he nor his group had the appropriate stature to take power and stay in power

The same is true of Karl Liebknecht for the USPD and the KPD-Spartakusbund for January 1919. Liebknecht had many times more people on the streets of Berlin than Lenin had at the time of his seizure of power in 1917 in Petersburg. The Constituent Assembly elections in 1918, which Lenin crushed, showed that there were fewer Marxists in Russia than in Germany. Just remember Christmas 1918, when regular German troops refused to drive the Communists out of strategically important positions. But Karl Liebknecht and his adviser, the Polish Jew Rosa Luxemburg, proved that they lacked the tactical skills of a Lenin and Hitler. This was also true of the Jewish leader of the Munich soviet government, Kurt Eisner, shot by the Munich university student Arco-Valley in 1919 after a foolish speech. In this speech, Eisner had publicly declared that two percent of the electoral votes would be enough for him to carry out his political goals.

Although there were KPD uprisings, especially in Thuringia and Hamburg, and Hitler also dared to attempt his Munich putsch in 1923 - after all, he wanted to prevent Bavaria from leaving the Reich, as Kahr and Lossow had planned - the Weimar Republic gradually came to rest. The currency reform of 1923, implemented by Karl Helfferich and approved by Schacht and Stresemann, also contributed to this. The year 1924 was still quite turbulent, but the emerging prosperity of the years 1925 to 1929 gave Weimar the deceptive hope of stability.

Difficulties in the Bismarck Empire

Things were different in Bismarck's empire, although economic conditions were very difficult two decades after the collapse of the Gründerzeit and the economic crisis of 1873, which also originated in the United States, when Europeans had invested a lot of capital. Europe was the banking house for the whole world (see Herbert Freis, *Europe, the World's Banker*, Princeton, New York 1953).

The scandal surrounding railroad king Bethel Strouberg, who received

more press attention than the Hohen- zollern royal family, was quickly off the table when it became known that Strouberg was broke at the time of his suicide in Romania in 1877. Other well-known Jews such as Albert Ballin (HAPAG) and Walther Rathenau (AEG) learned from this.

A major economic problem that Bismarck was aware of since the founding of the Reich and had never been able to solve properly was the rural exodus, although Bismarck made early use of the technically eminently suitable Bund der Landwirte to get the problem. With the development of industry in western Germany especially

after the introduction of protective tariffs on cheap English imports (1879) - one can compare this with the simultaneous protective tariff policy against cheap English imports in the U.S.A. (W. G. Sumner) - there was a considerable population shift from East to West, primarily at the expense of the peasant population

By 1880, England was already producing only half the food it required. However, Bismarck, like the leaders of modern Japan (since 1868), was firmly convinced that a healthy state needed a healthy peasant population, which was also essential for preserving the national character. A predominantly rootless urban population would undoubtedly produce a different Germany. And such a Germany, in Bismarck's opinion, loses some of its essential virtues. Although France was at a standstill in terms of population around 1880, the ratio between urban and rural population was balanced there, with half of the people working in the farming sector

The Poles in Eastern Prussia

As far as Germany was concerned, there was also a *völkisch* problem (see Thomas/Zaniencki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, 4 vols., New York 1956). This was primarily a question of the Polish element in East Germany. Probably no statesman in Germany was more aware of the time bomb that the Englishman Castlereagh had left Prussia, Russia and Austria at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 when he pushed through the fourth partition of Poland instead of accepting the proposal of Hardenberg and Speransky: namely, a Kingdom of Poland united with Russia in personal union. At the time of Alvensleben's agreement with the Russians in 1863 on the occasion of a major Polish uprising, Bismarck declared before the Prussian Diet that the situation created by the English made it necessary for Russia and Prussia to cooperate on the Polish question. It was not a matter of temporary romantic pro-Polish nonsense that would create new problems for Prussia when other problems were up for solution. Bismarck saw above all the necessity of having a German protective wall against Poland at a time when Polish chauvinists, hoping for English and French help, were demanding not only

parts of the Ukraine as far as Kiev, but also German territory as far as Berlin. These Poles wanted a Greater Poland including Lithuania, but also Boleslaw's Empire with parts of Germany (see Appendix). In the Polish question there were tangible common interests with the Romanovs. And if they did not hurry, it could cost Germany and Prussia dearly. The whole situation would have been different if England had agreed to the establishment of a Polish state in 1815; the Poles would then have become accustomed to it. Although Bismarck remained faithful to his policy toward Russia in 1863, he did find that the majority of the Landtag was pro-Polish, so he had to rule by emergency decree (it was provided for in the 1850 constitution and was roughly equivalent to Article 48 of the Weimar constitution). Bismarck told the Landtag that his deputies were the only group that believed that charity was the basis of foreign policy.

Of course, there was also a large migration of Poles to the industrial areas along the Rhine and Ruhr, but also to Belgium and the industrial area around Lille in northern France. Compared to its western and northern neighbors, Poland was very poor. However, this was largely the Poles' own fault, for their land was fertile, but the Poles themselves were consistently less industrious.

Hitler often pointed out that Germans went to America for adventure and were then lost to Germany. Polish emigration was consistently for purely economic reasons. The Poles who came to the Ruhr posed no threat to the German element. In the East, however, especially after the Germans had left the country, this was the case.

The English had also known the problem of rural exodus in the 16th and 18th centuries, when the nobility began fencing off the commons to raise livestock. Today's U.S. is not spared from this either, with mostly illegal Mexicans now doing the farm work. In the American Southwest today, Bismarck's reasoning can be traced: one area after another is becoming majority Mexican.

There were also problems with the Polish Jews, and therefore the German Jews asked Bismarck to do something about their influx. When in 1885 the tsarist authorities declared passports of numerous Polish Jews living in

Germany to be expired, Bismarck did not hesitate long and had them all deported to Congress Poland. In the case of the rural exodus, it should be noted that it was primarily German farm workers, not German landowners, who were attracted by the higher wages in the industrial areas of the West. The need for folk uniformity and peasant self-sufficiency has become a problem for many modern states. No state has solved this better than Japan, which, at the size of California, can feed 70 percent of its 120 million strong population on one-eighth arable land.

It is to Bismarck's credit that he recognized the problem of rural exodus at an early stage and did much to combat it.

The beginning of Bismarck's protective tariff policy in 1879 was tough in the early years. It initially brought higher prices, without wages rising in the process. Moreover, the whole world economy was still in disarray and had not yet fully recovered from the difficulties of 1873. But from 1871 onward, numerous German factories were created during these founding years that by the 1990s, when Bismarck stepped down from the political stage, a favorable combination of market, raw materials and productive factors was in place. "Made in Germany" soon became a brand name worldwide. The social security system created by Bismarck was working, and wages were rising faster than in the *Gründerzeit*. Moreover, with its Erfurt Program of 1891, the SPD turned to the revisionist Marxism of Eduard Bernstein, thus favoring an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary path toward socialism. Wilhelm II was very pleased about this.

Wilhelm II as beneficiary of Bismarck's policy

thus clear that the young emperor became the direct beneficiary of Bismarck's policies in the fields of agriculture (rural exodus), social legislation and protective tariff policies. Nor should the reconciliation with the Vatican be forgotten, when in 1885 Bismarck received the highest honor that could be bestowed on a non-Catholic - as late as 1870, the Vatican had called Bismarck the son of the devil. After all, Bismarck had to contend for years in the "Kulturkampf" with the ultramontane politics of a Ludwig Windthorst and

other Catholic opponents. Little Germany, after all, also had one-third Catholics. Wilhelm II was able to begin his reign as a Protestant prince because of the good relations that Bismarck had achieved after years of struggle with the Catholics. Of course, the emperor had to wrestle with other problems: the question of income and inheritance tax, the hunting compensation law, peasants, and others

One must agree, however, with Nicholas Murry Butler, 1913 president of Columbia University in New York, when he states that during the first 25 years of his reign Wilhelm II welded the Germans closer together than ever before. He had emerged as an able politician who could have been elected to the highest offices with or without royal blood

One of the reasons was the emperor's political skill in turning the other cheek and simply letting his opponent stew in his own guilt, as he did with Bernhard von Bülow on the occasion of the *Daily Telegraph affair* in 1908 (see below). Or he could disagree with a diplomat on repeated occasions - as he did with Marshal von Bieberstein in the case of the unfavorable Ohm Kruger telegram in 1896 which prevented the outbreak of war between the U.S. and England in Venezuela

Did the Boers thank the emperor for his support after the raid organized by Cecil Rhodes? Not at all, because with

Except for a few insignificant and ineffective supporters, the Boer troops fought as hard as the rest of the troops of the British Empire in the First World War against Germany in German Southwest, and especially against Lettow-Vorbeck in German East Africa. Although Foreign Minister Kiderlen-Wächter sharply criticized Marshal von Bieberstein when the latter was ambassador in Constantinople, the Kaiser always received him kindly and without a word of criticism. Thus the emperor behaved as a politician who wanted reconciliation and could bring together people of quite different views. When the emperor reconciled with Bismarck again in 1895, he did not demand any apology, although Bismarck had communicated essential state secrets to the German press.

to be emphasized again and again, and it has also been proven, that the

real power did not lie with the emperor, but with the government, which in turn was responsible to the Reichstag - this relationship became clearer under the Reich Chancellors von Bülow and Bethmann Hollweg than under their predecessors von Caprivi and Prinz Hohenlohe. The emperor himself, as ruler, also became a leading politician in the state by virtue of his personality and intellectual abilities.

The crisis period around the First World War

"If every German were eliminated tomorrow, there would be no English business that would not immediately grow ... Get ready for battle with Germany, for Germania est delenda".

Sir Peters Chalmers Mitchell in The
Saturday Review on 2/1/1896.

Germany and its colonies

In 1900, the German Hohenzollern Empire had more prestige than any other country in the world. German overseas possessions had been limited to modest proportions by Bismarck, the founder of the German colonial empire.

After Bismarck's dismissal (in 1890, mainly because of the new emperor's intention to make substantial concessions to the Social Democrats), Wilhelm II was willing to exchange German island of Heligoland, which the English had taken possession of in 1815, for Zanzibar which had been won for the empire by Karl Peters shortly before and this was done in 1890.

The German colonial administration had a reputation for being decent, orderly, and fair to all. The opportunities for education for the natives also went beyond what the other colonial powers, France, England, and U.S. America included. Under the German overseas flag, atrocities such as those of the Belgians in the Congo, the English in South Africa, Zanzibar, Egypt, India, and China, and those of the Americans in the Philippines were unknown (see Heinrich Schnee, *Die koloniale Schuldfrage*. Munich 1925, especially chapter 7, and Harry Rudin, *German Colonial rule in Cameroon Compared with the Neighboring Colonies of England and France*, New Haven 1938). Rudin met many adult blacks in the Mandate territory, which was divided between England and France, who more than 25 years after the departure of the Germans could recite in good German texts from their earlier lessons.

Germany's social situation around 1900

Lord Bryce, whom no one can accuse of the prejudice characterizing the English observers of the 19th century, was nevertheless forced to admit that the local American administrations, with their affairs of bribery and fraud

and the filth in the cities, were a disgrace to all civilized mankind, quite unlike Germany with its clean cities and its exceedingly correct administrations (see Lord Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, 2 vols., New York 1889- 1890). Bryce had also spent a long time in Germany when he wrote a book on medieval Germany. His attacks against Germany after 1914 are the typical product of English war psychosis, stemming from the machinations of Sir Edward Grey.

Before 1914, the leading English economist of the time Elfric Barker, pointed out that the savings deposits of German workers were four times those of English workers. Moreover, real wages went up in Germany, while they declined in the United States and England. In the United States, nominal wages rose 12 percent from 1900 to 1914 but the inflation rate was 18 percent. At the same time, American workers did not know the protection of the social security system that Bismarck had imposed in 1880s and that had been further developed by the new Kaiser (see Elfric Barker, *England and Germany*, London 1908, and Lord Ponsonby, *Lies in Time of War*, Berlin 1930). For all the pomp in India, which the English had taken from the French in 1763, and for all the looting and robbing in Peking (1860), where the British made many inhabitants addicted to narcotics, Germany's genuine progress in economic affairs and social being left England far behind.

The jealous England

As Hans Grimm (*Die Erzbischofschrift*, Lippoldsberg 1950) pointed out, outbursts of English jealousy, both in the press and from the pulpit, were already all too common in the last years of the late century. Five generations earlier French Foreign Minister Vergennes had explained the basic attitude of the English American envoy Benjamin Franklin thus: "They are a restless and greedy nation that cannot see that any neighboring country is happy." (see D.L. Hoggan, *The Blind Century*, vol. 2, loc. cit.; especially the chapter on England).

Although England's economy had been dominated by the Hanseatic League in the Middle Ages, England's attitude toward Germany after Elizabeth I closed the London Steel Court, the Hanseatic League's branch, in 1598 and terminated its privileges was condescending. However, there were

also increasing signs of making trouble for Germany whenever favorable opportunities presented themselves, for example, at the Separate Peace of Utrecht in 1713, when Germany was about to regain Alsace. The Prussians faced the same opposition on the Alsace question at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. In 1848 Lord Palmerston opposed German unification; in 1864 he also tried to involve the Swedes in Denmark's war with Germany. It is also worth recalling Gladstone's futile efforts to prevent Bismarck from annexing German Lorraine to the Reich. These few examples sufficiently underscore Vergennes' view that the nefarious Albion was a greedy and jealous nation.

After the Anglo-Saxon conquest of England in 1066, there was never a German-English war. The situation with France is quite different. In the Middle Ages alone, Germany and France were at war with each other for 250 years. It is also worth remembering some of the wars between the two countries in modern times: the Dutch War of 1672; the Spanish War of Succession of 1701; the Austrian War of Succession of 1740; the Seven Years' War of 1756 and the four coalition wars against Napoleon in the period from 1793 to 1813.

Colonialism end of the 18th century

On the subject of war, a few more remarks. The Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchyany warsafter the*Compromise* with the Hungarian half of the Empire (1867) until the assassination in Sarajevo in 1914, i.e. during a period of almost fifty years. This is to clarify the Allied war propaganda during World War I, which portrayed the Habsburg Empire as an incendiary in the Balkans. At the same time, in addition to the four wars against the Boers, England had struck in Egypt and finally took possession of the whole country (1882). After suffering initial defeats in Sudan in the 1880s, it again attacked and destroyed the Kingdom of Sudan in 1893. Furthermore, it waged various border wars in northwestern India and violently expanded its sphere of power in China. There was also armed interference in South America. Twice during this period it almost went to war: in 1878 against Russia over the Dardanelles issue and in 1898 at Faschoda against France. Then England

appropriated the territory of the Boer States, took possession of the Greek-populated island of Cyprus, and obtained further treaty ports in China (1898: Weihaiwei on the Pichili Gulf) In the meantime, all of Egypt as well as the Sudan had also become British territory. Not a single one of these possessions was acquired peacefully. In this context, the annexation of Burma (1885) should also be mentioned.

As already indicated, there was only a modest colonial heritage from Bismarck's reign. Kaiser Wilhelm II supplemented it slightly with the possession of the Chinese Tsing-tau (Proving Shantung) and in the South Seas. It is easy to understand that Kaiser Wilhelm II annoyed huge territorial acquisitions of English, French, Russians and Americans during this period.

Under the pretext of liberating Cuba from Spain - fighting had been going on since 1895 - the Americans turned the richest of the sugar islands into a protectorate with a military garrison and unceremoniously took possession of another rich sugar island, Puerto Rico. The U.S. also conquered the Philippine archipelago, but had to wage a war that lasted almost three years before they had the island territory completely under control. This was followed by machinations against Colombia that led to the independence of Panama. This enabled them to build the Panama Canal under American control. Finally, in 1904, in a unilateral action, the U.S. swung to become the protecting power of all 21 Latin American countries. Teddy Roosevelt justified this action as follows: No country but the U.S. could send troops into any of these countries to collect debts. The U.S. had the unilateral right to determine when and how to intervene. No wonder, then, that eleven years later FDRable to write a constitution for Haiti single evening; rejection was impossible under the circumstances.

In this respect, it is not surprising that the Spanish, who were in constant need of money, sold the island groups of the Caroline Islands and the Marianas to Germany. The Samoa Treaty of 1899 confirmed the tripartite division of the Samoa archipelago among Germany, U.S. America and England, which had existed since 1879. The German base at Tsingtau in Shantung Province was acquired through a treaty with the Chinese Manchu rulers. Compared to the slaughter of 640,000 Filipino civilians by General

Funston's troops in the Aguinaldo War - according to their own accounts - and compared to the cruel colonial wars of the English, French, Belgians (Belgian rule in the Congo was the worst), Americans and Russians (1884 campaign against the Merv), the German record (only some tribal uprisings and unrest in Southwest Africa) looks quite good. The German colonies did not know the slightest violence during this time. In addition, the Germans did not wage war in Europe at that time either.

Germany in Europe before 1914

American historians such as Roland Usher (*The Pan-German League*, New York 1913) and German ones such as Fritz Fischer (*Der Griff nach der Weltmacht*, Hamburg 1961) shared, even if they otherwise disagreed, the view that military ambition and a lust for conquest existed in Germany. Small groups such as the *Alldeutsche Verband*, large interest groups such as the *Flottenverein*, and later in the war, in 1917, the *Vaterländische Bund*, had been a threat to the internal balance and stability of the Reich achieved by Bismarck.

Paul Massing's book *Rehearsal for Destruction* (New York 1952) takes us in a different direction. The fact that there were small groups in Wilhelmine Germany whose aim was to fight Jewish influence in public as well as in economic life - they also occasionally had Reichstag deputies - , had in a way been a threat to the prosperity and even to the existence of German Jewry. The groups mentioned were more insignificant than American associations in the 1880s. Before 1914, the *All-German Association* played no role in German foreign policy. And if one follows England's leading professional historian, F. L. Woodward, the German navy, which Admiral v. Tirpitz assumed would become an attractive ally for the British, never posed a threat to British naval security and superiority.

Theodor Fontane (see his novel *Effi Briest* as well as the five-volume *History of Brandenburg*) did not share Usher and Fischer's negative view of Wilhelm II. The emperor had exerted a great influence on the modernization of Germany.

In short, the Hohenzollern Empire was a power of peace and stability in Europe. There were no plans for German territorial expansion and seizure of

European space. In overseas trade, as well as in its colonial policy, it was more restrained and moderate than the other European and non-European colonial powers of the time: the English, French, Russians, Belgians and Americans. The cruel exploitation policy of the Dutch in Indonesia was a disgrace. In comparison, the German record was good.

The empire as founded by Bismarck, in alliance with Austria-Hungary, was an ingenious solution for *Central Europe*. Even Leopold von Ranke, the great historian of the 19th century. Century - Ranke, by the way, was the only foreign historian ever offered honorary membership in the *American Historical Association*, which he accepted - believed that Bismarck's solution driven between 1862 (his appointment as Prussian prime minister) and the conclusion of the two-party alliance with the Habsburgs (1879), and his protective tariff policy adopted against the influx of English goods (which, incidentally, laid the foundation for the German economic boom in the 1990s) would provide a fitting response to the German unification efforts of modern era (see Leopold von Ranke, *Geschichte und Politik. Ausgewählte Aufsätze und Meister Schriften*, ed. by H. Hofmann, Stuttgart 1942, pp. 425ff.). When a French colleague who had been in correspondence with Ranke in 1870 about Switzerland asked him why he still supported Bismarck's war against the 3rd French Republic despite the capture of Napoleon III on September 2 at Sedan, Ranke replied, ".... We Germans have nothing against the 3rd French Republic. We are fighting Louis XIV to get Strasbourg back." Ranke agreed with Bismarck until 1879. He also agreed with the Imperial Chancellor that, regardless of some later colonial acquisitions, all of which occurred in the 1980s with England's approval, this state of affairs had made Germany a satisfied power in Europe and that it was therefore a factor of stability for Europe as a whole.

Immediately after Bismarck's dismissal, English propaganda tried to undermine Germany's well-deserved reputation as a stable factor in Europe. Disraeli himself admitted that without Bismarck's mediation he would have given senseless Anglo-Russian war 1878. In connection with Bismarck's dismissal, it is worth recalling the well-known caricature "The Pilot Disembarks!" in the English newspaper *Punch*: a snooty and silly-looking youthful emperor watches a somber-looking Bismarck board a small boat.

Nowadays, such disparagement would lead to diplomatic protest. But back then, all this fell under the heading of freedom of the press. Consider also the vituperation of Maximilian Harden, a Polish Jew, in the scandalous newspaper *Die Zukunft* toward a friend (Philipp Fürst zu Eulenburg) of the emperor. The English even went so far as to forge an address by the emperor to General Waldersee before his troops marched out against the rebellious Boxers in China in 1900.

Edward VII's hatred of Germany

The ascent to the English throne by Edward VII, an uncle of Kaiser Wilhelm II, made matters worse in 1901. Queen Victoria had never forgotten her German origins, nor her German husband (Prince Albert, who died in 1860). And she also died in 1901 in the arms of her favorite grandson, the Emperor William II. By contrast, she despised her son, who ascended the throne in 1901 as Edward VII, as a good-for-nothing. The remark in James Joyce's book *Dubliners* (London 1908; Engl. 1928) that the king was constantly going out with maligned French ladies led to censorship and a ban until Irish independence. The new king's hatred and jealousy of the German emperor was matched by the jealousy of powerful circles in England of German success and prosperity. All of this helped to fuel German hatred in England, although the Germans continued to be liked by the English as well as the Americans. This is also evidenced by the annual enrollment of 4000 American students in German universities at a time when the total number of students was only a fraction compared to today. It is a kind of irony that King Edward VII's grandson Edward VIII was as enthusiastic about Hitler as his grandfather hated the Kaiser (see the pictures of Wally and Eddy at the Berghof in 1937). The hatred of Germany, which received new nourishment with the accession of Edward VII, was still evident in his successor Edward VIII, who reigned only from January 20 to December 10, 1936, then had to abdicate because of his admiration for Hitler and was given the post of governor of the Bahamas in 1940.

Edward VII was a compliant tool in the ill-advised policy of encirclement against Germany, which has been steadily pursued since the resignation of Lord Salisbury in 1902, and in the outbreak of war in 1914, the target of English desires. In 1903, Edward VII agreed to an official state visit to France at a time when the French still remembered the retreat at Faschoda (Sudan) and English atrocities in the 4th Boer War (1899-1902). On his first public outing in Paris, Edward was reviled and hissed out by the French crowd. His valet, riding with him in the carriage, said, "The French don't seem to like us!" The king's reply, "Who can blame them?" But the king understood the Parisian mentality, and so he also

succeeded in preparing the ground for the Anglo-French "Entente" of 1904.

Overall assessment of the situation before 1914

In this overview, which covers nearly a century, it does seem clear that it was England, not Germany, that posed a threat to the European balance. It was not the speeches of Kaiser Wilhelm II, but rather speeches of the kind made by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons and by Lloyd George on July 21, 1911, in the house of the Lord Mayor of London, that caused unrest. Said speeches were nothing but a mixture of insinuations and threats. Without British warmongering, the 20th century could have become just like the 19th. Raymond Aron (*The Centurion of Total War*, New York 1951) pointed out many years ago that at the time of the outbreak of World War I there were no social, economic or political reasons why war had to break out at that particular time.

Woodrow Wilson would have disappeared into historical obscurity in 1921 after a two-term term, the first part of which included his banking reform and protective tariff policy, as a not particularly successful professor, had not the British conservatives and liberals, equally bent on war, harnessed him for their own purposes. It is shocking to note that Wilson, a year before his death destroyed the magnificent Hohenzollern Empire founded by Bismarck with cunning and treachery. First he offered without any precondition in Jan. 1918, then he demanded the abdication of the emperor and a revolution, and finally he did not even grant the promised 14 points to the German revolutionary government.

The German Empire of 1871 - 1914 was the result of German aspirations and such men as Roon and Moltke and many others who actively cooperated in this task. Its form of government was highly developed in many respects, and it became a world leader in economic and social reforms. Speech and expression were freer in Germany than in England and France. This included criticism of the Kaiser and Bismarck. But most Germans were certainly justifiably proud of this new Germany that had emerged on its own without foreign influence.

Central Europe before 1914

Due to French intransigence toward Germany, especially after the overthrow of Prime Minister Jules Ferry in 1885, as well as the strong Russian Empire, which had entered into a military alliance with the Third French Republic in 1894, the new German Empire created by Bismarck, with its energetic young emperor at its head, resembled a country under siege, behaving according to Bismarck's motto "We Germans fear God, but nothing else in the world!" Hitler realized very early on that the k. u. k. multinational state was a dubious military ally: in 1914, k. u. k. troops failed to cross the Danube and capture Belgrade, the capital of tiny Serbia. And although German-Austrian troops were consistently on the Galician front, they had to retreat there before the advancing Russians. Italy, the other partner in the Triple Alliance, had just suffered defeat in Abyssinia and was another less reliable military factor. Italy had broken long before the "Entente Cordiale" (1904) by England and France. The calm, steady, and eloquent demeanor that the Kaiser displayed in spite of everything won Hitler's admiration.

German foreign policy before 1914

In 1908, major internal tensions* arose, in which the emperor was also involved. Hitler dealt with this event in *Mein Kampf*, since it dealt with the central problem of loyalty and leadership. Hitler also makes clear that these are the ideas he had as a nineteen-year-old and to which he remained loyal in later years. Reich Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow (see *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 4 vols., Berlin 1930 - 1931; and *Front wider Bülow*, Berlin 1931) was the ineffectual political leader of Germany from 1900 to 1909, those years, that is,

* For example, the failure of Bülow's bloc policy and the subsequent replacement of Reich Chancellor von Bülow by Bethmann Hollweg, but also those affairs that weakened the emperor's position in the public eye: the Daily Telegraph interview already mentioned and, earlier, the Eulenburg affair. Philipp Fürst zu Eulenburg und Hertefeld (1847-1921) was a longtime friend and confidant of Wilhelm II. The emperor had to distance himself from him when Eulenburg was suspected of homosexuality in a broad press offensive.

which saw the English change of front and the completion of Edward's policy of encirclement. In the opinion of the leading German historian Karl Lamprecht, this placed Germany in the same

*Three personalities who were the focus of public interest in the 2nd part of Wilhelm II's era.
From left: Prince Philipp zu Eulenburg, Prince Bernhard von Bülow and Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg.*

The situation was similar to that of Frederick the Great on the eve of the Seven Years' War. Frederick the Great would have lost this war if Tsarina Elisabeth had not died in 1762 and if the Russians not changed sides. In 1909, Bethmann Hollweg succeeded Bülow in the office of Reich Chancellor. However, he accepted the office only on the condition that he get a strong foreign minister, since he felt at home only in domestic politics. He made an excellent choice in Alfred von Kiderlen-Wächter (see the excellent biography by Ernst Jäck, *Alfred von Kiderlen-Wächter - der Staatsmann und Mensch* 2 vols, Stuttgart 1924).

Hitler agreed with the statement of Kiderlen, who thus repeated Bismarck's wise saying that the Balkan question was not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier. And he vowed that as long as Germany had something to say, it would not let itself be dragged into anything again by the Habsburgs. But this was the case in 1914. Kiderlen himself had unfortunately died unexpectedly in 1912. From 1912 until the appointment of Kühlmann in 1918, Germany had no strong and effective foreign minister, and this at a time when it could have needed him most. The Emperor, who had the necessary knowledge and the right thoughts for foreign policy, was prevented from moving appropriately first by Parliament and then, especially after 1916, by the military leaders Hindenburg and Ludendorff.

The Daily Telegraph affair

It goes without saying that the Kaiser could have avoided being drawn into the war by England in 1914 if, at the time of greatest advantage to England and her allies, he had had Kiderlen as Foreign Minister instead of the incompetent Jagow. And it is also true that the Kaiser, who was very well informed about America through Prince Henry, could have undermined Wilson's efforts to enter the world war if Hindenburg, Ludendorff, and the Reichstag parties, including the Social Democrats, listened to him because of the implications of the unrestricted submarine warfare being decided upon (see Charles Callan Tansill, *Amerika geht in den Krieg*, Stuttgart 1939).

Bülow, as the real culprit, made the emperor the scapegoat for the

spectacle in the Reichstag in *Daily Telegraph* affair 1908 and ridiculed[†] No fanatical Republican could have done better. What was von Bulow's loyalty like? Bülow's father had made a career in Danish service, being hostile to Bismarck's aims. It is conceivable that Bülow was a kind of egocentric cosmopolitan who only wanted to do something for his popularity. Otherwise, his shady behavior can hardly be explained. After reading his memoirs 1931, German historians rejected him as a lying as well as incompetent politician

At a meeting on the Isle of Wight, the Kaiser had commented on German-English relations. One of his English hosts was so impressed that he asked if he could report the Kaiser's remarks to the press. The Kaiser laughed and said that this was theoretically possible, but as a constitutional ruler he was like his uncle Edward VII, which meant that his remarks would have to be approved and sanctioned by the Cabinet. The terms were agreed upon, and the emperor read over his written remarks once more before they were sent to Berlin with a request for approval. It was vacation and vacation time, and yet it might have been assumed that the government of a world power functioned even during such a period. It was an open secret in the capital that shortly after the momentous meeting of King Edward VII and Tsar Nicholas II in Reval, Reich Chancellor von Bülow had gone to Norderney, his favorite island in the North Sea, for a summer retreat. A subordinate official in Berlin approved the emperor's remarks intended for publication in the English press but did not pass them on to Bulow. He explained that he had

† Reich Chancellor von Bülow took a rather strange stance during the "Daily Telegraph" affair. Not only did he refuse to accept responsibility, but he also stood against the Kaiser before the Reichstag, thereby weakening the latter's position in favor of Parliament. In his Reichstag speech of November 10, 1908, Bülow significantly says, among other things, "... When the *Daily Telegraph* article had appeared, the disastrous effect of which could a moment be doubtful to me, I tendered my resignation. This decision was imperative, and it did not become difficult for me. The most serious and difficult decision I have taken in my political life was to remain in office in accordance with the Emperor's wishes; I only decided to do so because I considered it a matter of political duty to serve His Majesty and the country at this difficult time. How long this will be possible for me remains to be seen."

been of the opinion that their publication was very important. The Kaiser thus received the endorsement, and the storm broke.

What was so terrible about the emperor's remarks? Today we can only laugh about it. In this context, it should be remembered that negative propaganda was just as assiduously waged against Bismarck, although both were completely different characters. The propaganda against Bismarck was based on financial irregularities. According to Charles Vagts, the son-in-law of Charles Beard and an expert on the subject, Bismarck and later Hindenburg were financially intemperate; but Bismarck never broke the law. The emperor could not be accused of financial venality and would not have succeeded anyway. Propaganda thus focused on the emperor's alleged moral depravity, even though his married life was free of infidelities (see *Das persönliche Regiment Wilhelms II*, Munich 1949). As is usual in such an approach, his personal friends were also attacked in order to constantly discredit the monarchy.

In most cases, as here in the case of Bismarck, the Kaiser, and later Hitler, such destructive propaganda was not so much about something insightful and reasonable or moral, but all was simply an expression of nihilism, as Turgenyev described it five generations earlier in *Fathers and Sons* (1862) (see also E. v. Salomon, *Der Fragebogen*, Hamburg 1951; and especially Johannes Haller, *Philipp Eulenburg, des Kaisers Freund*, 2 vols, New York 1930). Unless one was Jewish, as Albert Ballin or Walther Rathenau were, friendship with the Kaiser after 1900 meant almost certain doom. Especially after the *Daily Telegraph affair*, the emperor remained almost completely isolated for the remaining years of his reign. The only exception to this was the period after his famous speech of 1914, saying that he no longer knew any parties, that he only knew Germans. Despite his many objections and protests, his speeches were rarely accurately reported in the German press.

Various Reichstag deputies accused the Kaiser of not having been as anti-English as the German people in the Boer War. He had even given military advice to the commanding English general, Lord Roberts. What was so terrible about that? Was there anyone who could deny that the Germans like the French and many other peoples, were anti-English in the Boer War? The Kaiser also called the English "mad chickens" for their hostility to Germany

By 1908, the Boer War was already "history". Although initially the prisoners of war were cruelly treated and maltreated, in the end a relatively clean Dominion Treaty emerged, securing limited self-government for the Boers in 1905. The problems Germany had with England, France, and Russia in 1908 were more paramount. When the Kaiser was in England, he intended to come clean to the English. He was a brilliant entertainer, as the eminent English-speaking intellectuals Sidney B. Fay and Harry Barnes could attest from their own experience. Kaiser's alleged indiscretion includes references to unpleasant topics such as Anglo-German relations?

Regardless of one's opinion of the emperor's remarks on the Isle of Wight, there is certainly no excuse whatsoever for von Bülow's move to bring the matter before the Reichstag. His factual statement did not correspond to the truth. The fact that the Emperor had forwarded the conversation intended for publication to his government for its information and approval, and that he had obtained its consent to publication, was deliberately concealed. Von Bülow was probably concerned with disciplining his sovereign and preventing him from making irresponsible speeches. However, von Bülow did behave irresponsibly in this matter, namely by his untrue representation.

Hitler, who regarded the Kaiser as a brilliant representative of the German idea and was also later prepared to serve him of his own free will for more than four years in the First World War, was appalled by the condescending and contemptuous manner in which von Bülow treated his ruler, knowing full well that the Kaiser would not address him publicly. The empress is the best witness to the fact of how wounded and dejected the emperor was in private. Hitler would have been even more indignant if he had known all the details of the *Daily Telegraph incident*.

The meeting of Björkö

The Kaiser observed the same secrecy towards von Bülow three years earlier, when concluding the Treaty of Björkö[‡] of July 25, 1905, which was to seal a

‡ On July 25, 1905 - during the 1st Moroccan Crisis - Kaiser Wilhelm II visited the tsar at Björkö northwest of Petersburg and proposed to him - in the absence of both foreign ministers - an alliance treaty according to which in the event of an attack by a European power on Germany or Russia, the

meeting of the Kaiser with Tsar Nicholas in Finland. The Tsar sailed to this meeting on his yacht *Polarstern*, the Emperor on his yacht *Hohenzollern*. The Emperor knew very well that an Anglo-Russian alliance concluded on basis of the "Entente Cordiale" of 1904 initiated by England. The English de facto alliance with France, which had been Russia's ally for eleven years, suggested this. The Kaiser had drawn up a treaty that recognized the Russian alliance with France, but in effect ruled out a war between Germany and Russia, since Germany had no intention of attacking either England or France. The Kaiser also knew that the Franco-Russian alliance of 1894, like the Triple Alliance of 1882, was purely defensive in nature. The Emperor was prepared to promise Germany would not support Austria-Hungary in a war of aggression against Russia, provided that the Tsar would promise in an official treaty not to help France in a war of aggression against Germany. It was intended to extend these points to other possible treaty states of the two thus allied. In this way it would also have been possible to find treaty solutions with England in the future. At this time, the Tsar did not harbor too friendly feelings toward the English, since they had provided the Japanese with the weapons for the surprise attack on Port Arthur. He also harbored resentment toward the French for not providing him with support in the Far East, for example, by ceding the port city of Saigon. In addition, they had used the time immediately after the Japanese attack to join forces with England in the Egypt-

and Morocco question to reach an agreement that might have contained secret additional points. And this was indeed the case.

In short, the German emperor's draft treaty was well thought out. Normally, the Tsar would have preferred to have his Prime Minister Peter Stolypin read the draft treaty, because he knew that the latter shared his conviction that Russia should not become an appendage of French policy. He

partner should provide assistance with all its forces. France was to be won over to this as well, if possible. Russia wanted to ratify the Treaty of Björkö agreed upon by the rulers only. An attack on France by Germany was excluded. Under the circumstances the treaty was worthless to Germany, was not ratified, and acquired no significance. See W. Klein, *Der Vertrag von Björkö*, 1931.

also clearly showed this attitude during the Moroccan crisis. According to the Russian constitution, only the additional signature of a cabinet minister was required for a treaty legally valid with ruler's signature. The Minister of the Navy, Birilev, was present. Since the tsar wanted his prime minister to read the treaty first, he asked Birilev if he was willing to sign the treaty without having read it. Birilev agreed without hesitation. The tsar covered the text of the treaty with his palms, and Birilev signed.

The fact that the Russian Council of Ministers later refused to approve this treaty has often been discussed. It was probably due primarily to the fact that the German ambassador in Petersburg had to express his regret that Reich Chancellor von Bülow had rejected the treaty. The Russians, of course, were of the opinion that this had been done primarily because of agreements in the Austro-Hungarian matter. The whole affair did not become known before the outbreak of the war. However, one can well imagine the indignation of the young Hitler in this case.

England's contribution to the start of the war in 1914

In the few years before 1914, England had fought many wars, attacked and annexed or destroyed countries: Iran (it was partitioned with Russia in 1907); Morocco (it was ceded to the French in 1912, although there was a treaty with eight signatories guaranteeing Morocco's integrity); Egypt (it was annexed in 1914); the Sudan, Tibet (which was conceded as an area of influence despite Chinese protests); Zanzibar, Transvaal and the Orange Free State, and Burma, to name a few.

In this context, it should also be recalled that England, when it suited its political purposes, informed Brussels through its ambassador Lord Vivian in 1887 that London would not object in the event of a German two-front war against France and Russia if Germany used Belgium as a deployment area. England continued to make secret agreements with France, Russia and Belgium in the years between 1908 and 1912, including that in the event of a war between Germany on the one hand and Russia and France on the other, she would enter the war on their side, and this independently of the so-called Belgian question. The English also managed to involve a reluctant Tsar

Nicholas II in a war that would eventually destroy him and also his people

In view of these facts, one must ask how England could dare to request the support of the neutral USA!

In 1913, Wilson, a friend of England, moved into the White House in Washington. When, disregarding American neutrality and under the influence of the constant efforts of Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign minister, he led US-America into war on the side of the Allies, thus bringing in the whole power of the USA, the wily British imperialists had managed to mobilize the whole world against Germany and her few friends.

If one also knows that in the course of the first great battle of the Marne in September 1914, the advance of the German troops under General von Kluck was not only brought to a halt by an order from the General Staff far behind the front, but also ordered to retreat (thus eliminating the possibility of quickly eliminating at least one of Germany's enemies), then one has in hand all the sad and heroic elements necessary for a Greek tragedy.

Of all the states in the world, Germany least deserved to be encircled by Britain. Germany posed no threat to British naval supremacy, as F. L. Woodward proved (see *Great Britain and the German Navy*, London 1951)-Germany pose any threat in the economic sphere, but on the contrary helped to greatly increase England's prosperity (see R. J. Hoffmann, *Great Britain and German Trade Rivalry*, New York 1938). The two countries had excellent cultural relations. The Germans appreciated Shakespeare, the English Goethe and German music, and both valued each other's painting. Even the children's book *Der Struwwelpeter* (written by Dr. Hoffmann in 1810), virtually unknown in U.S. Americawidely read in England in an excellently illustrated English translation. Nor should we forget the numerous fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. There were also many relationships of a similar nature with France and Italy.

Although England had few real points of contention with Germany and the two countries had never been at war with each other, England played the leading role in the encirclement. When a British naval unit left Kiel in July 1914, the signals on the masts still proclaimed, "Friends past and friends forever!" Ordinary British naval officers had no idea of the plans that were soon to become reality.

After the creation of the German Empire, Alsace-Lorraine was still a special problem: it had been snatched from the Empire by France in the 17th century. And Bismarck did well to reintegrate it into the Second German Reich as an imperial land, not as a separate state. In 1911, forty years after the Peace of Frankfurt, Alsace-Lorraine became a German federal state like the others.

After the quick victory against Hanover (Langensalza) and Austria (Königgrätz) in 1866, the North German Confederation and its South German allies waged successful war against France 1870-71. The preoccupation with this war stimulated in the youthful Hitler his German patriotism, which contrasted with the cosmopolitan Habsburg views of his father. There was something exciting in the unflinching as well as victorious advance of the German troops against the well-trained French opponent.

In the Middle Ages, Germany and France were neighbors with friendly relations. They both shared Frankish-Carolingian roots, and many French nobles had German blood in their veins, as the French revolutionaries of 1789 loudly lamented.

Under Louis XI, France made the transition from feudal state to modern centralized state much faster than Germany. Louis XI, for example, was the first to introduce the standing army in Europe. From the 15th century until the 18th century, France had constantly expanded, also at German expense - especially under Richelieu, Mazarin and Louis XIV.

At that time, the nonsensical thesis that the borders of modern France should coincide with the borders of Caesar's Gaul found its way into Versailles - this also includes the Rhine border from the Rhine bend near Basel to its mouth. For this reason Louis XIV attacked the Dutch in 1672 and the German Rhineland in 1688.

Although Blücher, in association with Wellington, contributed to the decisive defeat of Napoleon I at Waterloo in 1815, it was not a Franco-German war, but Prussia fought in a coalition with England and Austria.

The Franco-German war of 1870/71 was of a completely different nature. At that time, the two countries were roughly equal in strength (population,

material). From the beginning, two equal opponents faced each other.

Prussia-Germany emerged victorious from this struggle. One can fully appreciate this process only if one has accurate knowledge of the centuries-long French attacks against Germany as well as of the German national catastrophes such as the Thirty Years' War

Could the Germans not be forgiven for believing after 1871 that their national security was henceforth safe? great historian and writer Theodor Fontane as well as the outstanding philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche were worried about complacency of their countrymen after 1871. Is it not perhaps true that the French acted similarly when they finally drove the arrogant English out of France in 1453 after 250 years of war after the English had owned almost half of the country up to that time? They now made front to the east and treated the Germans just as badly as they had been treated by the English, as they repeatedly claimed.

It should also be noted that around 1871, German higher education reached a peak - at that time, the Germans were undoubtedly number one in the world. It is also worth mentioning the scientific achievements, optimism and belief in human progress. In this respect, one can understand that a great victory at that time was like an intoxicating drink.

But nothing was to become of the expected long-lasting security. And although Germany tried to avoid all wars for 43 years, it took less than 33 years to sign the fateful Anglo-French "Entente Cordiale" in April 1904. This was both the beginning of the end for Germany and for Europe and the first step toward over this Europe to the Eurasian monster and the cruel, ignorant American settlers. This is where, historically, the 20th century began. And it will end when both the Americans and the Soviets have perished financially or have been driven out.

The year before, in 1903, the English King Edward VII, known in Paris as the greatest whoremonger, had entered into a permanent alliance with Zionism on the part of the Hanoverian royal house (the term "Windsor" was not used for the dynasty until 1917). The Zionist leader Theodor Herzl had previously proposed a similar alliance to Kaiser Wilhelm II. It would have been the same as if Mussolini had entered into an alliance with the Mafia. Such an alliance would have dishonored his country and cost him everything

he lived for. The English monarchy had already loaded so much dirt on its shield since 1066 that further filth could hardly sully it. With the current alliance between the U.S. and Israel, more dirt probably falls on the latter.

The American "world record" of fraud, cruelty, ignorance and atrocity has no parallel. And this is what the West German media makers and court historians should actually see, but they won't. They seem to believe for some irrational reason, that the money is always ultimately on the side of the Americans you tell them that this cannot work in the long run, they smile absent-mindedly and have that look that sees nothing. If someone blocks himself, then you can't talk to him and you can't get in touch with him.

Farewell to security

That exuberant sense of security and confidence that had accompanied the birth of the Second Reich of the Germans in 1871 had long since disappeared the young Hitler confided in his friend August Kubizek in Linz at the age of sixteen. The young Hitler did not know it yet, but soon he would somehow suspect it: he was already living in the age of total war. The glorious year 1871 already belonged to a distant past Wilhelm II had not quite been in office sixteen years when the shadow of the British-French "Entente Cordiale" fell upon him. German historian Karl Lamprecht, who visited the United States a few months later, saw the writing on the wall.

Would the Emperor be as fortunate as Frederick the Great was by the death of Tsarina Elizabeth if there were another Seven Years' War?

At the time of the Seven Years' War, America consisted of insignificant English colonies, inhabited not only by Englishmen but also by Germans, Scots, Swedes and, after the conquest of Quebec (1759), Frenchmen. But what about raw materials, the transportation problem and the approximately 90 million Americans at the time of Karl Lamprecht's visit in 1904 ?

Bernhard von Bülow, former Foreign Minister and then German Chancellor (1900 - 1909), had always indulged the deceptive hope of German diplomacy that England and Tsarist Russia would never be able to settle their differences in Asia. But for Lamprecht it seemed obvious that, despite the Russo-Japanese war between Russia and England, some sort of agreement

with Russia could be reached the French "Entente" partner. And this came to pass. England even managed to get Japan and Russia to agree on the Manchurian question in a series of treaties (between 1907 and 1910). In order to maintain an advantage over Russia and to protect its own ambitious plans in the Middle East, the British adopted a policy of stalling on the question of the Russian demand to send merchant ships through the Dardanelles. By the time Russia obtained concessions from them in 1915, it had already suffered several defeats.

These concessions never had any practical consequences, but a deal was struck with the Russians on the Persian question, with the two contracting parties dividing up the country between themselves as an expression of their goodwill, so to speak, and thus putting an end to the liberal revolution of that year. England also retained almost all of China - the Russians remained at the door here - Tibet and Afghanistan as areas of influence and interest. In 1908 King Edward VII visited Tsar Nicholas in Reval. The Russian public, i.e. the small educated ruling and upper classes, was not pleased with agreements. For this reason, the following year Foreign Minister Alexander Iswolsky made a tour of Europe. It was a futile attempt to improve the agreements with England. Despite everything, secret Russian-English arrangements in the military sphere nevertheless followed. Germany, the ally of the Dual Monarchy, was gradually leaving the ranks of the Great Powers itself, facing the other five world powers together with the now neutral Italy: France, Russia, England, the United States and Japan. These were indeed poor conditions.

The beginning of the world war

We have seen that in spite of the German success at Tannenberg on August 27-30, 1914 - the Russians who had invaded East Prussia were crushed because of internal dissension between their commanding generals Samsonov and Rennenkampf - the second month of the war was followed by the great blunder of Lieutenant Colonel Hentsch in northern France, who on 8 Kluck, as an orderly vested with all powers by Chief of Staff General Moltke September 8, 1914, he gave the order to withdraw from the Marne to the Aisne line. This

was followed by the race between the Germans and the British through Flanders to the Channel ports. It was in these battles, with their heavy losses, that Hitler experienced his baptism of fire. From the beginning, Hitler had a training that, thanks also to his iron will, made him a model soldier who did not shy away from any danger. The concentrated artillery fire of the U.S.-origin guns on the Somme was certainly more severe, but fighting the experienced regular British troops in October 1914 was also a great challenge for the Munich volunteer.

Although some experts argued from the beginning that Germany should make peace unless the initial assault on Paris was successful, this was not practically possible. The German victory at Tannenberg also improved Germany's desperate situation somewhat.

Today, of course, we know that Germany would have succeeded in defeating England and France in 1915. In 1916, the final defeat of the Russians would have followed. All this would have occurred if U.S. President Wilson had adhered to international law, as his Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan had demanded - Allied experts admit as much (see Frank Chambers, *The War behind the war*, op. cit.).

The fighting performance of the Germans far exceeded what had been expected in Germany itself or abroad. Although Germany was fighting a purely defensive war in 1916, it had proven that it was the number one bell nation. It deserved victory over its three main adversaries, England, France, and Russia. Japan kept out of Europe, and in the Pacific region despite a significant trade the German-Japanese antagonism played only a secondary role because of the insignificant German colonial territories.

What ultimately deprived the Germans of the victory they deserved and almost tripled their losses was, as historian Karl Lamprecht had predicted, the unlawful and by nothing justifiable interference of the USA. Under a President Bob La Follette, had he been elected in 1912, this would not have happened. However, the doom occurred under a less than honorable minority president, namely Woodrow Wilson.

What had William Jennings Bryan, without whose help Wilson would never have succeeded in knocking off the popular Champ Clark at the Democratic convention in Baltimore, and Senator Robert LaFollette, without whose help Wilson would never have been together through his only significant political reform, the Underwood protective tariff bill told and communicated to Wilson in the first days of the war? The answer can be found with respect to LaFollette in the *Congressional Record* (loc. cit., 1914), and with respect to Bryan memoirs individual Cabinet members, most notably Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels (*President Wilson and the World War*, New York 1921).

Both politicians, who had sought the presidency long before it occurred to Wilson, had told him everything, and this is to be taken literally, that he knew in order to avoid war, and also to avoid serious friction and trouble. Wilson was a favorite of Captain Harvey, a partner of J. P. Morgan, and especially of Captain Edward Mandell House, a Jew from Texas whose father had made a million-dollar fortune in illegal bootlegging.

Neither Bryan nor LaFollette had asked Wilson to make his foolish and hysterical statement of August 8, 1914, the day Wilson declared in the Cabinet that the Germans were nothing but filthy, wild animals and that England was defending civilization with her back against the wall. This statement prompted Bryan to remark that there was probably no other imperialist system in the world that had killed as many people as England's. By his statement, Wilson had, in a silly way, virtually decreed that every American must be neutral in his thinking about this war. At least today everybody knows that there is no such thing as an American nation in the sense of a German or French nation, but that the USA is an entity of different nations without one having a preponderance. Something like a real American nation will not exist in the foreseeable future.

In his book *Amerika geht in den Krieg ein* (Berlin 1939), C. C. Tansill describes the developments, though not always without errors, and in doing so includes above all Wilson's England-friendly ambassador in London, Walter Hines Page. Tansill notes that Wilson had been briefed on possible entanglements and repercussions from the beginning of the war. Tansill further describes the German submarine blockade of February 1915, which was neither legal nor illegal under existing law. Moreover, it was a response

to the obviously unlawful British naval blockade ordered shortly after the transition to positional warfare in October 1914. This British blockade did not conform to the principles of the international naval agreements of 1856 and 1909 because the British navy did not take the risk of exercising it near the coast. The British also violated the doctrine of "indirect voyage" by, for example, seizing cargoes from neutral Holland on the mere assumption of a possible German destination. They also seized foodstuffs and raw materials for the textile industry and thus did not observe the rules that applied to goods that were not prohibited.

Months before the *Lusitania* incident, Bryan was already calling Wilson's attention to the fact that the British Admiralty had declared in the course of the Russo-Japanese War, which lasted about ten years, that English citizens traveling on the ship of a nation involved in the war did so at their own risk. The presence of British citizens on such ships did not affect, either positively or negatively, the status of those ships. In the *Lusitania affair*, Wilson insisted that the American citizens were aboard the *Lusitania*, a cruiser of the English Cunard Line, and thus a ship of one of the nations involved in the war. The *Lusitania* was loaded with ammunition. The captain did everything he could to make sure the ship sank. He was later decorated by the first lord of the British Admiralty, Churchill. When Bryan then sharply criticized Wilson's disregard for international laws in the *Lusitania affair*, Wilson dismissed him as his Secretary of State. Bryan was not silenced by this, however. He voiced his charges in many speeches that were well laid out in the press. He also played an important role at the 1916 Democratic convention in St. Louis.

From the beginning, Republican Senator LaFollette pointed out to Wilson the trade as well as financial responsibilities of a neutral state - LaFollette's friend George Record was Wilson's principal advisor during Wilson's brief but difficult tenure as governor of New Jersey. Record helped Wilson jail the party higher-ups who had put him in office. Later, when Wilson traveled to France near the end of the war, Record criticized him sharply for this. He told him that he had played the part of a fool.

LaFollette told Wilson that it was unlawful to pick a favorite among belligerents - it was equally unlawful later for President Reagan, allied with both England and Argentina, to support the British in the Falklands conflict.

Nor was it right-wing what Nixon did when he supported the Israelis against the Arabs in 1973. By now it has become clear how many violations of rights, both internally and externally, these two Republicans committed. For example, it was also not legal for Wilson to supply war materiel to England and France but deny it to Germany. Before the Senate, LaFollette pointed out that this action alone would be enough to remove Wilson from office. But this offense, Bob LaFollette said, was harmless compared to the deals Wilson made with a criminal war profiteer like John D. Rockefeller. According to Ida Tarbell (see *John D. Rockefeller*, 2 vols., New York 1932), Rockefeller deserved the death penalty several times. And according to John Flynn (*God's Gold - the Story of J. D. Rockefeller*, New York 1932) this Rockefeller was a worse criminal than Nathan Rothschild. Men of great wealth had always dazzled and excited Wilson. So had his Jewish friend Bernard Baruch, who dated him and took him to the whorehouses of New York. One day, Baruch bluntly opened up to Wilson about how much he and his friends had gotten out of the stock market since 1890. He then looked Wilson straight in the eye and challenged the supposedly progressive Democratic politician to condemn him for the ill-gotten gains. Wilson, who was more devoted to Baruch than to Harvey, Mandell House, or the young Roosevelt, calmly told Baruch that he had nothing at all against Baruch, either in personal or business matters (see Margaret Coits, *Bernard Baruch*, New York 1961).

Baruch, like Rockefeller, was an agent of the House of Rothschild - Baruch since about 1890, Rockefeller since about 1880. Baruch knew he was successful and had Wilson in his pocket for the rest of his life. Like Wilson and Roosevelt, Baruch wanted to enter the war as soon as possible as an ally of England as early as 1914. The reaction of the invisible plutocrat government had been accurately predicted by Karl Lamprecht. Bob LaFollette described the endless U.S. credits that Wilson and Rockefeller gave to England as crimes against civilization, which they actually were (see Albert Carr, *John D. Rockefeller's Secret Weapons*, New York 1962, p. 178ff.).

The father of Lindbergh, the first Atlantic flyer, Charles A. Lindbergh Sr.- his book *Your Country at War*, 1917, was confiscated by Wilson's secret police but reissued after the war (Philadelphia 1934)-confirmed that Bryan and LaFollette had at all times briefed Wilson on the duties of a neutral state.

Wilson, however, had preferred to listen to Baruch and Rockefeller. J. P. Morgan, who was closer to Teddy Roosevelt than Wilson, took advantage of all this. It should also be noted that at the beginning of the war Teddy Roosevelt wrote articles in *Outlook* magazine justifying the invasion of Belgium by German troops.

Lindbergh Sr. states in the above-mentioned book (p. 215) that in the period from 1914 to 1917 the U.S. supplied war materiel then worth six billion dollars; over 90 percent of this went to England, and France, in disregard of the neutrality status. This figure, over a trillion dollars in today's currency, should give everyone an idea of Wilson's war-making role in World War I, long before the U.S. entered World War I on April 6, 1917, on a pretext. The lenders for this military aid, and it must be noted here, were Morgan and Rockefeller. The collateral for this was Wilson's 1917 declaration of war. Bryan and LaFollette had predicted this development as early as 1914. Charles Lindbergh, Sr. who had been deprived of his governor's seat in Minnesota, rightly noted that U.S. entry into the war would cost the lives of more than another million German boys. There was not even the slightest excuse for Wilson's actions, which bordered on the criminal, as the 1934 Nye Congress report made abundantly clear: Wilson had unnecessarily brought the U.S., where the German element was overrepresented, into the First World War against Germany.

Hitler first realized that the Second Reich was approaching collapse because of external causes when he was on a brief convalescent leave in Berlin in 1916 - He had sustained several wounds at the Battle of the Somme in October 1915.

Had it not been for Wilson, the war would have been over by then. Wilson had noted with pleasure a report by Edward Mandell House on the situation of Germany in 1915. This report, in fact, stated that Germany was already very badly battered by the large deliveries of arms to England and France and by the brutal, unlawful British naval blockade. Under such conditions, the mood of the Germans when Hitler came to Berlin in 1916 was naturally not the best. One can compare the situation at that time with that of the Southern states in 1863, when General Robert F. Lee had been defeated by the Northerners, the Yankies, at the Battle of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania - for

example, half of the Northern arms here came from England.

Reasons for Germany's defeat in 1918

Hitler saw the main problem with German morale in the too many subversive Jews pouring into the Reich from German-occupied Poland, and in freedom of speech. It was noted in the French National Assembly that Germans inside as well as outside the Reichstag could say things at that time for which they would have faced long prison sentences in wartime France. In *Mein Kampf*, Hitler then describes how he would have consolidated the home front and improved German propaganda along the British battle line

The English, on the other hand, could afford to be both deceptive and confident in their propaganda. In 1916 it was still open whether the Germans could conquer Paris. In 1914, they could have easily taken that city had it not been for the terrible blunder at the German High Command: Mackensen was undoubtedly Germany's best general in World War I. He would undoubtedly have taken Paris in 1914, since, unlike Kluck, he would have refused to retreat as Hentsch had ordered. To cover up his refusal, he might have claimed that Hentsch had suffered a nervous breakdown due to his first baptism of fire.

England still had naval supremacy. The huge U.S. arms shipments allowed the English and French to inflict significant losses on the Germans. Moreover, Grey had the personal assurance of Wilson's envoy Page that Wilson would persuade Congress to enter the war should England get into a truly threatening situation. In both world wars, England was the trigger, but at the same time was able to provide itself with a security guarantee of which the states on the European mainland, such as France, Germany, and Italy, were unaware. The two-front war - besides wars in the colonies, there were also theaters of war in Italy, Greece, Palestine and Iraq - only made Germany's situation worse. That is why Hitler *Mein Kampf* that in a future war a war on two fronts must be avoided at all costs.

Tansill (op. cit.) notes that both Germany and the United States made mistakes during the period of American neutrality that England did not.

Whether the German countermeasures against England and America were wise is another matter. However, what Teddy Roosevelt did in 1912, when he stabbed Bob LaFollette in the back, split the Republicans, prevented the election of LaFollette, but made possible that of the psychopath Wilson, was not wisdom by any means. Wilson became a man who did not take foreign policy advice and who was under the influence of the internationalist capital of a Baruch and Rockefeller and their machinations. And Wilson's example set the stage for an even greater political criminal: his disciple FDR (see Anthony C. Sutton, *Roosevelt and International High Finance*, Tübingen 1990).

An analytical and a developmental approach to historical events are not mutually exclusive; they complement each other. An analytical view of Hitler's ideas and considerations reveals the importance of such an approach. One might suppose that after the failure of the Young Plan (reparations moratorium) around 1930, as well as the abandonment of the hypocritical Geneva disarmament conferences (1932- 1934), Hitler might have grown weak in regard to his goal of restoring Germany as a major power, given Germany's situation in 1916 or 1918. Despite brilliant military efforts and achievements, Germany was literally starved and drowned in a sea of American goods and war materiel at that time. Although the battle on the second front in the East was decided in Germany's favor in 1918, Germany still had military obligations to fulfill and aid to provide to the new states formerly under Russian rule. This, as well as the supply of fresh American troops, regardless of

During the occupation of the Ruhr by Franco-Belgian troops, the German people unanimously opposed this act of violence. Numerous posters called for passive resistance.

of their combat experience and kindness, caused the pendulum of fortune on the Western Front to swing gradually in Germany's favor.

Weimar difficulties

Despite its considerable constitutional achievements - such as proportional representation - the Weimar Republic was a child of defeat and capitulation. After protests, the SPD-Zentrum majority in the Reichstag finally agreed to sign the Versailles Dictate, even though this treaty was not based on Wilson's 14 points promised on the occasion of the armistice of November 11, 1918.

The German Revolution of 1918 was a process that lacked heroic lore and was based on the view that the nation's honor and prestige were something suspect and that the key to its eventual success lay in fulfilling the victors' requirements and being well-disposed toward them.

The German passive resistance in 1923 on the Rhine and Ruhr against the French and Belgians was a sign of revolt; England did not approve of the actions of its allies. In 1924, the intransigent Raymond Poincare was replaced in Paris by Edouard Heriot. The latter worked out a Belgian-French withdrawal plan. But after that came the adoption of Allied plans for reparations payments - this included the Dawes Plan of 1924 and the Young Plan of 1928; both were named after American bankers. The Young Plan stipulated that Germany was obligated to pay until 1988. Moreover, like the Versailles Dictate, it was based on the fictitious assumption that Germany and its allies, but not the Allies, were responsible for the outbreak of war.-The Allies freighted the Young Plan with ever-increasing tribute payments, so that eventually even Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, the leading German banker and member of the DDP (the German Democratic Party, the successor party of the Progressives from the Empire), advised the Weimar government and the Reichstag to reject the Young Plan. This was remarkable because, after all, Schacht had been member of the negotiating commission

In 1927, at the Tannenberg commemoration, Reich President Paul von

Hindenburg hadofficially rejected Article 231 of the Versailles Dictate, namely the war guilt paragraph on which reparations were based For this reason, too, the Weimar government could have resisted the Allies' greed for money a year before the great world economic crisis of 1929. Moreover, the Allies had themselves violated the harsh peace dictate in 1921 when, after the March 10, 1921 referendum in Upper Silesia(under Article 88 of the Versailles Dictate), which came out in Germany's favortheyagreed to partition the territory so that eastern Upper Silesia went to Poland This meant for Germany the loss of extremely valuable mineral resources and industrial plants, as well as hundreds of thousands of human tragedies.

In this context, it should be recalled that in 1919 the conservative and national parties - for example, the German Democratic Party and the German Party - had rejected the signing of the Dictatorship Treaty. Even the then SPD Chancellor of the ReichPhilipp Scheidemann, after first taking note of the treaty in the auditorium of Berlin University, had declared to enthusiastic applause that his right hand would wither rather than sign the treaty He then resigned and left it to his SPD successor Bauer to sign the dictate.

It has often been disputed that the British blackmailed the Weimar government into signing the Dictate by maintaining the inhumane starvation blockade for nearly six months after the end of the war-this meant another 800,000 or so German deaths, all in one action. Moreover, the starvation blockade imposed four years earlier was also illegal under international law; such a blockade was permissible only for a specific coastal area under certain circumstances.- The British postwar action cost nearly three times as many lives as the concentration camps of the Third Reich in the period 1933-45.

Lloyd George shouted during the 1919 election campaign, "Hang the Emperor!" From this also stems the contempt of George B. Shaw (see the preface to *Back to Methuselah*, London 1919; dt. 1922). - Was not Lloyd George the war criminal, and should not he have hanged instead of the Kaiser? comparison to 1945 (NurembergTrials) already forces itself here.

The continuation of the British hunger blockade after the armistice may have been aimed at forcing Germany to sign the criminal peace treaty (this treaty, as is well known, violated Wilson's 14 points as the basis of the armistice agreement of November 11, 1918 between Germany and the Allies);

nevertheless, it is by no means true that the SPD and the Center had to sign this treaty in order to achieve a lifting of the blockade. The blockade had already ended in April 1919.

All sources agree that even if Lloyd George had wanted to, he could not have resumed the blockade. The Allied peace terms, along with the threat that further German territory would be occupied if he refused to sign the treaty, were not submitted until May 1919. The official signing of the Treaty of Versailles took place on June 28, 1919, the fifth anniversary of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne. It is necessary to emphasize this in order to judge the victor mentality of people like Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George. They had deliberately chosen the anniversary of one of the most consequential crimes in world history. Only the Italian representative Orlando had spoken out against it.

On the German character of Silesia

John Quincy Adams, the authoritative writer of the Monroe Doctrine and Monroe's successor in the presidency, made an extensive tour of Silesia in 1801 when he was U.S. envoy to Prussia. He found that Silesia was entirely German. The Reichstag elections up to 1890 indicate that the Polish element in Silesia was insignificant until 1890, despite the fact that the industrially flourishing German Empire attracted more foreigners than Germans emigrated. Although there was universal suffrage, Korfanty from Upper Silesia was the only Polish member of the Reichstag. And as late as March 20, 1921, Katowice - the largest city in Upper Silesia, located on the old border drawn at the Congress of Vienna - voted 80 percent for Germany, despite French occupation, Polish terror and the illegal smuggling in of Polish voters. That Wrocław never had a Polish population before 1945 and was as German as any other German city is confirmed by a special report of the Rockefeller Foundation, which made substantial donations to the medical research department of the University of Wrocław.

Instead of Americans holding back on this issue today, all we see is increased pressure on the West German government to lend Poland more money, even though the Poles are already close to 40 billion in debt. And

Polish reports say that only 20 percent of Poland's working-age population currently working. Moreover, the Poles have refused to pay interest on the debt. They have also asked for a deferral of principal repayment until the 21st century. However, they are demanding further "reparations" from the Germans.

Ebert and Hindenburg

Friedrich Ebert, with his reserved and conservative manner, could have achieved the same influence had he not died in 1925, in the middle of his term as Reich President. Ebert was succeeded by Hindenburg, who did not have a good reputation in certain circles, as he had betrayed the emperor and had him pressured into abdicating at Spa. This process was unknown to most people. Even more doubtful is the assertion in these circles that the Kaiser had said that he wanted to be exclusively the ruler of the Social Democrats. Such an unwise assertion does not suit the emperor. And the fact that on September 29, 1918, after a speech in Essen, the press was given a different text than that of the emperor is more than outrageous.

The change in Hindenburg's political attitude from his term in office from 1925 to his second in 1932 is very revealing. Although Hindenburg, together with General Gröner of Württemberg, acted explicitly in the interests of the Social Democrats in 1918 when he prevented the Kaiser from returning to Germany and thus saving the monarchy, the Social Democrats were disturbed in 1925 by statements by Hindenburg that a military dictatorship was needed in emergencies. They therefore voted against him in large measure in the 1925 presidential election. Hindenburg received significant support from the German People's Party and the German National People's Party. Then in 1927, on the occasion of the Tannenberg celebration, when he denied the alleged German guilt for World War I laid down in the Versailles Dictate, ardent supporters gave him the Neudeck estate in East Prussia. Thus Hindenburg, who like Ludendorff was from Posen (it became part of Poland in 1919), no longer had to stay in an apartment in Hanover, where he had lived since 1911 before the Kaiser reactivated him in 1914. With this estate, Hindenburg became a lovable country squire, and thus he was more suitable

as a symbol for the people. In the two presidential elections of 1932, he won twice by a large margin over Hitler, and both times, unlike in 1925, he was actively supported by the Social Democrats.

Hindenburg very reluctantly appointed Hitler as Reich Chancellor of a coalition government of NSDAP and DNVP on January 30, 1933, a year after his re-election, and only on the advice of Franz von Papen. Hindenburg realized only later that it was unwise to speak of Hitler as the Bohemian corporal. In a conversation with Hitler, the Reich Chancellor, Hindenburg mentioned that he had been in Hitler's birthplace of Braunau during the Prussian-Habsburg War of 1866. Hitler was surprised by this. But then it turned out that the marshal had been in Braunau, Bohemia, and not in Braunau am Inn, near the Bavarian border. ice hadbroken and Hitler had succeeded in breaking through the wall of hatred erected by Hindenburg's advisers,a friendly relationship developed with the veteran of three wars of importance to Prussia and GermanyOf course, Hitler had too much tact toreproachthe old Field Marshalhis collaboration with the Social Democrats in 1918, whichhadultimatelyled toelimination ofthe KaiserHitler also did not remind Hindenburg that he had not resigned when his Chief of Staff, Ludendorff, to whom he owed his career in World War I, was dismissed in the fall of 1918, after the first uprisings and riotsand then revolution, had occurred in Germany in the wake of various eventsmistakenly, as it later turned out, thinking that this would lead to better peace conditions for Germany.

Wilson's breach of promise and the consequences

With Wilson's broken promise, the historicalpermanence of the Second German Reichalso broke in 1918, and this at a time when the military triumvirate of Hindenburg, Hoffmann, and Ludendorff was fully subject to civil authority, when there was the same parliamentary accountability in Germany as in England, and when the three-class suffrage system had been abolished in Prussia Two years earlier Wilson's ambassador to Sussex in England had declared that Wilson would work for a compromise peace among equals if re-elected. Not only did Wilson renege on this promise, he

also failed to support the Kaiser when he made his offer of a peace of understanding on December 12, 1916. Then, in October 1918, Wilson interfered in Germany's internal affairs when he declared that only a revolutionary republican German government could expect to obtain a decent peace based on the 14 points. These 14 Points had originally been intended as propaganda for Russia. They had never been thought through as to their feasibility for Germany. The desire to believe Wilson had the desired effect in Germany, and the Second Reich needlessly perished on an empty promise.

The gamble that Reich Chancellor Max von Baden's government had taken when it put its trust in Wilson in the fall of 1918 was lost by a landslide. The unity of the Reich was endangered, as the subsequent separatist movements in the Rhineland and Bavaria amply documented.

Karl Liebknecht had called for a republic in Berlin almost simultaneously with Philipp Scheidemann, a moderate Marxist. And now Scheidemann was hurrying to forestall a stormy arch-Marxist. The decision to overthrow the old government had, of course, opened wide all doors to revolutionary Marxism. And it was not thanks to Wilson but rather to Liebknecht's tactical incompetence that a Bolshevik dictatorship was not established in Germany in 1919. On the other hand, Hitler's National Socialism saw for itself an equally constant justification and challenge in the KPD's constant commitment to a communist Germany, for, Hitler argued, once Germany was communist, France and Spain would soon be as well. Ironically, such a development might have meant victory for the British fascists.

Reasons for Roosevelt's Hatred of Germany

Ivy Lee, a troublemaker leading on behalf of the Rockefeller Foundation, was difficult to spot because of his publicity shyness, noted that Hitler's appointment as Reich Chancellor by Hindenburg created the necessary conditions for FDR and Stalin to join forces. For with Hitler, both now had a clearly defined goal. Of course, both men also shared an ardent desire to dissolve the British Empire, humiliate Japan in the Far East, and punish

Mussolini as well. But the idea of being able to act together against a resurgent Germany was the most appealing of all goals.

It can be said quite openly that the three presidents after Wilson, namely Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover, had no antipathy toward Germany whatsoever. On the contrary, all three were of the firm opinion that Wilson's action against Germany had been a foolish mistake which, moreover, had no basis in international practice and law. Roosevelt had advocated war at the same time as Wilson in 1914. He had been in Europe with Wilson in 1919 and had said to anyone who would listen that the war should have continued until the military occupation of Berlin. Thus may be seen the long-lived effects of a joke which some good-natured classmates had allowed themselves in the eighties of the last century with the millionaire's son, the young Roosevelt, in a private school in Bad Homburg (see Emil Ludwig, *Roosevelt*, New York 1937).

Wilson and Roosevelt, of course, showed morbid traits not only in their behavior toward Germany, but also in their private lives. But the signs, one can also say the wounds, which they left behind worldwide, are mainly due to their pathological behavior towards Germany and in the long run towards Europe (see also Helmut Sündermann, *Deutsche Notizen*, Leoni 1955).

Hitler's political development

"Hitler was a saint." Ezra
Pound, 1945

"He was a rational man, but he was also
undoubtedly vicious." Prof. A. J. P. Taylor, 1962

On the assessment of Adolf Hitler

Meanwhile, there are enough English books (see, among others, the treatise of Emrys Hughes and Robert Rhodes James) condemning Churchill's errors and mistakes, but English politics has been trying for a long time to impose an attitude according to which one should be lenient toward one's own political actions and not apply the same moral standards to one's own deeds as one does to one's opponents. This is evident not only in a court historian, such as A.J.P. Taylor (*Die Ursprünge des Zweiten Weltkrieges*, Gütersloh 1962). In this book Taylor says of Hitler: "He was a rational man, but he was also undoubtedly vicious" (p. 193). Taylor, however, cites no evidence for this as justification for such a statement. In another context, he makes a very general comment about the gassing of Jews, but without attempting to link this to Hitler.

My publication *Falsehood in Peacetime: The Genocide Mirage* (Los Angeles 1969) may have been the world's first book to question the extermination of six million Jews, but it remains many ways the most fundamental, if only because of its examination of sources. It appeared eight years after Taylor's treatise and my investigation into the origins of World War II. Taylor is mistaken in his 1961 work; as an Oxford-trained historian who has published many excellent books, he should not have given such prominence to this propaganda myth. George Orwell, for example, distrusted the myth from the very beginning, as early as 1945. According to Taylor, Hitler was evil. What sense was that? Does Taylor also want us to believe that the Maid of Orleans was malevolent? Many English writers have denied that she was evil. Did the fact that the English hanged Nathan Hale, Yale College, during the American War of Independence mean that he was malicious? Have we come to the point where whoever gets in the way of English imperialism is considered vicious? I hope not.

I have read all the documents of the Nuremberg prosecutors as well as the

material of the defense lawyers. I have read Hitler biographies in seven languages - they are so numerous that it would be too tedious to list them here. I have studied ethics, logic, epistemology (which I also taught), political philosophy and political science for years. In this respect, I tend to take a different view and agree with the late Ezra Pound, who said in April 1945 in a conversation with American newspapermen: "Hitler was a saint!"

Like the fighter Bob La Follette in the USA, Hitler also wanted the best for his people in the field of living conditions. He never made many of the condescending and challenging statements attributed to him by the peoples of Eastern Europe. One of my numerous *Spiegel interrogators* claimed that Hitler hated all Slavs. But since his youth Hitler had a weakness and preference for the Poles and never harbored general hatred toward the Slavs. In the early years of his rise Hitler also had close relations with White Russian circles. But the unproven accusations against Hitler have become so legion that one would have to write countless books to refute them all.

Hitler shared with Bismarck and Wilhelm II the disappointment that no firm and reliable relations could be established with England. He expressed this view at a private dinner in Munich on February 26, 1939, a few days before Slovakia's declaration of independence and 21 days before Chamberlain's ill-fated Birmingham speech, which meant the slamming door, i.e. a rejection of German-English understanding by political England (see Hermann Giesler, *Ein anderer Hitler*, Leoni 1977, p. 363ff.). Hitler saw the lack of willingness to cooperate in English policy of the "balance of power," which, however, was outdated because of global power claims. Due to the new world situation, a firm European unity, as desired by Hitler, required the cooperation of England; England was refusing to do so. Hitler concluded by saying that von Ribbentrop had convinced him that England was making preparations for war since the Munich Conference in September 1938 because of the old British policy of a "balance of power." Hitler's view is fully confirmed by E. L. Woodward's publication of *Documents on British Foreign Policy*. Hitler had been working toward realization of his dream idea, Anglo-German cooperation since the Anglo-German Naval Treaty of 1935 and the London Conference - held in the course of the military occupation of the Rhineland in 1936. He did not object to the new Franco-English alliance, believing that this

would bring them closer together, in line with the German-Italian alliance (see the Munich Conference to settle the Sudeten question in 1938) Hitler also unhesitatingly signed the Anglo-German friendship treaty offered by England, although he had doubts Chamberlain's sincerity the time of the signing on September 30, 1938 The conversation with Ribbentrop on February 25, 1939, prepared him for the *about-face* that Chamberlain was to make 21 days later with his speech in Birmingham (appended).

There are many reasons to believe that the whole tragedy would have been different if the British Foreign Office had known about the Roosevelt-Stalin alliance in 1938, which Churchill was not told until 1942. One can well imagine the effect of such revelations on Halifax, who had always despised the USSR and could never imagine Roosevelt making common cause with Stalin, and not with Churchill. In 1942 Halifax acted as the English envoy to the USA.

In his book *The Fall of the British Empire*, Collin Cross clearly elaborates the question: on the one hand, a British world empire that enjoyed the support of a strong European confederation according to Hitler's conception, or on the other hand, the situation in which Churchill was put by his two cynical allies Stalin and FDR. Cross further elaborates that this choice was open to Britain until the outbreak of the German-Russian War.

The enthusiasm for Hitler's government in Germany is understandable. Equally understandable was the support for a Europe united in peace. Bismarck had also pursued this goal with his European alliance policy. Despite England, Hitler might have come to an agreement with the Polish dictator Josef Pilsudski on the Danzig and East Prussian issues. But the early death of the Polish dictator on May 12, 1935, put an end to such considerations.

The Battle of Kursk in July 1943 against the Soviets showed that Hitler would not succeed in turning around fate, as indicated by the recapture of Kharkov as late as March 1943. Six weeks after Pearl Harbor, Japan had been pushed out of the Pacific with the start of the Midway Offensive. For Germany, the last 22 months of World War II were one defensive struggle by sea, land, and air. Negotiations were out of the question, and further resistance was virtually preprogrammed with the promulgation of the

Casablanca Doctrine of "unconditional surrender." Churchill finally agreed to it, albeit reluctantly

Hitler stood his ground bravely and was able to cope with the attempted assassination of the German aristocrats on July 20, 1944, as was still evident in a speech to the Gauleiters in February 1945, reported by Helmut Sündermann (see *Deutsche Notizen*, Leoni am Starnberger See 1965).

Despite sabotage and espionage, which did cause damage, Hitler went down through the external effects of war, not through a revolution within. Most Germans loved their Führer beyond his death until, as Kolbenheyer tells us (loc. cit.), the world was drowned in the sea of postwar propaganda.

German culture before 1914

How prestigious Imperial Germany was among leading international writers is shown by a brief survey of most creative Australian writers. Henry Handel Richardson, a male alias for a woman, in his novel *Maurice Guest* (London 1913), which many consider the most apt modern love story, set the main hero as an art student in the socially and culturally perfect Dresden, as a counterpoint, so to speak, for his destiny. The love story ends tragically with the hero's suicide. The Australian setting, as we find it in the famous trilogy *The Fortunes of Richard O'Mahoney*, would not have suited it as a setting.

For the same reason, England's great writer D. L. Lawrence, in his temporarily banned book *Lady Chatterly's Lover* (London 1925), had his main heroine a delightful tour of pre-1914 Wilhelmine Germany with the Wandervogel, that nature-loving youth movement, to give her the necessary distinction and make her as exquisite as

Important humanities scholars, natural scientists and inventors of the imperial era.

1. Series: Leopold von Ranke, Heinrich Schliemann, Heinrich von Treitschke.
2. Series: Max Planck, Robert Koch, Wilhelm Conrad Röntgen.
3. The first row: Rudolf Diesel, Carl Zeiss, Werner von Siemens. to make it seem possible. - Although Frenchman Romain Rolland's *Jean-Christophe* - written at the suggestion of former Wagner friend Mathilde von Wesendonck - hazily reminiscent of Beethoven, hints of the splendor of Wilhelminian Germany are discernible. - Henrik Ibsen, by far the most influential writer of the 19th century, wrote most of his important work in Munich, which he considered his spiritual home. Fedor Dostoevsky, too, especially after his second marriage, divided his time almost equally between Russia and Germany. And Dostoevsky is undoubtedly one of the greatest Russian literary figures. The great German writers such as Gerhart Hauptmann, Thomas Mann and the young Friedrich Hebbel spent time at home in Germany. The important German composers such as Brückner, Brahms and Richard Strauss also stayed in the country. This era was also a great time for German painters and musicians, for German poets and novelists, and furthermore for a culturally very interested and open-minded public. Admission prices for theater, ballet and opera performances, which were among the best in the world, were affordable in Germany. The range of museums was constantly expanding; the symphony orchestras were also among the best in the world. The philosophical lore, which began with Kant and continued through Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, was unparalleled in the world. Likewise, the architecture and sculpture enjoyed world ren

As can be traced in the Deutsches Museum in Munich, the empire took a leading position in the field of chemistry as well as technology (see Georg Franz-Willing, *Die industrielle Revolution im 19. Jahrhundert*, Tübingen 1988). Germans were among the pioneers in automobile manufacturing, and German engineers built the world's first functioning subway in Budapest. German cruise ships were at the forefront in terms of equipment and comfort. And it was mainly Germans who made skiing a popular sport.

Although the great historian Leopold von Ranke had recognized the dual alliance between the new German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy as a suitable solution to the German question in Central Europe, and other historians of the Second Empire agreed with him, there were still many German historians, scholars, students and citizens who had their

doubts The Habsburg Empire seemed to fall apart at the end of the 19th century. And one was involuntarily reminded of that scene in Auerbach's cellar in Goethe's *Faust*: "What still holds this old empire together?"

Hitler's family

Nothing is more attractive to a young mind than a difficult, yet solvable problem. Hitler's father, a wealthy former soldier and civil servant who retired on a full pension after forty years in the Habsburg state, remained loyal to his emperor, Franz Joseph. Hitler's father was only eleven years old when Franz Joseph ascended the throne in Vienna in 1848, a year filled with unrest. While Hitler and his classmates in Linz on the Danube thought the spirit of modern German nationalism and attacked the Habsburgs (for whom Hungarians, Poles, Croats and Czechs more useful than the Germans, who with a 25 percent share of the population formed the traditional backbone of the imperial and royal monarchy), his father, like the dynasty itself, was more cosmopolitan.

And this also applied to attitudes toward the Jews, who in the last fifty years had increasingly streamed from Galicia into the great cities of the Dual Monarchy, such as Vienna, Budapest, and Prague. Hitler's father was quick to point out that the Eastern Jews, with their vernacular Yiddish, which was very similar to German - Hebrew was reserved for the religious - readily assimilated to the Germans, thus encouraging the Germanization of the non-German ethnic groups. Hitler's father, whose ancestors came from the Lower Austrian *Waldviertel* when the Czechs immigrated to Upper and Lower Austria, albeit in small numbers, for economic reasons, felt just as much threatened as a German as he did as a Linzer from Upper Austria, indeed as a citizen of the world of the imperial and multi-ethnic state. Since Hitler was 52 years younger than his father, he reflected the generation that saw the need to solve this question in the spirit of enlightened nationalism. His father, on the other hand, embodied that generation of the imperial and royal monarchy - especially after the suppression of the Greater German Revolution in Vienna in 1849 - whose highest ideal was a kind of cosmopolitanism.

Although Hitler makes it clear his biography (*Mein Kampf*) that he rebelled against some of his father's methods of influencing his professional career, he seems never have been outraged by his father's opposing political views, which he discusses impartially in his biography. Later, he also commissioned his architect Hermann Giesler to design a magnificent tomb for his parents in Linz a. d. Donau. His own tomb, modeled on the Roman Pantheon and also to be designed by Giesler, was to be located in Munich, the movement's capital, as an annex to a meeting building. Hitler's father died in 1903 at the age of 65. His world view remained limited to the Habsburgs and the dual monarchy. His son was different. He had been influenced not only by nationalist and anti-Jewish teachers during his school days in Linz, but also by numerous writings with which he grappled from an early age.

Hitler's political tradition

Werner Maser (*Das Ende einer Legende*, Munich 1971; one of four scholarly anti-Hitler books) attributes Hitler's success to self-education. He notes that Hitler had read much university teacher of some age by the age of 35, ten years after he had gone into World War I as a common soldier for four years. This is a high tribute to Hitler's intellectual abilities and his ambition to acquire as much knowledge as possible.

Even as a boy, Hitler had begun to study, among other topics, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 and the German victory under Helmut von Moltke's leadership. For Hitler, this was a different kind of experience than any Habsburg triumph that would have pleased his father. Hitler, being an idealist, decided to fight in wars only for Germany, and not for Habsburg, even though it had been only 35 years since the two states had gone to war against each other. Once Hitler had formed an opinion and made up his mind, he stuck to it. So also in this case. This confirms Nietzsche's statement that it is not great feeling but the constancy of great feeling that makes great men. In April 1939, at the age of 50, Hitler said to the Romanian Foreign Minister Grigore Gafencu that if he, Hitler, had been in the place of Bethmann-Hollweg and Jagow at the time of the 1914 crisis, he would have deposed the Habsburgs, annexed their German territories from the "Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation" to Germany and divided the other

territories among Romania and the other states. Austria-Hungary, however, had pursued an independent policy and also got in way of German Empire at the Algeiras Conference 1906 anyone believe that Germany would have been in trouble in disempowering the Habsburgs if an agreement reached Russia in 1914, comparable to the German-Soviet agreement of August 27, 1939 in the matter of Poland? At the turn of the century, the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy had long been a numb nut[§]

The more Hitler examined the two-party alliance after 1900, the more he rejected Leopold von Ranke's judgment that Bismarck's alliance had been a satisfactory settlement of the German question. Already at the time of Ranke's judgment, Austria-Hungary under Andrassy appeared stronger than it actually was any case, it was stronger than at the time of the silly quarrel the Austrian Imperial Council in the nineties of the last century when it sometimes seemed that Czechs and Poles were calling the shots in the Austrian part of the Habsburg. The policy of an Ährenthal and Berchtold already showed more weaknesses. There was also frequent talk about the nihilistic view of the Imperial and Royal Chief of Staff Conrad von Hötzendorf that the Dual Monarchy was not suffering from any disease that a good war could not cure.

Hitler was aware of this reality and acted accordingly. When he was to be drafted into the Imperial and Royal Armed Forces,

§ At the Algeiras Conference from January 16 to April 7, 1906, the European Great and Central Powers and the United States settled the 1st Moroccan Crisis. France was able to practically assert its claims to rule Morocco, which had been asserting since 1904 against Germany, which was supported only by Austria in its rights that had existed since the Morocco Agreement of 1880. At the Algeiras Conference, the result of the policy of encirclement against Germany became clearly evident for the first time. This had been preceded by a visit by Kaiser Wilhelm II to the Sultan of Tangier on March 31, 1905. In 1911, France's obstruction of the agreed freedom of trade led to the "Panther Leap," the visit of the German gunboat *Panther* to Agadir on July 1, 1911, and thus to the 2nd Moroccan Crisis, which was settled in the Morocco-Congo Agreement of November 4, 1911. See Diercks, *Die Marokko-Frage*, 1906.

The European delegation at the Algeciras Conference. After the conference, Germany knows that it can only count on Austria-Hungary. Even Theodore Roosevelt had "warned" Wilhelm II that in case of failure Germany loses its moral credit

French caricature. Kaiser Wilhelm, in the guise of a Turkish galley owner, tries to lure French Marianne with a fly wag in Morocco.

he went into hiding in the giant city of Vienna until he made his way to Munich in 1913. There he continued to live from the sale of his paintings, some of which were excellent (see B. F. Price, *Hitler als Maler und Zeichner*. - Zug 1983). He also continued with his political-historical studies. August Kubizek, his best friend from his Linz and Vienna days and a gifted composer and concert conductor, acted like a normally intelligent person in 1914. Since he was a citizen of Austria-Hungary, he served in the Austro-Hungarian army during World War I. He was not a citizen of Austria-Hungary. He had understood, if at all, at most half of what Hitler had said about Central European politics.

It is vouched for by a professionally capable psychiatrist, who examined Hitler in Pasewalk in Pomerania in 1918 because of imaginary blindness due to a gas attack, that Hitler decided to go into politics only there at the age of 29. On the occasion of the Bayreuth Festival in 1940, Kubizek reminded Hitler of an incident in Linz, where Hitler went for a walk with him at the age of 16 after a visit to the opera. Hitler immediately remembered and said, "At that moment it began!" (See August Kubizek, *Adolf Hitler - mein Jugendfreund*, Graz 1989)

If the Hohenzollern Empire had emerged victorious from World War I, as Hitler fervently hoped from 1914 to 1918, Hitler would not have entered politics. Was Churchill not right when he said that only a politician like Hitler could have saved Germany?

Wars before 1914

When Hitler was 25 years old and serving as a war volunteer in a Bavarian regiment in 1914 with the consent and approval of the Habsburgs and Wittelsbachs, there was peace between Germany and Austria-

Hungary enough wars around the two countries as around the world in recent times. One of the most brutal of these wars was the 4th Boer War (1899-1902), which Hitler mentions in *Mein Kampf* and elsewhere. For Hitler it was natural to identify with the Boers, some of whom were of German origin. The whole world, except imperialist England and some pro-English Americans like Woodrow Wilson, was in favor of the Boers. Most of the atrocities were committed on the side of the English, and even in England there had not been such serious resistance as against this war since the 18th century.

In the period from 1889 to 1903, three wars took place: between the U.S. and Spain, the U.S. and the Philippines, and the U.S. and Colombia; also, various U.S. military interventions in some Latin American countries, such as Haiti and Nicaragua.

From 1894 to 1895 there were Japan's two wars against China, and later the Japanese-Russian War (1904 - 1905), which the Japanese fought with British support. This was followed by the unjustified Japanese seizure of Korea in 1910. In 1896 Italy fought two wars in Abyssinia and lost them. From 1911 to 1912 the Italians waged war against Turkey, opening hostilities without a declaration of war. The war resulted in the temporary seizure of Libya by the Italians. The Italians had their way there until 1934, before they managed to break the resistance of the Senussi Arabs. Ten years later, they then lost the hard-won colonies again in World War II.

From 1911 to 1912, the two Balkan Wars took place, all of which were instigated by Russia. The first Balkan war started in Montenegro. It was followed by Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece, and each time it was against the Turks to wrest from them the territories of the Balkans that had been dominated for centuries. Bulgaria then got into a second war and was - attacked alternately by the Serbs, Romanians, Greeks and Turks. The Bulgarians became victims of this war of encirclement. They lost their Aegean coastal territory, western Thrace, a large piece of Macedonia and southern Dobruja.

When the eight-power guarantee of Moroccan independence collapsed and the Germans withdrew their pledge of protection in 1911, the French invaded and conquered Morocco in 1912. Somewhat earlier, the French had also waged war in North Vietnam.

1890, England had attacked and destroyed the Sultanate of Zanzibar And all the while it was involved in border wars in northwestern India

At that time, the Americans had ended their centuries-long war of extermination against the Indians with the massacre at Wounded Knee (1890), as everyone in Europe knew. 200 Sioux Indians and their religious leaders were. In that year, according to the official U.S. census, the number of Indians, excluding the Eskimos, was still 360,000 for the entire U.S. territory, including the four territories of Oklahoma, New Mexico, Arizona, and Alaska. Twelve years later, U.S. General Funston reported the killing of 640,000 Filipinos in the U.S. war with the Philippines (1899-1902). This was about twice the number of deaths that I know of in all of Hitler's concentration camps from 1933 to 1945. Yet the American moral preachers dare to act as moralizers to Hitler.

On Hitler's political tradition

Hitler, after all his study of the various wars - by this time he had already decided not to fight in the army of the imperial and royal multinational state - would have wanted to fight in only two wars: the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 to 1871 and the 4th Boer War of 1899 to 1902. But despite his affection for the freedom-loving Boers, Hitler, like most Germans, was a friend of England in his basic attitude. The influence of English Darwinism as well as Rudyard Kipling's conception of the "white man's burden," which Hitler was taught at school, is clear and is also evident in his view of existence and world. And this despite all the well-known English atrocities in New Zealand, Japan, China, India and elsewhere. But in relation to the 20th century, the behavior of the English in the 19th century could still be called**.

** At an NSDAP meeting on April 13, 1923 in Munich (Zirkus Krone) Hitler said: "England provides three proofs of the greatest political injustice: 1. Boer War: On the Boer side just desire for freedom, on England's side greed for money and diamonds. 2. opium war against China: England's military power forces weaker China to accept opium, making the last a ruined nation. 3. conquest of India: 275 000 Englishmen subjugate a cultured people of 300 million. Where has been the right here?"

The Anglo-American Influence on Germany

The spiritual influence of England on Germany is stronger than the Marxist one. And both are among the main reasons for Germany's present weakness. Nevertheless, the British influence is having a much more devastating effect on the U.S. than on Germany and Norway, and this despite the fact that the predominant ethnic element in this modern American Tower of Babel is the German one - many German-Americans as well as many Norwegians have adopted English names (for example, Rock Hudson, Doris Day, Veronica Lake, Fred Astaire, and others more). In my personal circle of acquaintances I know fifty German-American families alone who have anglicized their names (for example Wertenbäcker to Wertenbaker, Breidenbach to Breidebough, Schwarzwälder to Blackwelder). These are colleagues in academia. Of course, other ethnic groups do it similarly, but to a much lesser extent. The worst in this are the Norwegians. The reason is that, like the Germans, they succumb more than others to complete adaptation to Anglo-Saxon U.S. society because of their special influence in Europe. This is less true of other groups, such as the French, Italians and Dutch. Americans of Norwegian descent are held in high esteem in Norway; this is not the case with Americans of Danish and Swedish descent in Denmark and Sweden. On the contrary, they are treated with contempt and ridicule. Possibly a key to understanding the super-shark society of the United States lies in a realistic examination of the British Empire at its height (see Ludwig Reiners, *Roman der Staatskunst - Leben und Leistung der Lords*, Munich 1951). Reiners' study, which goes far beyond the excellent previous work of Karl Abshagen (*König und Gentlemen*, Berlin 1938), makes the 700-year-old Mafia seem like an ecclesiastical charity compared to the world-conquering clan of the English oligarchy, which comes primarily from the descendants of the Anglo-Norman conquerors. The ambiguous morality prevailing in the U.S. accepts the crimes of England as well as those of Israel.

It should also be mentioned that besides Zionism, England is another source of the terrible homosexual plague in the USA. Added to this is the heavy immigration of English and Australian homosexuals. One is reminded of the 1938 film by Renoir, the son of the great Impressionist painter, entitled

The Grand Illusion. Part of the action takes place in a very cozy, human prisoner of war camp for English, French and Russians during the World War I. The English and French prisoners ask permission to put on a play. They are told there are costumes available for the female roles. All the English, but no French, want to play these roles. Renoir may be the victim of propaganda, but still there is a grain of truth in it. One is reminded of Alfred Lord Tennyson's "poeta laureatus" at the time when the British Empire was at the height of its power, and his 18-year love affair with Arthur Hallam. This relationship was by no means secret. Consider also the Irish playwright Oscar Wilde, who was imprisoned for three years in Reading prison after homosexual seduction. Should be remembered that Wilde had offended his sweetheart's father, the Marquis de Queensbury - it is the same Marquis who established the modern rules of fisticuffs not Wilde's homosexuality, which he indulged in long enough, but his attack on British authority in the person of a wealthy Scottish lord that had landed him in prison.

While Hitler mentions that the bravery of the British troops in World War I won his admiration, it should nevertheless be pointed out that this appreciation of his had already been shaped during his Linz school days.

Greater German Aspirations since 1848

Hitler, who had also once toyed with the idea of making his way in the service of the Church, grew up as an idealist, a romantic, an artist and, above all, a utopian. In 1915, on the Krainberg, he said to his friend Kubizek that the greater Germany must arise again. When one considers the English hypocrisy on the occasion of the Czech question in 1938 (one should also mention the Romanian, Russian and Greek questions), one must remember how the staunch democratic liberals of the Frankfurt Paulskirche reacted when the Czech historian Frantisek Palacky proposed to divide Bohemia, one of the seven electorates of the First German Empire, into two and to create a separate Czech state in alliance with Russia. Heinrich von Gagern reminded Palacky that Bohemia had been an undiminished part of the German Confederation since the Congress of Vienna. The Constituent Assembly of 1848 was more concerned with further territories to be annexed to Germany

than with the question of giving away one's own territory out of pure charity.

Strictly speaking, Denmark was not a German state, but it was a member of the German Confederation because of its rule over Holstein. Schleswig, with its majority German population, was not one of them, although Schleswig-Holstein had belonged together since time immemorial. It was Paulskirche policy to use Prussian army as an executive arm in the Schleswig-Holstein question, with the approval of Prussian King Frederick William IV. At the same time, Prussia was a Polish uprising in Posen. The German Confederation included Silesia and Pomerania, but not Posen, West and East Prussia. Nor did it include the Habsburg possessions in Galicia, Hungary and Dalmatia. But Posen, which at the Congress of Vienna was to be granted to a Kingdom of Poland in personal union with Russia, had remained Prussian after the objections of the English, French and Austrians. Prussia, however, did not receive the promised Saxon territories. Moreover, Poland would have been barely viable with Posen but without Galicia. If the Frankfurt National Liberals were willing to risk war over all these issues, it is also understandable that they were not willing to compromise on the question of a Czech state allied with Russia in Bohemia, in the heart of Germany. If Palacky had continued to insist, he would have ended up in prison sooner or later.

The dream of a larger Germany, a Greater Germany, died first in 1849, forty years before Hitler was born, also with the shooting in Vienna of one Robert Blum, the emissary of the Frankfurt Paulskirche, and the premature accession to the throne of Emperor Franz Joseph. The dream of Little Germany died first in 1850 in Olomouc in Moravia, when in Prussia Radowitz and King Frederick William IV were forced to accept the ultimatum^{††} Francis Joseph and Tsar Nicholas I. Despite the bitter rivalry between the Habsburgs and the Romanovs in the Balkans, the Russians helped the Habsburgs,

^{††} After Prussia had initiated a German unification without Austria, Bavaria and Württemberg in the Erfurt Union in the spring of 1850, it had to withdraw from it in the "Olmützer Punktation" on 29.11.1850 under pressure from Russia in agreement with Austria. The German question remained unresolved.

including with two military interventions in Hungary, to destroy the dream of German unity, much to the delight of the British Lord Palmerston, and to let Germany relapse into reactionary conditions not much different from the era of a Metternich.

young Hitler admired Bismarck and Wilhelm II because both men, each in his own way, were excellent representatives of what Hitler called the German idea in the world, and this made him overlook the temporary estrangement between the two (1890 - 1895). While some negative critics claim that Bismarck made Germany small by taking everything from them, Hitler saw in Bismarck as well as in the emperor the convincing role models for his people.

For the young Hitler, the period from 1904 ("Entente Cordiale") until he was allowed to serve as a volunteer in a Bavarian infantry regiment was an exciting epoch. It would be wrong to claim that Hitler displayed a fatalistic attitude toward a possible major war. But the observer who overlooked the dangers of the British policy of encirclement for the flourishing new Germany would indeed have been blind. Undoubtedly, this possible danger to "beleaguered" Germany was a cause that made Hitler explore more closely the question of the Jews as a possible subversive element.

Hitler's idea of a greater Germany, as he had had in mind since 1905, was never connected with thoughts of colonies, as was the case with English and French boys of the same age. Although the outcome of the Boer Wars somehow fascinated Hitler, modern overseas colonialism, as was fashionable worldwide in the period up to 1914, never appealed to him. This may go back to his anchoring in classical as well as medieval lore. His dream was for Greater Germany with sufficient territory to ensure the country's needs for industrial raw materials and food. This was at a time when the population of Central Europe was multiplying and Hermann Göring once made the statement that Germany would number 200 million people by the year 2000. Meanwhile, two world wars intervened.

Looking at Hitler's youthful interests as a whole, it can be said that he was more interested in civil and artistic life than in the soldierly-military. He did not spend his time in Vienna, for example, drafting war maps and acting out imaginary wars. He wrote poetry and even an opera. He painted quite well

(see B. F. Price, *Adolf Hitler als Maler und Zeichner*, Zug 1983) and was able to make a living at it. He also continued his architectural studies as a self-taught artist. What a contrast to Churchill's life at Sandhurst! As a result of the mistreatment by his parents, the latter became a small-

*Another Hitler. Above: "Musica" (1910); below: Resting Quarters
in Fournes
(1915), pen and ink drawing with yellow, brown and colored pencils*

little disciplinarian who dreamed of exotic wars for comfort. - FDR delighted as a sixteen-year-old in his cousin Teddy's attack against the Spanish at San Juan Hill as well as Teddy's saying, "Look at those damn dead Spaniards!" One is reminded of General MacArthur's saying at Inchon in 1950, "Seeing those dead Koreans does my old eyes good!" FDR, for example, dreamed of a career in military administration. Therefore, in 1912, he asked Wilson for a position not in the Treasury but in the Navy. Roosevelt, like Churchill, was more militaristic in their youth than Hitler ever wanted to be.

Hitler never dreamed of a peacetime military career as did FDR and Churchill. Neither of them, nor their sons, aspired to be exposed to the dangers of a front-line soldier. They knew the desire and spirit of adventure that drove Stalin to raid banks, prompting Lenin to say that Stalin had a taste for criminals. Even in the victorious phase of the "Great Patriotic War" from 1943 to 1945, none of the top Soviet army leaders, such as Koniev and Zhukov, was free from the fear that a mistake made might cost them their lives (on this, see John Frickson *The Road to Berlin - Continuing the History of Stalin's War with Germany*, Boulder, Colorado, pp. 513ff.).

Hitler answered the call to the military only in the year of the crisis (1914), and in a country where he had lived for only half a year. He was ready to take on all dangers and did not waste a thought on financial, military or political advantages. He did not even demand German citizenship, which he did not receive until many years later. And if he came home from the war with the intention of entering politics, it was because Germany lay cheated, dishonored, and defeated. Hitler was an idealist. The years of thinking about Germany's role in Western civilization, as well as thinking about the achievement that Bismarck had accomplished in founding the Second Reich of the Germans, gave him the patriotic strength to be a model soldier in World War I, just as he was described his superior, Captain Fritz Wiedemann (see Fritz Wiedemann, *Der Mann, der Feldherr werden wollte*. Velbert 1964).

Sarajevo

Hitler grew up aware that Bismarck's brilliant empire, which embodied the

best social, economic and political system in the world at the time, was danger of being destroyed by a barbaric Russia, a vengeful France and an envious England. After the death of the Reich Foreign Minister Kiderlen-Wächter in 1912, it pained Hitler to have to watch Germany drawn more and more into the Habsburg Balkan policy instead of pursuing an independent and autonomous policy in the spirit of Kiderlen. A final example was the Sarajevo tragedy of June 28, 1914, which allowed England to launch its great war to destroy Germany. The Germans agreed to an Austro-Hungarian punitive expedition against Serbia.

This was a week after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife. No one could have imagined that this princely murder of the most capable Habsburg since Rudolf I could lead to a general or even localized war. When the Serbian royal family of the Obrenovics was assassinated in 1903, Edward VII had interrupted diplomatic relations with Serbia for five years as a sign of protest. And no one could have imagined that George V would act differently in 1914. No one would have believed that the English Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, would have asked his ambassador to Russia, Sir

When the new King of England, George V, came to Berlin in May 1913 for the wedding of the Emperor's daughter, Wilhelm II and Bethmann Hollweg believed that Britain would remain neutral in the Serbian conflict.... They overheard the constant warnings of their ambassador in London, Prince Lichnowsky.

Sir George Buchanan, would urge pressure on the Tsargo to war over Serbia against both Germany and Austria-Hungary But this is precisely what occurred.

The constant defiant and treaty-breaking behavior of the English in Europe in the years since 1904 ("Entente Cordiale"), the maneuvering of the Russians into the war, and the hypocritical pretext of the Belgian question for England's own entry into the war (it had been planned by treaty years before; see 1912 naval treaty with France, in which England agreed to protect the entire French Channel coast), led to the inescapable conclusion that England, of all the powers concerned, had fully considered war as a means of enforcing national policy In 1939, the British behaved accordingly. German political and military leaders were hanged for this at Nuremberg in 1946, and the English still pleased themselves in the role of judges

On Hitler's political views

Although Hitler admired the British Empire for mythical and romantic reasons known only to him, it never occurred to him that Germany should possess an overseas colonial empire of the same size as the British. Hans Grimm, for example, was disappointed that he, as a creative writer and poet, could not awaken in Hitler even an average interest in overseas colonies, as he laments in his 1954 book *Warum, woher - aber wohin* (Lippoldsberg). Hitler only ever saw Germany as firmly anchored in Europe, and he also did not see the Lebensraum concept as narrowly as his comrades-in-arms Himmler and Rosenberg. Hitler did not like either of them very much; also he could not decide to read Rosenberg's book *The Myth of the 20th Century*, because its historical approaches were too much humanistic and based in ancient Rome and Greece.

I agree with A. J. P. Taylor that Hitler was quite flexible in his relationship with Stalin and the USSR and did not intend from the outset to attack the

Russians. I can still remember how surprised I was when Helmut Sündermann told me in Ocean Beach, San Francisco, in 1965 that it had been a fixed idea of Hitler's since he came to power in 1933 to attack the Soviet Union. I disagreed with him vehemently, of course. As the second man after Dr. Dietrich in the press service of the Third Reich, Sündermann naturally held an important office and had many opportunities to talk to Hitler. I asked him if Hitler had ever spoken to him about this fixed idea, and Sündermann said no. However, he, Sündermann, had always had the instinctive feeling that Hitler was planning an attack on Russia. With all due respect to Helmut Sündermann (1911 - 1972), I agree with Taylor on this issue that Hitler, for all his idealism in foreign policy, was pragmatic enough and possessed the necessary agility to succeed in this area.

After England had shown with Lord Halifax in 1939 that it was not interested in friendly relations between itself, Poland, France, and Germany, and Stalin had given his speech to the Supreme Soviet on March 10, 1939, in which he sought greater flexibility in the foreign policy field while criticizing various aspects of English policy Hitler rightly interpreted this as an indication that Stalin responsive to Germany foreign policy Hitler made the first tentative connections through Soviet representatives in Berlin (see Karl Höffkes, *Deutsch-sowjetische Geheimverbindungen*. Tübingen 1988). And despite the presence of Western Allied special envoys, hesent Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and staff to Moscow in August 1939 conclude the German-Soviet nonaggression pact on August 23 Even when Stalin began committing treaty violation the Baltics and the Balkans shortly before the Franco-German armistice in June 1940, Hitler still thought it wise to avoid a two-front war through treaty agreements as long as he still had to deal with the British Empire, which was massively supported by the United States This also seemed safer than embarking on a daring arms race with the Bolshevik colossus. Even after the failure of the Molotov mission in Berlin in November 1940 - Stalin had delayed it for three months - Hitler had initiated provisional, but not definitive, planning as far as a preemptive war against the Soviet Union was concerned.

Burton Klein, in his book *Germany's Economic Preparations for War* (-

Harvard 1959), clearly demonstrates that, despite all the peace propaganda, England was relatively better prepared for war than Germany in 1939 -to mention Stalin's enormous armaments program He also mentions Hitler's desire for peace after his victory over France in 1940, which found expression in the fact that he ordered a reduction in forces in the summer of 1940. He would not have done all this if for years he had only thought of attacking the USSR Harry Elmer Barnes (*Revisionism and Brainwashing: a Survey of the War-Guilt Question in Germany after two World Wars*, 1963) rightly noted that Klein's thesis and his more than accurate statements of facts are major blows against the claim of Germany's chief war guilt European tragedy of 1939 to 1945

The outbreak of the Second World War is primarily to be blamed on England and Poland. Both openly used war as a means of enforcing their policies. Their actions also show that both policies have been a fraud since the Munich Conference of 1938.

Fraud was also the English offer of a German-English friendship treaty of September 30, 1938, accepted by Hitler, as well as the English offer to guarantee the security of Czecho-Slovakia after the Munich Agreement. As French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet later confirmed, England never intended to make such a declaration One used this question only as a hanger. It can be stated that in August 1938, even before the so-called Munich Pacification Conference, Poland and England had hatched the plan how to force Hitler first to a local, but in the end to a world war against the two great allies Stalin and Roosevelt. - The result was then different than expected: The USA and the USSR divided up the world in 1945, the British were eliminated as a power factor world politics after five years of Churchill's leadership and Poland was a suppressed satellite of Moscow

August Kubizek (*Adolf Hitler, mein Jugendfreund*, Graz 1989) recalls the Bayreuth Festival in 1940, where Hitler expressed his yearning for peace in order to be able to carry out all the peace projects he had discussed with his childhood friend. It is clear from Kubizek's book that Hitler did not dream of military glory, but constantly emphasized literature, art, painting, architecture, and above all civilian achievements and accomplishments in

order to make Germany beautiful and great. - Hermann Giesler also confirms that Hitler himself, two months before his death, preferred to concern himself with reconstruction rather than with warlike destruction (loc. cit.).

A. J. P. Taylor (loc. cit.) points out in his 1961 book - in which he absolves Germany of the main war guilt - that it would have been wiser for Hitler the confrontations with Stalin and FDR 1941. Even if one accepts Hitler's main arguments for his preemptive war against Russia - avoiding a disastrous two-front war as in World War I and forestalling a sure Soviet attack on all of Europe - Hitler, had he had any idea of the outcome of the 47-month-long struggle in the East, would have been as frightened as anyone else.

This leads us to the question of Hitler's military advisers (see Wheeler-Bennett, *The Nemesis of Power: the German Army in Politics, 1918-1945*. New York 1954.). Hitler himself was responsible for the decisive planning in the French and Russian campaigns, not, as is often claimed, Manstein for the French campaign and Marcks for the Russian campaign. The vast majority of his military advisers were terrified of the possible outcome of the French campaign. Nevertheless, it was over in six weeks. The Polish campaign had lasted five weeks - with Soviet help; the French had been helped by the British. The same advisers were very confident about the outcome of the Russian campaign. Nevertheless, it faltered after five months and ended 42 months later with an indescribable catastrophe.

Stalin, who had been Roosevelt's ally since 1933, had turned back to England in 1940 after Sir Stafford Cripps' mission to Moscow. According to the testimony of all Soviet generals (see Bialyer collection, loc. cit.), Stalin, regardless of his treaty violations, assembled massive troop formations to strike against Germany at the most opportune moment for him. The value of the Soviet spy Richard Sorge - who had emerged from the Frankfurt School around Max Horkheimer (see Viktor Suvorov, *Der Eisbrecher - Hitler in Stalins Kalkül*, Stuttgart 1989; and Rudolf Künast, *Umweltzerstörung und Ideologie*, Tübingen 1985) - in Tokyo was that he could report to Stalin that the Japanese would stay out of a German-Soviet war. This allowed Stalin to use many of his Siberian

elite divisions from the Far East to the front near Moscow in the fall of 1941

and stabilize them against the Germans. As for Roosevelt's Germany policy (see Friedländer, *Auftakt zum Untergang*, Stuttgart 1965), Hitler deserves top marks for not being lured out of his restraint by the U.S. president's myriad challenges. But FDR's move with Pearl Harbor, as well as the collapse of resistance in the U.S. to entering the war, led to direct military confrontation between the Roosevelt U.S. and Hitler's Germany.

Hitler and the betrayal

Hitler bore the brunt of seeing the Habsburgs drag Germany into a major war over the Balkan issue in 1914. However, this did not diminish his loyalty. Throughout his life, Hitler was convinced that the war of 1914 could have been avoided if Germany had been led by a Bismarck, a Kiderlen guard or himself. Thus he expressed himself to the Romanian Foreign Minister Gafencu in 1939 (*Europe's Last Days*).

Hitler loved Bismarckian Germany and, although he was Austrian, revered the Prussian kings, here above all Frederick the Great, who had created the modern Prussian superpower. This, in turn, had made German unity in the small-German form possible. And Hitler hoped one day for the greater Germany in which Prussians and Austrians would be brothers forever. Hitler had also distributed leaflets against the law on universal conscription in Austria-Hungary because, unlike his father, he disliked the Habsburgs.

At the Führer's headquarters in Vinnitsa, Ukraine, Hitler told Giesler how disturbed he was by the treachery, espionage and sabotage, especially in the highest places, and this in times of mortal danger to Germany. Hitler never took any of this personally, nor could it ever shake his faith in the German people as a whole. Nevertheless, a few days after the Stauffenberg assassination on July 20, 1944 he still dismayed when Kaltenbrunner handed him the complete list of known people involved in the conspiracy including primarily leading military officers (see *Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung: die Kaltenbrunner-Berichte*, Stuttgart 1961).

It is not uninteresting to mention that Hitler communicated this to Giesler

even before the great defeat at Stalingrad (February 1943) - the battle for Moscow in the fall of 1941 cannot be counted as a catastrophe, since it did not lead to any collapse of the German front; and the defeat at Rostov was more a strategic retreat. In the late summer of 1942, Hitler was at odds with some leading officers - it is worth recalling the diary of Chief of General Staff Franz Halder, who was pleased with the traffic jam he deliberately caused when it came to moving tanks and other transport into the Caucasus. Such an attitude would have been unthinkable in an English or American officer at the same time. According to Halder's diary Paulus took over as commander-in-chief 6th Army at Stalingrad after the mysterious death of General von Reichenau had sabotaged supplies for Rommel, making the conquest of Egypt impossible (see the manuscript of the uncensored Halder diary, Hoover Institution in Stanford, California; *Generaloberst Halder's Kriegstagebuch*, Stuttgart 1962).

During the time that Giesler was Hitler's guest in Ukraine, the latter also confided to his architect that he was certain he was surrounded by traitors (see Giesler, *Ein anderer Hitler*, p. 402).

Hitler saw the beginning of sabotage as early as July 1941, after the German troops had covered two-thirds of the distance to Moscow in three weeks and at the same time were deep in Ukraine and just outside Leningrad. From that point on, Hitler could say with one hundred percent certainty that nothing was going as planned. Would it not have been better if General von Manstein, who was aware of the conspiracy intentions, had informed his commander in chief instead of concealing this from his officer comrades out of esprit de corps (see Erich von Manstein, *Verlorene Siege*, Bonn 1955, p. 59ff.).

Many problems in the German military leadership were the result of ethical as well as political ignorance. The following significant detail may be cited: U.S. General Wedemeyer, one of the many U.S. officers of German descent (of whom no army could be proud, for he was known for his inhumane actions, which included the execution of prisoners of war), received permission to attend the Berlin Military Academy in the mid-1930s. A graduate of West Point, he was surprised to find that officers received no instruction in philosophy or politics. The emphasis was entirely on military

technology, strategy, and tactics. This was the key to the downfall of the German Wehrmacht. The English Hindenburg biographer J. W. Wheeler-Bennett (*The Nemesis of Power: the German Army in Politics, 1918-1945*, loc. cit.) and the German-Jewish historian Curt Riess (*The Glory and Doom of the German Generals*, New York 1949) attempted to show this.

Wedemeyer noted that most of the noble officers at the military academy were sons of landed gentry who could order around farm workers, but who had practically no knowledge in political as well as ethical terms. Any pronouncements Hitler in this area did not work on them

This background also makes Fedor von Bock's comment understandable. The latter declared that he would do exactly the opposite of what Hitler had ordered for the Russian war. Instead of shooting the Soviet commissars - who, according to the laws of war, were not legitimate members of the Red Army - he would dine with them. On the common people, whom Hitler wanted to be treated well, he would spit.

It is obvious that this old-fashioned Prussian general, who prided himself on never smiling, helped to evoke that hatred among the Russians which enabled Stalin to proclaim his "Great Patriotic War". And it is also a fact that many mainly noble German officers wanted to see Germany down rather than Hitler succeed. Is the reason possibly that Hitler was a native Austrian? The Sudeten German and Austrian officers certainly made less trouble. One is reminded of the dispute of the Gerlach brothers against Bismarck, who did not want their beloved Prussia to be contaminated by Germany.

Since 1940, some officers called Hitler "Gröfaz" in the casinos. Only if you hate someone, you can call him such a name. What could Hitler do about the fact that an employee of the Hamburger *Fremdenblatt* described him after the French campaign as the "greatest general of all time"? It is a great effort to imagine the narrow-mindedness of these people.

According to Giesler, after the end of the war in Landsberg, a German general who was far away from Rastenburg at the time of Stauffenberg's assassination on July 20, 1944, is said to have claimed that Stauffenberg was no longer able to fire a pistol at the time of the assassination (which is not true), and that Hitler was wearing a bulletproof helmet and vest during that

hot summer time - this is also not true. Similar false viewsconspirators' confessionsthe Kaltenbrunner reportThebigotry and ignorance expressed therein, the prejudices and the lack of a sense of what is feasible are truly breathtaking.

Russia would have been defeated in 1941. Only sabotage and narrow-minded traitors brought Germany's downfall. Although Germany's military starting position in 1942 was still quite favorable, Hitler, knowing all this, was not at all hopeful. What effect does it have when, out of three supply ships to Africa and Finland, two are lost through sabotage? What happens when a General von Thies, whose name Hitler did not even know and who acted as successor to the "Red Chapel", which had been smashed in 1941, made sure that the highest military decisions, down to the last detailavailable to Stalin within 24 hours?What happens when, on the basis of a wrong order, the 194th Infantry Division in the front sectionnear Stalingrad goes to the dogs within a few minutes because the order of a Seydlitz told them to leave the dugouts a few minutes before a Russian attack? Do we need to list more examples? The 47-month German-Sovietwar is a prime example of how the winning side became the losing side through treachery, sabotage and espionage

In the summer of 1942, Hitler also confided to Giesler that since July 1941, and especially since the time when he had to depose the shady General Walther von Brauchitsch - who tried to play a role in the July 20 putsch in Berlin - and take over the supreme command himself, the main daily problem was to deal with recalcitrant officers, to deal with false reports, and even to deal with open treason And all this on top of the already difficult burden of commanding in chief.

Giesler, who was himself a decorated veteran of World War I, reports that you could see the fear on Hitler's face, although he was otherwise a good actor and could hide his emotions. At the slightest argument or contradiction, the officers would click their heels together and say, "I ask for my leave!" As if the war was a game and you could go home if you wanted to. Hitler then recalled the 1941-42 campaign and Bock's proposal to withdraw to the Polish border. This would certainly have beequivalent to Napoleon's debacle and

would have meant Germany's defeat But the German soldiers fought on with admirable courage, and the front held. Hitler felt that 1942, or 1943 at the latest, was the last chance to avoid the two-front war that Germany had feared since 1914 Therefore, he once again threw all his forces into the offensive of 1942 to bring Stalin to his knees so that he could strike the final blow in 1943 at the latest (see Giesler, *loc. cit.*, p. 403).

Giesler tried to convince Hitler that his Major Groth, who was leading an expedition to climb Mount Elbrus, the highest mountain in the Caucasus, was of some use, on the basis of the good propaganda effect it would have on Germany itself. Hitler, however, shook his head and said good-naturedly that Germany's situation was much too critical for such peacetime undertakings and that it would be better if Major Groth and his mountain troops concentrated on the capture of the port of Sukhum on the Black Sea (*loc. cit.*).

Hitler then confided to Giesler that he was forced to replace Halder because of the latter's constant insubordination, arrogance, and open hatred—three months later Halder was replaced by Zeitzler, who performed his duties satisfactorily for almost two years until his serious illness. Hitler pointed out, however, that isolated personnel measures would not solve the overall problem of conspiracy, sabotage, and espionage that was in the air but intangible. Somewhere among his officers, probably even in the highest ranks, Hitler said, there were people who wanted to sell Germany to Stalin. This is reminiscent of many senior Reichswehr officers of the Weimar period who could only imagine an alliance with Stalin, or of Hitler's own military attaché to Stalin (until 1941), who, although aware of the latest Soviet weapons, deliberately did not inform Hitler of them.

Frederick the Great used to say that he was a philosopher when he was with his generals. And when he was with his philosophers, he would say that he was a Spartan general in the morning and that in the afternoon he was like the generals of Athens. Hitler and Giesler were, in a sense, colleagues in the field of architecture, although Hitler had no academic training in this area. Giesler, on the other hand, had studied architecture for eight semesters and had practiced his profession steadily since 1924. Giesler, born in 1898, was nine years younger than Hitler. Just as the latter shared a love of music with

his childhood friend Kubizek, so he shared a love of architecture with Giesler.

Giesler's book reveals many times that Hitler not only had knowledge of contemporary architecture in Europe, but also had excellent knowledge of Roman and Greek architecture. In addition, and Giesler also shows this, Hitler himself was a first-class architectural creator. In this he differs from the recreational painters Churchill and Eisenhower, from Woodrow Wilson, the collector of bawdy shillelagh verse("limericks"), and from the stamp collector FDR

*Fortress Germany 1943as
the First World War*

To what can one compare the military situation of Hitler's beloved Bismarck Germany after the senseless defeat at the Marne and after the botched invasion of France in the fall of 1914? Could it not be compared with the situation of the Third Reich when, since November 1942, after 38 months of unchallenged victories, everything went wrong, when a series of defeats set in, culminating in the Battle of Stalingrad and the Volga in February 1943? Add to that the loss of Libya and of Tunisia in May 1943, as well as the lost battle of Kursk in early July 1943 and the loss of Sicily in mid-August 1943! After so many victories, a series of heavy losses within only eight months. But that was not all! Grand Admiral Dönitz's U-boat fleet also suffered a heavy defeat in March 1943 when the enemy's use of new technology blunted the submarine weapon. Even though the U-boat war continued until the end of the war, the damage inflicted on the enemy was now far less than his own high losses; the two sons of the Grand Admiral were also among the 33,000 dead German submariners. In 1943, Hitler's Fortress Europe was, as Helmut Sündermann so aptly put it, a fortress without a roof.

However desperate Hitler's military situation had become by mid-1943 - the Allies had air superiority, controlled the seas unchallenged, and were also superior at least on the Russian front, where the Germans had to retreat constantly and could no longer win a battle, as in the days of Frederick the Great - it was little different from that of Germany in September 1914. The main front World War I was not in Russia, but in France. When the Germans

and the English had taken up their mutual positions in the area of the Channel ports. October 1914, the beginning of the unlawful and piratical English famine blockade, it seemed unlikely careful observers like Hans Delbrück - who had written a book on warfare on a world scale - that German troops would ever manage to break through the Anglo-French front in France. Even Marshal Petain, who had a special eye on development of new weapons techniques (machine guns, artillery, and aerial reconnaissance), thought that the attacker would be drowned in the fire of the defense.

Of course, there was still the faint possibility that Russia could be defeated before it had completely drained Germany, and that the danger of a two-front war would thus have been averted. Initially, this prospect was more than unfavorable. In the first year of the war (1914 - 1915), losses on the Russian front were far higher than on the Western Front despite support from Austria-Hungary. Falkenhayn's boast in 1916 that German losses in an offensive would be half those of the French turned out to be a great mistake. After a six-month onslaught against the stronghold of Verdun, it became apparent that German losses (500,000 soldiers) were roughly equal to those of the French in what had been the largest and costliest land war of all time. Moreover, Petain was able to hold the original positions at Verdun and claim a defensive victory.

In the meantime, the Central Powers had occupied Poland and Serbia in World War I and allied themselves with Turkey, which turned out to be exceedingly dubious on the whole. The promised help of the Poles against the Russians was to be forgotten (it was similar with Franco's help in Russia in the Second World War). The Allies violated Greek neutrality in the Salonika area in order to build up an unpleasant and increasingly dangerous front against Bulgaria. The Habsburgs suffered further defeats against the Russians, such as in the Brusilov offensive in Buchenland (Bukovina) in 1916. Preventing the breakthrough cost more German soldiers' lives.

Russia left the First World War in 1917. But the Americans now deployed in France were undoubtedly fresh, having not fought a major war since 1865 (the Civil War). They entered the war to defend with their blood the financial investments of a J. P. Morgan and a Rockefeller.

The logic was to lend material and money to the side that had initiated the blockade, and then, when the side suffering from the blockade seemed to be winning, to declare war on the victims of the blockade and to ruin them mercilessly and without pity. If one considers the endless series of crimes committed against Germany by Wilson, Roosevelt and all the others, taking into account also the numerous denigrations and blackmails, an attentive observer can only laugh at the readiness of those who today willingly hope for American friendship. There is hardly anyone in established U.S. America who would be willing to lift a little finger for the restoration of German unity. On the contrary, there are constant demands for financial injections from West Germany in order to rehabilitate its own crisis-ridden economy. In doing so, the Americans are not doing themselves any favors in the medium and long term. And very soon they will be too weak to continue their costly and disastrous interference in the eastern half of the world.

Due to the events of the last fifty years, the Europeans will probably never think of sending home the arrogant and insufferable US imperialists in the spirit of FDR (almost all presidents after 1945 can be considered as FDR's court singers) because of the permanent Zionist propaganda (in the form of plutocracy, Marxism, Zionism, etc.). But, like it or not, developments will force the U.S. to withdraw. The Englishman Graham Greene wrote his book *The Ugly American* in 1961. This book is about the liberation of Europe and in particular the liberation of Germany, the most oppressed of all European countries. Inevitably, there are several references to the American oppressors, who are called here not the ugly Americans, but the dirty Americans, because since the inauguration of W. Wilson in 1913 and especially since the presidency of F. D. Roosevelt, their methods and their system must be called dirty. Even Coolidge and Hoover were unable to clean out the Augean stables left by Wilson. And then came the Roosevelt era!

USA are taken for England

The historian Karl Lamprecht (*German History*, 15 vols., Leipzig 1892-1905) correctly foresaw the outcome of World War I, although he died as early as

1911. He gained his view primarily after a tour of the United States following the French-English alliance of 1904. James Harvey Robinson, the creator of the radical and unconventional *New History*, had invited Lamprecht to lecture at New York's Columbia University. He hoped Lamprecht would support his movement, although Lamprecht's socio-psychological philosophy of history was miles away from Robinson's views. Lamprecht was also a regular nationalist and loyal to Bismarck's empire. Robinson? He was a cosmopolitan who lived constantly at war with most human institutions. Lamprecht naturally took the opportunity to look around the country, and also visited Wisconsin, Oregon, and California. To his great horror, he had to realize that the population, including German-Americans, had been brainwashed by the British imperialists since the Spanish-American War of 1898-1899 and the Philippine War (1899-1902). The folksy Teddy Roosevelt ruled in the White House at that time. Teddy was an ardent supporter and promoter of the English world overlords and at that time supported the English in their aid to the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese War. But it was clear to Lamprecht that the war in the Far East would by no means weaken the Russians in Europe for long. Before it came to that, the English would already intervene as mediators. And so it happened.

Lamprecht gained the certainty that a great war coalition was brewing against Germany in the style of Kaunitz, the chancellor of Maria Theresa in her quarrel with Frederick the Great, since the United States, regardless of any English crimes, was openly on England's side and England was ready for war with Germany no matter what efforts the Kaiser might make to pacify and satisfy England. War would then break out when England had completed her preparations, especially since U.S. America was on call for London. All Lamprecht could say and hope was that his beloved Germany would meet the fate of another Seven Years' War in the face of this great war coalition (see Karl Lamprecht, *Americana - Reiseindrücke, Betrachtungen, geschichtliche Gesamtansicht*, Freiburg 1906).

The only difference with Hitler's view of a beleaguered Bismarck Germany in 1914 was that the experienced historian Lamprecht had his additional America experience. It was short, but fully sufficient to see the terrible danger

coming and to predict with great accuracy the course of the looming war.

Hitler and the USA

The fact that Hitler declared war on FDR-America in 1941 and did not wait for the latter to do so itself - as England had done in 1939, as well as the USA and England had declared war on Germany in World War I - is seen by American historians such as John Toland (loc. cit.) as being due to the fact that Hitler did not particularly appreciate the Americans as a factor in world politics. For all his knowledge, Hitler did not have the personal experience that Lamprechthad In this respect, his assessment for the period of World War I is somewhat dubious. As far as World War II is concerned, it is more sound, Hitler having been in close contact with Putzi Hanfstaengl for fifteen years (see Ernst Hanfstaengl, *Unheard Witness*, New York 1957). Putzi Hanfstaengl, who had studied at Harvard University and had known several U.S. presidents, confirmed that Hitler had a fairly good grasp of U.S. reality.

Ex-President Herbert Hoover, after his conversation with Hitler on March 8, 1938, declared that Hitler saw through American as well as British politics quite well. When the German chargé d'affaires Thomsen complained about the increasing interference of the Americans in the spirit of 1917, Hitler replied that he spent too much time in Washington and that he should travel around the country more.

When FDR tried to conjure up incidents of American destroyers unlawfully escorting British convoys with German U-boats early in World War II Hitler issued orders to Grand Admiral Dönitz to exercise restraint And although there were some minor incidents, they were not enough to give Roosevelt the leverage to rush the public into a war against Germany that was opposed by eighty percent of the population at the time, as opinion polls showed.

If the "American First Committee" (the >America First< Committee) supported by wealthy businessmen, congressmen and senators, had continued to oppose interference in Europe after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, safe to assume that Hitler, following Ribbentrop's advice, would have offered his hand to the U.S., especially since the 1940 treaty between the Axis

powers (Germany, Italy, Japan) was a defense pact But the whole "American First Committee" fell apart like a deck of cards after Pearl Harbor. And Connolly, as spokesman for the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was able to declare that a state of war would result from either a declaration of war by the Axis powers or a declaration of war by the United States. It no longer mattered to American war readiness who would declare war.

Ribbentrop, who been instrumental in bringing about the tripartite alliance with Japan, attempted, after the collapse of the America First Committee, to make it clear within the first twenty-four hours after the Japanese attack that Germany had not been informed of the attack until December 8, 1941, and to influence Hitler not to declare war on FDR, especially since the Japanese had refused to enter the war against Stalin despite repeated requests Mussolini had already declared war on the United States before Hitler did.

Hitler, who knew from Grand Admiral Raeder that the Japanese had not been able to strike a decisive blow at Pearl Harbor because the American aircraft carriers had not been hit and other ships could be quickly repaired, nevertheless decided to declare war on the USA. He did so in a public speech on December 11, 1941, sharpening his criticism of Roosevelt from his Reichstag speech of April 28, 1939. Hitler also questioned FDR's state of health This question has been addressed by the well-known New York physician and psychologist Dr. E.M. Josephson (*The Strange Death of Franklin D. Roosevelt: a history of the Roosevelt-Delano Dynasty, America's Royal Family*, - New York 1948) has gone into it in great detail. Josephson's thesis is: Roosevelt had been mentally ill for years. Shortly before his death he became so confused and senile that he began to divulge important secrets. Therefore, he was killed by the secret service several years before his otherwise passing, at the urging of the Rockefeller clan and other Rothschild agents. Only an autopsy would ultimately determine the true causes of death. In cases of sudden death, the law mandates an investigation; insurance companies also require it To this day, no such autopsy has been performed. In life as in death, FDR despised and violated the law ...

indeed most astonishing that the cause of death was not investigated, but

passed over with the greatest silence It is also strange that Roosevelt's coffin was not opened to the public even for a short time, either before or during the funeral ceremonies.

At that time, Eimer Davis of the OWI ("Office of War Information") announced to the soldiers over the radio the lie that Roosevelt was laid out in the White House and that thousands would pass by the coffin every day (loc. cit., pp. 287f.)

John T. Flynn, in his *The Roosevelt Myth* (New York 1948, p.418), comes to the following general conclusion about the deranged and pathological liar FDR: "He broke every promise. He betrayed all who trusted him." The exception to this, he said, was FDR's relationship with Stalin, the one person he served constantly all his life - it should also be noted here the great expression of grief state-directed Soviet press - One has to ask why all those West German historians like Grewe and Jacobsen, according to whom Roosevelt was Germany's best friend, never read such independent commentaries and findings as those of Flynn and Josephson?

The disagreement between Hitler and Ribbentrop over the declaration of war on the United States prompted me to seek out William L. Langer at Harvard in 1946, who had the best access to the events and facts of the time because of the work he had done during the war. He was, moreover, the leading U.S. historian in the study of diplomacy. Langer had also done translations for the "German Library of Information" in 1941 and knew German thought quite well, especially since he had lived in Europe, especially Vienna, for several years. He told me that he had thought long and hard about this question, since it was also the subject of his two-volume work *Challenge to Isolation* - published in 1950 - on which he was working at the time. He agreed completely with Hitler about Ribbentrop. Opposition to Roosevelt's war policy had ground to a halt at every level in the United States. It no longer mattered at all to FDR whether he or Hitler declared war. He had his opportunity to destroy Germany That was also the main reason why he had been the first to challenge the Japanese to an unnecessary war. Hitler, on the other hand, was in the midst of the deadly crisis of the Russian winter outside Moscow. Psychologically, nothing would have been worse

than another declaration of war from the other side. Ribbentrop's attitude was one of wishful thinking, while according to Langer, Hitler's opinion was the more realistic. Nothing could be gained by Germany waiting until the USA declared war on it. Hitler's December speech of 1941 surpassed by far his masterly Reichstag speech of April 28, 1939

Harvard professor to FDR

Although I personally regret that Langer sold out to FDR in April 1941, when his work at Harvard was in jeopardy - he made himself fully safe in the *New York Times Magazine* praising Woodrow Wilson, a man he always despised. From the perspective of the time, I nevertheless still respect his historical judgment. In any case, I knew from private conversations that Langer's good opinion of Hitler had not changed by the time of his death in 1977. Langer's switch to the other side also coincided with Goering's defeat in the air battle over England. It was also the time shortly after Roosevelt, breaking neutrality, had delivered 50 U.S. destroyers to Churchill. Further, it was by now known to insiders that there had been a rupture between Hitler and Stalin. The Harvard establishment took Langer's side as soon as it became clear that Adolf Hitler, who appeared to be the victor, would lose the war after all (see W. L. Langer *When German Dreams Come True*, Yale Review, Fall 1938).

Like Harry Rudin, the chairman of the historian's department at Yale University, Langer had had to work his way up from humble beginnings. If Langer had not divorced his first wife for a blonde floozy with big financial aspirations, he probably would not have sold out to FDR and his Harvard coterie. Numerous witnesses confirm that Langer detested the pro-Stalin orientation of the Harvard group. Langer told me that my revisionist dissertation on Poland would not encounter any problems at Harvard, if only because they hated Poles for their attitude toward Stalin.

Felix Frankfurter, who had reached the highest U.S. court through Roosevelt, and other well-known intellectuals had followed Roosevelt's official line after 1937 and had expressed their enthusiasm more and more clearly despite the massive waves of purges in Russia. Mikhail Karpovich,

who had been one of the social reformers around Kerensky in Russia whom Lenin had eliminated one by one, was most disturbed by the change at Harvard: the opposition to Stalin of the 1920s had turned into an endorsement of Stalin's policies. Later it turned out that Karpovich, who had a good reputation at the university and was one of my favorite professors, had been slandered to the FBI as a fascist. He was interrogated and had an exceedingly hard time at a time when anti-Communist Russians were going to prison en masse (see John Stephan, *The Russian Fascists*, New York 1978, p. 291 f.).

If English observers had been more attentive, they should have found out the background to all this, namely, the underlying alliance between FDR and Stalin. Henry May, professor of American intellectual and religious history, showed this clearly in a letter of January 4, 1940, to Professor Harry Elmer Barnes, who had previously been a professor at Columbia University but had been working as a correspondent for the Scripps-Howard newspaper chain since 1937. He wrote that Harvard had overwhelmingly gone over to the isolationist camp after the *German-Soviet nonaggression pact*. No one at Harvard seemed to be concerned whether Hitler attacked England or not - the letter I mentioned is in my possession. Years later I had several discussions with May, and I found that he, like some others, was still very pro-Soviet. When Hitler started the war with Russia due to Stalin's change of sides, Harvard swung over to the pro-war camp overnight and came out in support of Stalin. The same process could be observed in the so-called elite circles all over the USA.

Anthony C. Sutton points out in his book *Western Capital Aids to the USSR* (3 vols., Stanford 1967-1971; see also his *Roosevelt und die internationale Hochfinanz*. Tübingen 1990) points out that in the U.S. not only the prospect of profit but also ideological reasons were at play when it came to giving Stalin a helping hand. Although the mass of Americans reacted favorably to the outbreak of the German-Russian war, this changed due to OWI propaganda after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The fact that Germany's military situation in July 1943 was hopeless, or at least as desperate as in September 1914, is due to the murderous hostility of official America, which cannot be justified by reason.

Frank Chambers is correct in his book *The War behind the War* (New York 1952, p. 242ff.) when he states that in World War I, German control of both Belgian and northern French industry in the Lille area, together with home industrial production twice that of England, would have won a war of material and wear in the West despite the fiasco at the first Battle of the Marne, had not J.P. Morgan and J. D. Rockefeller supplied the Anglo-French front with huge quantities of ammunition, and if the pro-English U.S. president had not tolerated English famine blockade, which was contrary to international law. This US-Anglomania prevented the Germans from winning the defensive war against the encirclement policy of the arrogant English.

The situation in 1943 was similar to that in World War I, but worse. As recent documents provided by the Pentagon show, we have been misled for years about the extent of American aid to the Russians.

The only account of these events so far (Georg Jordan, *Sowjets siegen durch Spione*, Göttingen 1960) states that throughout the Second World War, despite the access roads in Persia, the mass of ships called at the Pacific ports and despite the huge convoys to Murmansk, only goods worth 11 billion dollars went to Stalin, but for 50 billion to Churchill. Now it turns out that already by the end of 1942 material for 11 billion dollars had gone to Stalin, to be followed in the next 30 months by more for 42 billion dollars.

On the basis of Major Jordan's nonsensical figures, which many authors accepted as correct, I had to start from the assumption in one of my books (*The Myth of the New History*, New York 1965; 2nd ed. Los Angeles 1985) that the Roosevelt financial aid had not been decisive for Stalin's victory. It would have been unnecessary to speculate if the exact figure of \$53 billion had been known—for example, the entire U.S. defense budget in 1938 was only \$800 million, one sixtieth the amount of Stalin's aid. Today it can be said with all clarity that it was American aid to Stalin that ultimately decided the war in Europe in Stalin's favor and thus ushered in all that we have witnessed in Eastern and parts of Central Europe before and after 1945 and practically to

this day. Did official post-Roosevelt-era America ever express mourning because of this? How can official West Germany today pretend that the Americans are its friends? Without Stalin and his American helpers, there would be 160 million Germans today instead of 90 million. The fear that Germany threatened with extinction today would not exist

However, it is not my task to dictate to the official West Germany whom it wants to take as a friend. Of course, I defend myself against the accusation that I am bitter when I draw attention to some essential points I have never been the victim of the atrocities committed in Europe. I oppose them on the basis of fundamental ethical considerations. We shall see what happens to the Bonn-Washington friendship when America has to withdraw more and more from Europe and other areas its increasing economic difficulties. The world heaved a sigh of relief when the British Empire became a toothless lion in 1945. When "Uncle Sam" goes down on his knees, there will be an even greater sigh of relief, because the U.S. has hurt the world the most.

Hitler, the loyal soldier of World War I, lost to provincial U.S. settlers two fatherlands: first, Bismarck's empire, which he had admired in his youth and defended with great courage in World War I; second, the Third Reich, which he himself had created. Was there ever a case in the history of the world where a country thousands of miles away and separated by an ocean, whose largest ethnic group was of German descent and which claimed to be a democracy and harbored no imperialist intentions, twice waged war in spiteful and hostile manner against Germany, which had never been hostile to it, and brought Germany much hardship, ignominy, misery, hunger and death? Even the 700-year war of extermination waged by the English against the Irish or the Hundred Years' War between England and France are easier to explain than the repeated American attacks on Germany, Ireland, France and also

Scotland were in the immediate vicinity of England and were, after all, quite respectable targets. This cannot be said for the USA and Germany.

The ignorance and corruption of the USA

In his exile in Doorn, Kaiser Wilhelm II told George Sylvester Viereck the

story of the American traveler to Europe, according to which the Americans were not comfortable with the idea of having to wage war against their old German friends. But the Americans could not simply stand by and watch the Germans constantly mistreat the two French girls of Alsace and Lorraine (!). An American of the same ilk thought Pearl Harbor was an American girl raped by the Japanese. Giesler reports of an American commandant in the Landsberg camp who heard of a Goethe celebration. If it turned out that this Goethe had been a member of the "Nazi" party, he would have to forbid the celebration. A widow from the best circles in San Francisco said to the German historian Fritz Fischer that she feared Germany because it was bigger than America. Ignorance is indeed the main source of crime

American pragmatism of a Pierce, James and Dewey - and pragmatism is American philosophy par excellence- assumes that Plato's search for the true, the good and the beautiful is nonsense

Russian Jew Ivan Boesky recently swindled himself out two billion dollars on the American securities market through criminal activities. He got away with a fine of 100 million dollars. So far I have read only good things about this "successful" entrepreneur in the media. No American Jew has been praised more than Bernard Baruch, who served as an advisor to six (!) U.S. presidents. Baruch behaved the same way as Boesky in 1898, but did not have to pay any penalty. Nathan Rothschild also got off scot-free when he skimmed the English market in 1815. When Baruch made a huge profit as late as 1929, he sent Churchill a million dollars, and this at a time when Churchill, as a journalist - it was his learned profession - received eight shillings for a word. Baruch was considered clever because he bought himself an influential English politician. Churchill was later all the more ready to fight against the Munich Agreement and to incite war against Germany.

Illiteracy is on the rise in the U.S. - currently estimated at 40 percent of the adult population. Most have never tried to read a book in its entirety, or are not encouraged to do so in the state schools, which devour as much as 50 percent of state budgets. 1986 statewide elections for Congress (all members of the House of Representatives and one-third of the Senate), only less than 37 percent of eligible voters went to the polls. And it is unlikely that turnout will be

much higher in the next presidential election Columnists like Andy Rooney claim in all seriousness that the fewer people who went to the polls, the better the elections would be. How does he know that it is not people of stature who stay home out of reluctance? Many columnists claim that it would be better if the U.S. were a debtor country instead of constantly having a favorable trade balance Doesn't this all suggest that the moment of truth is coming for the American national philosophy of pragmatism and for most of the ignorant?

The more the American ship of state begins to lurch, the more aid will be demanded from Germany and Japan. And ironically, these demands will be accompanied by the nonsensical claim that these states are obligated to do so because of aid they received earlier. The fact is, however, that America did its best to wipe out both Germany and Japan. Marshall Plan aid - most of it to England, with neutral Ireland receiving not a penny - to Germany after World War II amounted to less than half the American occupation costs And German trade with Argentina was worth more than all the American aid.

The Hypocrisy of the Atlantic Charter

Roosevelt and Churchill, when they met in August 1941, both promised in the Atlantic Charter that there would be no territorial changes in connection with World War II without the consent of the peoples concerned. Regardless of the human tragedies, could anyone measure the value of the German eastern provinces of East Prussia, Gdansk, Pomerania, East Brandenburg, Silesia and the Sudetenland? The smile on a Japanese face says a lot when you hear someone say they are indebted to America. One must not forget that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was a justified countermeasure under valid international law. Hitler's measures against Stalin's treaty violations, which he enforced in the Baltic States as well as in the Balkans in 1939-41, must also be considered as such. Likewise, the declaration of war on the United States on the basis of the Triple Alliance; it could have been made a year earlier, after FDR had delivered 50 destroyers to Great Britain in violation of neutrality.

No really serious person in Japan or Germany supposes that the American forces standing in either country would offer the least protection in an emergency.

One also notes that Prime Minister Thatcher began to distance herself from President Reagan as he became more and more involved in Iran Contra affair. At the Pentagon, one doubts whether the U.S. could defeat Nicaragua without the area bombing tried in World War II, which was also once considered in the Vietnam War. The claim that more bombs fell in Vietnam than in Europe was nothing but propaganda and lies. Meanwhile, there is a likelihood that all twenty Latin American countries would declare war on the United States if World War II-style bombing were to be applied. The whole world is fed up with American barbarism and is shouting, "Yanks out!"

Political leaders like Bismarck, Wilhelm II, and Hitler stand above any American president in the five generations after the Civil War. And, of course, FDR was far worse than any politician Germany has ever had throughout its history.

The fact that after FDR all U.S. presidents but one have declared that they are FDR epigones, people who think that what Roosevelt did was right, consequently means that FDR, with the help of his disciples, is still running America. And what did Roosevelt's policy look like? Support of Stalin! Unprovoked entry into war against Germany! The elaboration of various plans to exterminate the German people! The depopulation of vast German territories! The inculcation of the German war guilt as well as of the German as the one guilty of all evil from the very beginning of mankind! - This also explains why a Willy Brandt was not only tolerated, but also allowed to lead one of the two most important parties until old age. Obviously, millions of Germans feel no pride but shame when they think of their historical past. How else can it be explained that a large percentage of them do not want to be Germans, as is evident from opinion polls. On the other hand, no nation should be more proud of its past and its identity than the German nation.

Eisenhower President instead of Taft

Consider what would have happened if, after a man like Truman (who jailed for his numerous crimes) 1952 presidential election had been won not by a

figure like EisenhowerRobert Taft of OhioAs everyone probably knows, only half the states at that time hadadopted the primary voting system, which was the brainchild of the pugnacious Bob LaFollette of WisconsinThis was intended to allow voters, rather than party bigwigs, to influence the selection of presidential candidates Although Taft had a clear lead over Eisenhower in the primaries, Eisenhower, who had never voted in an election in his life, declared to the party bigwigs at the convention that he was willing to run against Taft. Eisenhower, who boasted of having pushed through "Operation Keelhaul" (the handover of five million helpless non-German refugees to Stalin), triumphed over Taft, who, like Herbert Hoover after World War I, called all the postwar Nuremberg trials an unlawful farce. *America, where are you heading ?*

That event was now almost 35 years ago. And yet Taft remains the only major presidential candidate since 1933 who was not part of the FDR-Stalin alliance, with all its political implications and consequences In 1936, Hoover was not allowed to run against Roosevelt on the part of the Republicans. The Republican candidate was Alf Landon, the "Roosevelt from Kansas." In 1940, Wendell Willkie, who had prevailed over Vandenberg, Taft and Hoover at the Republican convention in Philadelphia, entered the race as the presidential candidate. In 1944, the RepublicancandidatewasTom Dewey, who was also defeated by Truman four years later in 1948

In this way, the ill-fated Roosevelt policy could continueanother two generations.With each successive decade, the mendacious grip on the weakening American people grows ever stronger One can imagine what it would have done for the German people if a man like Taft had entered the White House in 1953. He would have called for the eradication of American crimes rather than the senseless chargesand persecutions against the German peopleHad LaFollette's supporters succeededintroducingthe primary election system everywhere after his death in 1925, the salutary election of a Taft would have been assured.But in America nothing works so perfectly on the national level thatthe big bosses cannot continue to ply their dirty tradeAnd among the big bosses is a man like Grenville Clark, with his 200-manlaw and legal office in Manhattan

US problems of the future

From all this, it is evident that the world's embrace, which has been going on since the days of Roosevelt, can only be destroyed from within, and that by weakening the economy. This will force the U.S., whether it likes it or not, to return home, to its environment. America's inevitable economic collapse will not affect the other countries to the same extent as it did during the Great Depression of 1929, because the U.S. does not still have profits from World War II, as it did after World War I. The U.S. will be forced to return home, whether it likes it or not. Germany is not burdened with loans and with high interest rates as it was then. While the influence of the U.S. government will decline, foreigners from everywhere will continue to buy American companies with confidence, because Americans know only too well that they need the money from these sales to survive. In this way, the evil spirit of Roosevelt hanging over the world will be lifted, not by attack, but by

North America 2084? (Map by Michael Walker). Is a breakup of the North American territory into several ethnic republics imminent? In Southern California, Southern Texas, and New Mexico, Mexican ethnicity already predominates. Will the area around New York and Washington become a new Israel? Is the South becoming the home of blacks? See Hoggan's further comments on page 280.

be broken by constant wear and attrition, although years earlier a second Hitler could have broken him only with the power of his mind and his voice.

The problems facing America will help it learn its lesson. A settler republic does not have the stature to control a worldwide empire, nor does it have any divine right to arbitrate the fate of the European heartland of Western culture and civilization. And we know that people feel the same way in the great Asian bloc, India, China and Japan. Annoying for the Japanese, for example, to hear protests from the United States over the sale of high technology to the Soviets, while the Americans have done the same for years. It is also annoying for the French to be scolded by the United States for making concessions to Iran while the United States is secretly selling Persia weapons. Moreover, many believe that the Iran-Iraq war was started by the CIA.

The looming changes that will bring about a U.S. withdrawal into its own sphere of influence can only bring Germany a wonderful sense of liberation.

President Nixon's machinations

As another indication of the criminal behavior of the U.S. on the international level as well as its contempt for international law, consider the case of a typical FDR disciple. Richard Nixon, although officially as much a Republican as Eisenhower, Ford and Reagan had everything in common with Roosevelt, but nothing in common with Hoover and LaFollette. Why did all these so-called Republicans spend hours praising Wilson and Reagan, against doing nothing to defend Hoover when he was attacked in elections - as was the case the last presidential campaign when Mondale attacked Hoover and Reagan did not counter?

A good example of the nature of Nixon's interference in international affairs is the 1973 Israeli-Arab war. Within a few days, some \$2.2 billion worth of state-of-the-art weapons were shipped to Israel at a time when the

U.S. was experiencing the final stages of defeat in Vietnam (see A. M. Lilienthal, *The Zionist Connection*, New York 1978, pp. 759ff.). This process was an exact repetition of the unlawful arms deliveries to the Allies by Wilson and Roosevelt in the two world wars. Nixon's arms delivery turned the tide of war within a few days, although the Arabs would have deserved a victory because of the Israeli peace of conquest in 1967. In this context, it is also worth recalling Truman's \$135 million aid in the 1948-49 Israeli-Arab war. Israel would not have attacked Lebanon out of the blue in 1982 either had it not been assured of appropriate support by Reagan. This attack was the fifth Israeli war in the short period of 35 years, with Israel mostly the perpetrator and aggressor.

Lilienthal points out that it might be cheaper for a financially bankrupt America to bring the approximately twelve million Israeli Jews to New York, where six million Jews, one third of all American Jews, already live today. In a bankrupt New York, payments to Israel would also be meager.

In 1914, the Jewish population percentage in the USA was higher than in Palestine. Even today, the Arab share of population in Palestine is twice as high as the Jewish share. In addition, many Jews, for example from Morocco, were brought to Palestine, often against their will and without the opportunities for appropriate education.

Israel spent. Lilienthal also cites a statement made by Count Clermont-Tonnerre in the French National Assembly of

12. October 1798: "To the Jew as Jew - everything. To the Jews as a people - nothing!"

While Nixon was eager to quickly end the war in Vietnam, which he had also extended to Cambodia and which, according to U.S. estimates, cost five million lives, he still found time to support the Israelis in their war against the Arabs and to dash their hopes for freedom. Moreover, an Israeli puppet government also ruled Egypt until Sadat's assassination. But its successor, Mubarak, is not independent; U.S. troops have been stationed in Egypt since 1980, as they have been in Greece, Spain and Italy, to name just a few Mediterranean countries. Reliable sources indicate that Nixon, despite his good relationship with Kissinger, never particularly liked the Jews, but used

them to bring the U.S. decisively into play in the Middle East (see also then-U.S. Vice President Nixon's initiative in the occupation of Lebanon in 1956). Nixon's illegal intervention in the 1973 Israeli-Arab war occurred a year after the Watergate incident, which ultimately led to Nixon's resignation in 1974. On April 30, 1975 the defeated Americans forced to withdraw from Vietnam. The most important book ever written about Nixon is by Stanford historian Gary Allen (*Richard Nixon*, Boston 1971). It also covers Nixon's criminal political machinations, including in the election campaigns, before Watergate, and goes back to the time of FDR and Pearl Harbor (loc. cit., p.424).

It is important to mention the crimes of American presidents outside the States as well, such as Nixon's surprise and unlawful intervention in the Middle East in 1973, which was followed by other crimes, such as the 1982 massacre by the Israelis in Lebanon and the use of the U.S. warship *New Jersey* in the shelling of refugee camps with women and children in eastern Beirut. Above all, of course, the bombing of Libya in April 1986, ordered by Reagan, at a time when American businessmen were still going about their business there in complete peace. As it later turned out, Ghaddafi had nothing to do with the terrorist attacks in Rome, Vienna and Berlin, of which Reagan had accused him without a shred of evidence.

Like Wilson, Roosevelt, and Churchill, Reagan is nothing but a cowardly tyrant known for being as contemptuous of U.S. laws as he is of international ones. As David Stockman, Sam Donaldson, and Daniel Moynihan have demonstrated, Reagan never attempted to reduce the devastating U.S. deficit during his entire time in office, even though he promised to do so in all of his election speeches as well as in his election platform. When one then considers the cowardice and corruption prevailing in Congress, and the mess in the Supreme Court, which under Burger and Rehnquist has never recovered from the damage done by Earl Warren, how can one expect the U.S. ship of state, so battered, to lead the fleet of countries in the free world?

The U.S. is definitely the most hated nation in the Third World - the votes in the United Nations show that; and these Third World countries represent 70 percent of the world. Meanwhile, the U.S. makes up only 4.8 percent of the

world's population. In FDR's day, it was 5 percent, and this despite huge global immigration.

The white race, which under Article 7 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (L. B. Johnson's term) is the race with the least privilege, will face a terrible struggle in the ensuing years after the decline of American imperialism in the eastern hemisphere to what Harvard professor Lothrop Stoddard hinted at in his famous 1937 book *The Rising Tide of Color* (New York 1937).

The German-American element should stop claiming that the Crusades against the European heartland were justified because people like the Kaiser and Hitler were crazy would-be world conquerors. It will be allowed within America, along with the other descendants of White Europe, to build and hold bastions ensuring their natural claim to leadership in the colored U.S. sea

Hitler's Love for the Fatherland

Hitler, at least in his attitude in 1905, saw in the Prussian-Hohenzollern heritage since the Great Elector in 1640 the nucleus for the restoration of the ideal First Reich of the Germans from the days of Barbarossa to the execution of Konradin in 1268. He seemed somehow to feel that in the foreseeable future the multiethnic Habsburg state would collapse and the greater Germany would rise. However, although Hitler refused to fight for the Habsburg Empire, he was also not subversive like an Eduard Benesch in Prague. On the contrary. During his time in Vienna, Hitler limited his political activity to fighting Marxism, in which he rightly saw the main enemy of all bourgeois virtues, including love of country. When Hitler came to Munich in 1913, he simply wanted to serve the German Kaiser Wilhelm and the other German princes. His multiple decorations show how he did it. The question of whether there was anything messianic or egocentric about Hitler before the armistice on November 11, 1918, must be answered "no." According to his superiors, Hitler was just the opposite: selfless and community-minded. This also explains Hitler's astonishment when he later looked in vain for these qualities in his officers, who after all had grown up in the Prussian tradition. However great Hitler's disappointment was over the

assassination attempt of July 20, 1944, as well as the conspiracy in which 5,000 high-ranking personalities were involved - 133, and not all 5,000 were executed, as Toland (loc. cit., p.701 ff.) reports - he did not lose his faith in the German people, the majority of whom had been shaped by Prussian tradition. And in their overwhelming majority, the Germans remained devoted to him to the end.

We have seen in the previous chapter that Bismarck's Reich hinted to the young Hitler at the possibilities for a renewed and rejuvenated greater Germany of modernity. The Third Reich, however, was vastly different from the Second Reich. The reason is not that between the two thoroughly German states lies the Republic of Weimar, which repeatedly tried to get more humane terms from the Allies and which, like the FRG and GDR, was cosmopolitan in outlook. All three states had come into being under significant foreign influence. They were supposed to appeal more to foreigners than to Germans.

Hitler's reputation in the USA

Bailey made it abundantly clear in the book already mentioned that Hitler enjoyed natural sympathy among the average American at the beginning of his chancellorship. Hitler was the humble war hero from the Kaiser's army who rose up in a rage in his country's hour of greatest need to punish the loafers and war profiteers and build a new Germany on the basis of social justice and overcoming the class antagonisms promoted by the Marxists. At the time of the 1936 Olympics this feeling of sympathy was still present. But then that sea of propaganda, as Kolbenheyer had called it, gained more and more ground. When FDR gave his Chicago speech on October 5, 1937, people were afraid to mention Hitler in praise for fear of backlash. If they did, they did so only behind closed doors. One only had to whisper that the FBI might be listening to get people who had made some favorable remarks about Hitler to downright turn tail.

In Bailey's view, Hitler as a leadership type was more sympathetic to the average American than the plutocrat FDR, who lived a lavish life with the

fortune he had made in the opium trade with China.

We have seen that the Kaiserreich, beloved by Hitler, was destroyed by Wilson and the Weimar Republic, beloved by Frank Thiess, was destroyed by Mellon (see also Frank Thiess, *Freiheit bis Mitternacht*, Vienna 1965). The Third Reich, which millions of Germans trusted and believed in, was destroyed by Roosevelt. And the day is coming when the foreigner who insults Hitler in Germany will no longer be safe there.

Although Hitler would have found a greater echo in the United States of the twenties than in Germany - think of Huey Long, of the six million KuKluxKlan members north of the Mason- Dixon line - and probably each of his brilliant speeches would have brought him a million followers, in Germany, at least for a time, he had at least ninety percent of the masses behind him. And there is still today a considerable group of outstanding German intellectuals who have not wavered in their loyalty to Hitler. In order to give Hitler at least a modest recognition, the Germans of today should take a closer look at what the Americans did to them from 1900 to 1950.

When the emperor declared on January 1, 1900, "I lead you toward glorious times!" (see *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* of January 2, 1900), Germany experienced a unique upswing. This prophecy would have become reality if Wilson had not intervened.

There is also no reason to laugh at Reich Chancellor Müller's statement in 1928 that the Weimar Republic stood on solid foundations. Although the financial fox Dr. Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht was in the U.S. at the time of Montagu Norman's visit, Müller did not know that Mellon was such a fool to take up the English suggestion that led two years later to the greatest American stock market crash and the Great Depression. Schacht's best description of the stock market crash is in his early memoir (*76 Jahre meines Lebens*, Düsseldorf 1951).

President Hoover would have maintained friendly relations with Hitler, but without feeling the need to adopt all of Hitler's political views. What leader other than a puppet adopts everything a leading foreign politician does? Hoover admired Hitler, and FDR also paid tribute to Hitler for his

initial achievements But Roosevelt was the typical Wilson disciple - he even asked Wilson's second wife to sit at Wilson's desk after Wilson's death in 1924. And Wilson was the destroyer of empire. With a series of crimes similar to Wilson's, FDR became the destroyer of the Third Reich. Has America apologized this No, the U.S. is indicting Germany. That, too, will change.

About the Third Reich

"War as a great national myth is the creator of the Third Reich." Prof. W.K. Pfeiler, 1941

The German Awakening in the Early Thirties

In *War and the German Mind* (New York 1941) Prof. W. K. Pfeiler stated: "The World War of 1914 - 18 ended with the Weimar Republic as the political outcome. The war as a great national myth is the creator of the 3rd Reich." - The Nebraska-born scientist, a friend, by the way, of the Stuttgart professor Hermann Pongs (from whom the Grabert publishing house published considerable works after 1945), had subjected the German war novels in the period from 1916 to 1938 to a detailed investigation. He had found that around 1930 the people-oriented war novel had finally gained a preponderance over the ego-oriented war novel. This was three years before Hitler came to power and at a time when Hitler had a considerable parliamentary group in the Reichstag for the first time. The first-person war novel had led the way in the twenties.

There were several main reasons why the German people, twelve years after their defeat and that of their allies in the greatest world war to date, decided to do something about their situation rather than continue to accept the conditions dictated by the victors in perpetuity. The most important are:

German society, especially in the generation before the First World War, was the most developed in the world. It also had the most balanced social conditions; furthermore, it had a lot of economic opportunities equal to those of the colonial societies of America, Canada and Australia; however, it did not know their lack of culture as well as their venality. Moreover, Germany had an impeccable administration that no other could approach. And according to Hans Delbrück (see *Government and the Will of the People*, New York 1913), Germany had the best form of government in the world. The number of political parties in Germany, with less fragmentation than in France and Italy, embodied the various political forces to a better degree than the artificially maintained two-party system in the United States and Great

Britain (see also Adalbert Wahl, *Deutsche Geschichte 1871-1914*, 4 vols., Tübingen 1926-32).

2. The endless harassment to which Germany was subjected since the armistice of 1918 proved that it was not a peace among equals, as US President Wilson had preached. And the whole thing ended with the home-made economic crisis of 1929 in the U.S. If there had been a need for one last significant event, it was probably world economic crisis.

If one wants to weigh these significant reasons for the rise of a revolutionary movement, the fact that the Allies destroyed a happy and beautiful Germany with all available means undoubtedly ranks first. Germany in 1914 was neither a multiethnic state like Turkey; nor was it torn apart like Russia. It was a kind of model state with a model society for the whole world. In addition, Germany had to defend itself for five years and then became the victim of betrayals and disappointments for twelve. Hitler, who was born in the second year of the reign of Emperor Wilhelm II and always kept the young emperor in his memory, also defended him in *Mein Kampf* (vol. 1, 1925, vol. 2, 1927, Eher-Verlag, Munich 1942) against the public attacks of Bülow and the Reichstag.

The Polish and Czech Question of the Thirties

Hitler's meeting with the Polish Foreign Minister Joseph Beck, who had the full confidence of the authoritarian Polish collective leadership, was free and uncoerced on the part of the German leader. Hitler had also given preference to cooperation with Poland over Russia in the first cabinet meetings after coming to power in February 1933. He had signed the non-aggression pact with Poland in 1934. He had put the brakes on Göring, who wanted to intervene after the Polish annexation of the Olsa region on the occasion of the Sudeten crisis in October 1938. Beck, on the other hand, had pursued an altogether disingenuous policy toward Hitler since November 1938, when he approved of the Polish ambassador in Berlin, Lipski, replying to Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop that Poland had basically no objection to an extraterritorial road from Pomerania and Danzig to East Prussia. In his memoirs, however, Beck also praised Hitler's honesty (see *Dernier Rapport*, Lausanne 1951).

In 1938, Churchill, with the approval of Foreign Secretary Halifax, led by Duff Cooper, a very close friend of Churchill's, had sent a delegation to Finland and Poland to create sentiment against Germany. One reason for this trip was the fact that Stalin was planning to make territorial claims on Finland. Another reason was the suspicion of Halifax, who had succeeded Antony Eden as British Foreign Secretary in early 1938, that Hitler would try to convert the ten-year non-aggression pact with Poland into a permanent alliance.

Duff Cooper had his meeting with the Poles on the Hela Peninsula in August 1938, and Hitler had his proposals for an agreement with Poland conveyed to Polish Ambassador Lipski in October 1938. Hitler was still advocating these ideas in 1939 when he met with Beck. These terms included voluntary German recognition of the Polish borders from the Versailles Peace Dictate, which no government of the Weimar Republic had recognized. However, the British Empire, which considered itself invincible, had promised Beck more: the borders of a Greater Poland from 1750.

The files show that England had no intention of its promises to Poland. It used the Poles as a naive instrument to start another unnecessary European war. It wanted to do favor for FDR, Stalin's ally. Both FDR and Stalin were disappointed with the peaceful settlement of the 1938 Munich Conference. FDR openly demanded "Revenge for Königgrätz/Sadowa!" E. G. Kolbenheyer described this brood of witches best in his *Sebastian Karst* (Vol. 3, p. 88, Darmstadt 1958).

I will never forget how shocked I was by a discussion with Rudolf Rahn, author of the excellent book *Restless Life*. Among other things, he describes the exciting experiences with Groba in 1941 in the Middle East. I had just full victory a four-hour debate with Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, the best-known West German researcher in the field of the history of diplomacy the time, Jacobsen was working on a book about Reich Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, whom he was unfairly trying to one-up, for example, by the numerous contemptuous references to the "restless" Ribbentrop (see H.-A. Jacobsen, *Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik 1933-1938*, Frankfurt 1968).

My debate victory over Jacobsen had just come in the area of diplomacy research and the events that led to the outbreak of war.

Although Rahn was a diplomatic troublemaker and had later served quite ably in Italy, he was almost without any knowledge in the field of diplomatic history. It was touching and at the same time disheartening to hear try to turn around the judgment of the audience on the basis of the wise treaty that Hitler concluded with Czech President Hacha March 14, 1939, after collapse of Czechoslovakia due to the secession of Slovakia. Incredible as it may sound, and despite all the facts brought forward in the discussion, Rahn as well as Raymond Sontag (*A Broken World*, New York 1971, p.236, and the *Journal for Historical Review*, December 1983) held to the propagandistic superstition that England and France had guaranteed the existence of the diminished Czechoslovakia after the Munich Conference of 1938. It is an undeniable fact, however, that the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, said in France in early November 1938 - a month after the Sudeten Germans' demand for self-determination had been met - that the rump Czech state would soon break apart. This prospect left England completely indifferent, and London would never guarantee the existence of such a Czech state. He hoped the same of France (see Woodward *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, in: David Hoggan, *The Arch War*, as well as later in: Lord Birkenhead's official biography *Lord Halifax*).

The fact that England and France *had proposed* at the Munich Conference in 1928 to guarantee a Czech rump state in order to expedite a peaceful settlement in no way implied that such a guarantee would ever have to be honored. Indeed, the condition attached to such a guarantee was that the Czechs should achieve a stable situation in Central Europe by their own efforts. And the Czechs would never achieve such a thing. Georges Bonnet, who wrote four books about this (including *Vor der Katastrophe*, Cologne 1951) and with whom I was contacted years ago explained that he left the meeting with Halifax in Lille in November 1938 in the complete certainty that the Czechs would never receive any security guarantee from England and France even after Munich, the old Franco-Czech alliance no longer existed, France having allowed one old ally, Poland, to take land away from another former ally, Czechoslovakia (the Olsa area)

It is strange enough that both educated laymen and professional historians seem to have no difficulty whatsoever in grasping how English diplomats, such as Urquhartin, could, in the ten years between Louis-Philippe's visit to Queen Victoria in 1844 and Emperor Francis Joseph's ultimatum to Tsar Nicholas I. (withdrawal from Moldavia and Wallachia in 1854 so that the Dardanelles would be free for England in the event of an invasion by Russia; the plan had been forged as early as 1791 by the younger Pitt, but delayed by the French Revolution and Napoleon) seriously claimed year after year that they wanted friendly relations with the Russians, even though they were planning their destruction (see especially S. E. Gleason, *The Origins of Russophobia in Great Britain*, Harvard University Press, 1951).

This characteristically English style can be illustrated by reference to numerous other incidents. For example, in 1914 the German ambassador to England, Lichnowsky, had no idea that the British foreign minister, Lord Grey, was bent on war with Germany. Hence his poignant attempt to explain British policy in a different, more appropriate context, namely, the Belgian question. On this question, Germany had previously obtained British permission from Lord Vivian to march through. How commonplace this was compared to the partition of Iran in 1901 or to the tearing up of the Morocco Treaty of 1880, signed by eight parties, whose aim was supposed to be to guarantee that unfortunate country its territorial integrity forever.

A propaganda flood of lies poured out to this day and prevented many people of normal or higher mental makeup from paying increased and closer attention to the events of World War II.

George Lundberg of the University of Washington used to complain that his exam students looked at the period of the Second World War", that is, they lacked any sense of reality. This lack of understanding is not limited to the distortions that are to the detriment of the Axis powers, i.e. to the detriment of Germany, Italy, Japan. Wang-Ching-Wei's pro-Axis China, Sandra Böse's pro-Axis Indian national movement, and the pro-Axis rulers in Iraq, Vichy France, Croatia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Finland, and Slovakia. Nor should one forget the numerous volunteers from other countries who fought for the Axis

powers (see Hans Werner Neulen, *An deutscher Seite*, Munich 1985). This lack of understanding applies equally to traditional Anglo-American relations

I once offered a guest lecture on three dates and events. 1. the Anglo-Chinese alliance, which had been developing since 1903, when the German Kaiser had rejected Herzl's offer of an alliance on religious grounds; 2. the Federal Reserve Bank, which had been founded in 1913 by Senator Carter Glass and President Woodrow Wilson, and which, with its international linkages, was constantly changing the American monetary system, foreign investment in the United States, and U.S. investment abroad (see Antony Sutton, *Roosevelt und die internationale Hochfinanz*, Tübingen 1990); 3. The FDR-Stalin alliance of 1933. - However one conflates these three developments, the FDR-Stalin alliance of 1933, which still exists, can be examined as a separate complex because of its far-reaching consequences

Just as Tsar Nicholas I was tricked and hoodwinked by British Prime Minister Palmerston (his predecessor Alexander I had been intimidated by Castlereagh from London on the Polish question), Churchill was later played and hoodwinked by FDR with the Stalin alliance Litvinov had negotiated. Churchill can be compared to someone who wants to hitchhike from San Francisco to nearby Oakland and gets stuck far away in Tucson, Arizona. When Churchill became autocrat of England at the age of 66 (see Martin Gilbert, *Winston Churchill*, Vol. 5: The Continuation of the Biography of Randolph Churchill), he still confidently proclaimed: "I did not become Prime Minister of the British Empire to preside over its dissolution."

When FDR had maneuvered the naive Japanese into the Pearl Harbor attack (how could the whole thing be good for the Japanese when everything indicated, including the replacement of Admiral Richardson, who had opposed concentration of the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor, that this incident was wanted by FDR), Churchill told the British House of Commons that all U.S. reserves of men and material now British Empire. Churchill, who did not learn FDR's attitude until a few days later, should have said that now, because of Pearl Harbor, all the resources of the U.S. as well as the declining British Empire would be available to Stalin. The British, who were used to playing false, were the fools this time, as they often were later. Can anyone imagine that Churchill *would have pushed for war in 1939* if he had known he was doing

so for Stalin, whom he had called the "bloodthirsty Bolshevik baboon"? In Volume 1 of his World War II memoirs, Churchill notes that there had been no reason to expect Chamberlain to deliver the vicious anti-Hitler speech that came from Halifax at Birmingham on March 17, 1939. The Hitler-Hacha Treaty of March 1939 was even less suitable as a hook than the Belgian question had been in 1914.

In my book *The Forced War* I mentioned the Polish post-war historians Gasiorowski, Dzieanpowski and Halecki, who stated that they would have preferred an agreement with Hitler on the basis of the conditions offered to Lipski and Beck by Ribbentrop to an English offer. In fact, the English offer had not expressed any intention to protect Poland against the Soviet Union. The Anglo-Polish alliance was signed by the Polish Ambassador Edward Raczynski only on August 25, 1939 (and that after the German-Soviet non-aggression pact), and not on April 6, 1939, when the Polish Foreign Minister Josef Beck was in London, because the English were not ready to guarantee Poland assistance in case of a mentioned war with Russia. This situation meant a degree of maximum uncertainty for Polish foreign policy, after the Polish Supreme Commander Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly had publicly declared at the time of the Polish mobilization in 1939 that not Germany, but Russia was Poland's number one opponent. At that time, this attitude was undoubtedly shared by the overwhelming part of Poles.

The fact is that even if the British had wanted to - which was not the case - they could not have given the Poles any help at all without American support. The American support was self-excluded on the basis of the FDR-Stalin alliance. As for the German-Russian non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, Hitler endured it because he did not want a European war, and Stalin endured it because he wanted to start a European war (see J. Benoist-Mechin, *Geschichte der deutschen Militärmacht 1918-1946*, Vol. 7: *Wollte Hitler den Krieg*, - 1971, p.289 ff.). It need not be particularly emphasized that Benoist-Mechin's remarks also provide the answer to the question posed in the book's title. The outstanding French military historian and history expert (see also the other six volumes of his *History of German Military Power* well as his conscientious study of *Mein Kampf*) stated that it was not Hitler but Stalin, FDR and Halifax who wanted war in 1939 worth recalling, among other things, that diabolical

utterance of the U.S. President when he left in January 1939 his favorite seaside resort, Warm Springs, Georgia, where he had earlier been cured his polio "I'll be back in the fall, if we don't have a war."

This remark was made by FDR, who made it in his career to become the greatest war criminal of all time, exactly fifteen months after his provocative Chicago quarantine speech (see Appendix) of October 5, 1937, which even cost him the loss of some faithful followers; think, among others, of Democratic Party Chairman Jim Farley, who was responsible for FDR's 1936 campaign Yet ordinary, ignorant, and incredibly foolish Americans took no notice of the speech These people were willing to commit any crime as long as it paid. Even FDR and his Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, admitted that the American people were incredibly stupid and foolish.

FDR's war drive

On a day in 1939, that fateful year when FDR's British stooges opened World War II, overlooking the Russians, intimidating the French and Italians and using hapless Poland as a straw man, FDR gave a speech in which he spoke of the American people as the best informed in whole world In the Cabinet, he was later approached by Ickes about this. FDR replied that it was easier to get things from people if you flatter them. When Senator William Borah of Idaho commented that same year on the occasion of Hitler's response to FDR's European policy, that Hitler had done a very good thing by trying to teach FDR some history, FDR responded in the same childish manner as Churchill, who, when criticized, always flew into a rage (see Sherwood *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, op. cit., pp. 79ff.).

In retrospect, FDR's quarantine speech of October 5, 1937, was the decisive turning point for the FDR-Stalin alliance of 1933. There was too much sophistry regarding the domestic political background of this speech. There was something about Harry Black of Alabama, a former Ku Klux Klan member who was FDR's first U.S. Supreme Court justice appointee. There was something about the graying eminence Grenville Clark, chairman of Harvard University's Board of Inspectors, with the 200 lawyers on his Manhattan "law factory": in 1937, he interrupted FDR's plan to increase the number of chief justices from nine to fifteen, including six appointed by

FDR This plan would have immediately won FDR majority support for the radical New Deal policies of Harry Hopkins. And there was, above all, renewed failure to clean up the Democratic Party in the Wall Street securities and foreign exchange markets, which can be compared to the failure the following year. In addition, the new Securities and Exchange Committee appointed by FDR did nothing to assuage Roosevelt's anger and exasperation. FDR had instructed Bullitt to report to Stalin that he would remain in the White House as long as he lived. But it was becoming clearer by the day that FDR's second term would end in disaster if he did not get his European war. Hitler did not want this war any more than he needed it. This war, on the other hand, was needed by the likes of FDR, Stalin, and Churchill. Did Hitler need to fight for Danzig or invade France? Who benefited from all this?

The evil behind the 1937 quarantine speech consisted of more than FDR: it was founded in the system of American presidential office itself. Just as George Washington tried to restore his dwindling political prestige by an unnecessary war against France—that attempt was stopped once and for all by John Adams in 1798—just as Bill McKinley, after the Spanish surrender, almost criminally persuaded Congress to declare war on Spain in 1898—McKinley acted on the advice of his strongman in Ohio, Mark Hanna, with the hope of increasing his popular appeal—FDR behaved in exactly the same way.

With the Stalin alliance as his hidden trump card, and facing the disgrace and ruin that would inevitably mark his second peacetime term, FDR uncompromisingly decided to take flight into the open and make the case for a major war everywhere. His secret strategy was to use the British as a trigger and fight the war with Stalin as his chief ally. The press response to this Chicago speech of 1937 clearly showed that it was a warmongering speech. The radio comments, and this should be emphasized, sufficiently revealed that FDR was advocating an early war, with Germany as his main adversary - FDR had been secretly hoping for a new war with Germany ever since November 11, 1918 (see Frank Friedel, *Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. 2, New York 1954, p.220ff.).

It should also be emphasized, and this is confirmed both by the U.S. files and by Bullitt himself, that the atrocious atrocities during the *Chiska* (the great

purges in the USSR in 1936-39; see the book by Stanford professor Robert Conquest, *Ernte des Todes*. Stalin's Holocaust in Ukraine 1929-33. Munich 1988) were known in their extent and details to FDR as, by the way, to all other politicians outside the USSR. Yet these atrocities and atrocities did not prompt FDR to any private or public criticism of Stalin. Much ado was made of that incident on February 15, 1940, when FDR criticized Stalin on the White House lawn in the presence of students. This criticism occurred in the midst of the second Finno-Russian War - the first took place in 1918, and each time the Bolsheviks were the aggressors But FDR's criticism was only half-hearted, abstract, and hazy (for which see *New York Times*, February 16, 1940).

The people of Chicago certainly did not expect a speech on world politics from Roosevelt on October 5, 1937, just as the people of Birmingham certainly did not expect one from Chamberlain on March 17, 1939, and certainly did not appreciate such a speech (one can assume that the speech Halifax wrote for Chamberlain in 1939 was inane to the same degree as FDR's in 1937!).

Four years earlier, in 1933, FDR had lifted the sixteen-year boycott of the USSR under previous Presidents Wilson through Hoover. (Wilson might have recognized the USSR had he not gone insane in the middle of his crazy speech in Pueblo, Colorado, in September 1919. After that, Wilson's wife handed power to his arch-conservative Attorney General Palmer, who proceeded to send radical native citizens to the *Soviet ark in Russia*). FDR had his secret alliance with Stalin in the bag by 1937, but the Chicago public knew nothing about it.

The World Situation in 1937 at the Quarantine Speech

What was the world situation at that time ? In China, the Chinese Communists, centered in Shensin, had kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek in 1939 and released him only on condition that he start a new war against Japan (and that after the loss of the non-Chinese protectorate of Manchuria; like Mongolia, Tibet and Chinese Turkestan, Manchuria was not part of China proper, but only a dependent territory). Chiang had begun this new war only a few weeks before FDR's 1937 speech. From the beginning, the Japanese sought foreign mediators to help them end the war. At the time of FDR's

speech, there was still a German military mission in China to help Chiang and the Chinese Nationalists. A German trade mission was also in place.

After electoral fraud, the Spanish Popular Front government was threatened by insurgents in 1936. They received massive support from Italy and also from Germany (see Wilfred von Oven, *Hitler und der Spanische Bürgerkrieg*, Tübingen 1978). The Spanish Communists massacred parts of the Catholic clergy. The weight of petitions from U.S. Catholics to the American Congress made it impossible for FDR to stand by Stalin and intervene, as he would have liked, in favor of the Reds in Spain. Although this was a civil war not covered by the Neutrality Act, FDR felt compelled to adopt a clear policy of neutrality toward Spain.

As far as the Reich was concerned, it should be noted that the Anglo-German naval treaty of 1935 had the same peacemaking effect for the West as the German-Polish nonaggression pact of 1934 had for the East. The brief Rhineland crisis of March 1936, in which the British refused any support to the French (the latter had precipitated the crisis in the first signing and ratifying an alliance with Moscow in violation of the Locarno Treaty- see F. Berger *Locarno*, Berlin 1936), had been settled at the London Conference, at which Ribbentrop represented Germany.

To sum up, and this is also proved by the Olympic Games of 1936 (in the opinion of expert critics the best Games of modern times so far), there was little that affected Germany's international position. Nor had anything occurred to change this picture a year later until FDR's speech. This is particularly worth emphasizing because of the incomprehensible and angry tone in FDR's speech toward Germany. Likewise, Roosevelt's strikingly gentle and friendly tone toward Stalin and the USSR should be emphasized. This is surprising in view of the bloody events in the USSR.

This speech was certainly the most significant and momentous in the period 1919-39, especially from the retrospective of FDR, who was U.S. president four times. Nevertheless, it is surprising at first glance that later detailed history books such as those by John D. Hicks (*The American Nation*, Boston 1955) and by Sherwood (*Roosevelt and Hopkins*, Hamburg 1950) do not mention Roosevelt's quarantine speech at all, either in the text or in the notes.

If one examines them more closely, one finds that they are friendly to FDR. In this respect, it is clear that the speech was omitted because it came as if out of the blue and is difficult to defend when judged without prejudice. The full text of the speech was available a day later (see *New York Times*, October 6, 1937). The speech was also constantly referred to in Congress (for which see *Congressional Record, House, Senate/1937- 40*) until the outbreak of the European war. When Charles Beard decided to write his two-volume work on FDR's foreign policy (*American Foreign Policy in the Making*, New Haven 1946, and *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War*, New Haven 1948; in this book he emphasizes with emphasis the advantages Stalin derived from Roosevelt's policy), he recalled Roosevelt's August 1936 speech at Chautauqua, in New York State. FDR, then running for his second presidency, repeated his 1932 statement to William Randolph Hearst that if reelected he would pursue an isolationist foreign policy. For example, he would support the independence efforts of the Philippines, although such a policy was usually confined to the western part of the world. Further, he would stay out of League of Nations politics as well as entanglements in the eastern part of the world. In 1936, FDR went even further, calling war abroad insane.

Beard could not avoid the conclusion that FDR's speech in question (the content of which was also found in 1936 in an address on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of Harvard University, which was enthusiastically welcomed by Rector Conant, the faculty, as well as the students) represented the culmination of FDR's isolationist statements. Roosevelt, if he wanted to be elected in 1932 as in 1936, was forced to adopt such a policy. And this policy was in accord with the will of Congress as expressed in the 1934 Nye Report on the Errors of Wilsonian Policy in the First World War. It was still in accord with the permanent neutrality legislation Congress crafted from 1934 to 1937. And FDR signed all of this. In a Gallup opinion poll conducted before FDR's Chicago speech, 90 percent of respondents said that America's entry into World War I was a mistake.

As already pointed out, during the short 13-month period between the two speeches - if one adds the Harvard speech, the period is even shorter - Beard could find no foreign policy event that would have justified such a radical shift or even the slightest change. Although Beard knew FDR

personally and had even supported him on occasion in the past, he had no success later in his various attempts to get Roosevelt to explain about his speech. The press had little more luck either.

Although Roosevelt discussed the implications of his speech with his staff and said he felt like a captain who had given an order and realized in retrospect that no one was following him, the fact remains that this Chicago speech was a turning point. Roosevelt made no more foreign policy isolationist speeches. Nor did he ever claim that he did not admire Wilson's foreign policy and his League of Nations idea. Nor did he ever again pretend that he would stay out of entanglements in the eastern part of the world. A short time later he actually proposed a European conference to Neville Chamberlain in a speech (January 11, 1938). The British prime minister, however, wisely declined (January 14, 1938) Roosevelt's correspondence with leading politicians, not only the secret one with Stalin and Churchill, flourished worldwide within a short time.

Beard examined the wrong places when he looked in the foreign policy arena for a rationale for the change in Roosevelt policy. timing was dictated by the presidential election In his first election, FDR had more or less taken the cake with his "New Deal" (the economic reform program to combat the effects of the Great Depression). Wilson did similarly in his first election in 1912 with his tariff reform and new banking law (see Anthony Sutton, *Roosevelt and International High Finance*, Tübingen 1990). Both FDR and Wilson were exceptionally regressive politicians who played the reformers only temporarily but soon tired of that game. War seemed to be more fun for them.

The disadvantages of the US Constitution

The U.S. could never have risen to an all-destroying war machine in the 1930s and 1940s had it not been for the self-serving and plutocratic Constitution of 1787 (see Charles Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution*, New York 1913). This Constitution granted immense dictatorial powers to the president. The Constitution was intended to please George Washington, the military idol who presided at the Philadelphia convention. Washington had

virtually no opponent even as a candidate in the first presidential election in 1788-some of his supporters even wanted to address him as "Your Sublime Highness." But Washington was far too wily to have accepted such a thing.

Even Woodrow Wilson, in his days as a university professor (see *Congressional Government*, New York 1885), and even before he developed political ambition, called the office of the President, as incorporated into the Constitution at Philadelphia, a failure. He had no objection to a president modeled on the Third French Republic based on the 1875 legislation. Wilson, and this is expressed in the title of his book, believed that the power of a government should be a legislature with a bicameral or unicameral system. This meant no president who could do without the support of a party, whose opposition equal to one-third of the votes in the legislature, and who had dictatorial military powers, as expressed, for example, in Teddy Roosevelt's 1903 statement "I appropriated the canal (of Panama) and left Congress to debate"; or in the response of Andrew Jackson to Chief Justice Marshall's attempt to protect the Creek Indians: "He made the decision, let him try to enforce it"; or in Abraham Lincoln, who as minority president started the Civil War when, against the advice of his entire cabinet, he reinforced Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor without informing Congress.

Of course, even political leaders who are so in name only can do mischief on rare occasions, as was the case with King Edward VII, the architect of England's encirclement policy against Germany. The English should not have listened to him. On the other hand, the German Parliament almost completely disregarded the wise advice of Wilhelm II when he opposed the Morocco policy in 1905 and had a treaty with Russia drawn up in the same year, but was repeatedly rebuffed by Chancellor von Bülow. Germany might have been able to stay out of World War I if the emperor's advice had been taken more seriously.

In the case of the United States, a few presidents, such as John Quincy Adams and Herbert Clark, with their great abilities and constitutional scruples, have mitigated the dictatorial possibilities of presidential power, usually exercised on behalf of an invisible plutocratic minority. Although neither Roosevelt nor his wife Eleanor personally cared much for the Jews (on this issue the evidence is overwhelming), he negotiated the Stalin alliance

with the Soviet Jew Litvinov. He also knew that the Bolshevik movement, originally primarily a Jewish movement, was still sponsored by a large percentage of U.S. Jews. And among these Jewish sponsors were many wealthy Jews, sometimes very influential, who were involved with the press and the government. Hitler's anti-Jewish policy enabled FDR to make it an overwhelmingly majority policy, although by 1937 Congress received more Jewish petitions against anti-Jewish measures in Poland than in Germany.

On the content of the quarantine speech

The basic tenor of Roosevelt's Chicago speech of October 5, 1937, was a global alliance led by the U.S., the USSR, England (and the British Empire), and National China in conjunction with the Chinese Communists against Germany, Italy, and Japan, which at the time constituted about 10 percent of the world's population. This gives rise to Roosevelt's myth of the 90 percent peace-loving versus the 10 percent war-mongering nations. On Nov. 21, 1936, Germany and Japan had signed the Anti-Comintern Pact (against the further spread of Bolshevik ideology). Italy signed it on Nov. 6, 1937, immediately after FDR's Chicago speech. (Hungary, Manchukuo, and Spain followed in 1939, and Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Romania, Slovakia, and National Bohemia in 1941). By stating as the goal of this coalition with the Soviets a "quarantine measure," Roosevelt shamelessly denigrated three world powers when he relegated them to the level of being sick. It would have been much easier and more justifiable to do so with the United States, which has a record of belligerent aggression abroad, genocide of Indians, and periodic persecution of Irish, Italians, and other ethnic groups.

If one remembers that the Russian Civil War from 1917 to 1920 was bloodier than the American one (until 1917 the latter was the bloodiest in world history), if one remembers that during the same period the USSR had waged wars against Finland, the Baltic states and Poland - in 1920 the Russians advanced to the gates of Warsaw - if one remembers, that later uprisings of minorities were drowned in blood, Russia was successful in a five-month war in Manchuria against China in 1939, and when one remembers

that the Soviets had tried to break Ukrainian nationalism through famine then the designation "peace-loving" for Stalin's domain seems ridiculous. By 1939, Stalin himself was responsible for the deaths of more than 10 million people in the USSR. This was roughly equivalent to the number of deaths of all the belligerents of the First World War.

There is something even more compelling to reject FDR's claim in the quarantine speech. In the period from 1929 to 1945, Stalin spent \$750 billion on war materials. Add to that over eleven billion dollars in official U.S. aid from 1941 to 1945, and at the height of his power, including the great purge year of 1937, Stalin spent more money on war materials half a generation than the rest of the world combined. And at the time of Roosevelt's Chicago speech, Stalin's supporters were still crucifying Catholic nuns in Spain (for this, see Hugh Thomas, *The Spanish Civil War*, Berlin 1961). There is probably no empire in world history that was as militarized and police-dominated as Stalin's Russia in 1937, the year he executed Marshal Tukhatshevsky, the main Bolshevik hero of the Russian Civil War. Similarly, Stalin had a third of the Red Army killed from the captain up. One must imagine the military power that was behind this; a power that could afford the luxury of carrying out purges on such a scale, and with the sole aim of further increasing Stalin's authority and making the war machine even more effective.

But Stalin was not yet satisfied with that. He preached the communist world revolution and the establishment of the so-called one-world dictatorship of the proletariat. In a posed interview in 1937, Stalin answered the question whether the emphasis on socialism in the country meant Lenin's abandonment of the world revolution, this was only a necessary tactical measure fully exploiting all possibilities for a world revolution according to Lenin's thoughts (see especially Ed Smith, *Stalin - the Red Czar*, New York 1967, p. 117 ff. Smith was the CIA top agent in the USSR from 1947 to 1957).

It is also noteworthy that FDR did not meet Stalin until November 1943 in Tehran, at a time when, according to his Georgia adviser Pa Watson, he was already terminally ill and had only thirteen months to live. Roosevelt not only mishandled Stalin; his behavior was academic and pedantic. When he remarked in Tehran that Hitler was crazy, he had to put up with a telling off from Stalin (see Sherwood, loc. cit., p. 614 ff.).

When Jim Farley - who was in charge of FDR's 1936 campaign and Roosevelt's first political adviser from 1934 to 1937 - was shocked by the Chicago speech, he did not content himself with personally checking the Library of Congress, but went immediately to Berlin to talk to Germany's leading politicians, who reinforced his view that FDR's views on international political relations were nonsense. This was also true of Roosevelt's predecessor in office, Herbert Hoover, who had a lengthy conversation with Hitler on March 8, 1938 (the notes run 120 pages). Based on their first-hand knowledge, both Farley and Hoover concluded that the main threat to world peace came from Moscow, London, and Washington, but not from Berlin, Rome, or Tokyo. In fact, the states that FDR described as peace-loving were the principal threats to peace. In this respect, Roosevelt's Chicago speech can only be described as the speech of a political fool and a warmonger. What Roosevelt uttered here should have led to his impeachment and eventually to his resignation. In 1974, Nixon was forced to resign for a much lesser cause, although his second victory in the 1972 presidential election had been as overwhelming as Roosevelt's in 1936 over Alf Landon of Kansas. Nixon portrayed himself as the president who could end the Vietnam War (which he did), and FDR as the man who would master the economic crisis (which he failed to do, but the Japanese managed for him when they bombed Pearl Harbor).

Roosevelt's Hypocrisy

Considering the overwhelming public support for Roosevelt's January 2, 1936 speech (which was unfortunately disingenuous) and then the general consternation and indignation over his "quarantine speech," one wonders how this could have happened in light of the generally held view in 1937 that the Great Depression of 1929 was the inevitable result of Wilson's wartime policies in World War I as well as the machinations of big capitalists JP. Morgan and J. D Rockefeller, could have happened (see also John Dos Passos, *Wilson's Lost Peace*, op. cit.). It is a shame that people did not revolt more decisively against FDR in the years 1937 to 1941.

It must be recognized that in the fifty months between the Chicago speech and Pearl Harbor, FDR and the American people were in constant conflict. FDR survived Pearl Harbor by only 41 months. After the death of his dearly beloved mother in late 1941, he was but a human husk without juice or strength. During the presidential campaign in 1944, his physician, Dr. McIntire, was told not to tell the citizens that FDR was a dying man.

Thomas Aldrich Bailey, in his book *The Man in the Street* (New York 1949; as Bailey's seminary student, I was privileged to participate in writing of this book), points out that FDR solved the problem of the gap between his views and those of the public over a period of fifty months by constantly asserting, derived from absolutist doctrine, that the President had the right to lie to, deceive, and disappoint the people, when he believed that he was smarter than the people and that this was for their good. After his Chicago speech, FDR quite deliberately admitted openly to his speechwriters that he was deliberately lying when he read their speeches. Only rarely does he seem to have felt remorse, such as in a statement to Robert Sherwood that he was supposedly tired of telling the same old lies.

Nevertheless, the criticism of his Chicago speech did not in the least cause Roosevelt to deviate from his warmongering policy in favor of Stalin, whose USSR he regarded as a democracy, and the spread of Bolshevism. He superficially the cynical statement that he was betraying the people for their own good. He had few allies, but these were powerful: Felix Frankfurter, Louis Brandeis, Albert Einstein, Bernhard Baruch and the Jewish wife of Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Then there was the Mayer publishing group as well as the Jewish press. As soon as FDR decided to stick to his Chicago stance on Stalin, he got people like Congress to keep making damaging concessions.

Roosevelt brought unnecessary death and destruction upon the whole world for the benefit of Stalin: he openly admitted that he was eagerly helping to crush the British Empire. And apparently he did not give a single moment's thought to the fate of such countries as Poland, France, Italy, Germany, China, or Japan, although he expressed certain affections toward Italy, Gambia, and other British colonies. Did he have anything to offer against the assertions of his first two army commanders, namely General

Patton, who openly declared that Stalin, not Hitler, had been the main threat to Europe all along, and General MacArthur, who repeatedly stated that the real threat to Asia was Stalin's communism not Japanese imperialism, with which agreement could have been

For the benefit of Stalin, FDR had incurred \$350 billion in debt during World War II - the U.S. gross national product in 1939 was only \$80 billion. And since such sums were not payable, sooner or later this debt burden was bound to hit the U.S. economy, returning the U.S. to its pre-1914 condition as a debtor nation. That point was reached in 1984. Today, the U.S. is the most indebted nation; moreover, foreign investment in the U.S. is greater than U.S. investment abroad. No politician, and were he as mediocre and intellectually limited as FDR was in certain areas, could have done more damage to the world than Roosevelt did after his alliance with Stalin in 1933 and after his Chicago speech on October 5, 1937. Roosevelt held fast to the alliance with Stalin until his death. In 1945, FDR could easily be called the most popular U.S. president, whose unbalanced and unreasonable thoughts have become a kind of Holy Writ solemnly proclaimed by presidents of all parties, including Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Carter, and Reagan. And this in view of the fact that the American public abandoned the sane views of a Nye, Borah, Wheeler and Borchard and gradually switched to the criminal as well as international law violating policy of a FDR, but which at least temporarily restored the circulation of money

Reagan, who was just 22 when FDR first took office, is the only FDR successor who still reveres Roosevelt; the others rejected him, despised him, or at most praised him for his calculation. In 1984, during the second televised debate, Walter Mondale, the Democratic challenger, made some foul and hurtful remarks about ex-President Hoover to prompt Reagan to Hoover's defense. But Reagan did not respond to Hoover's slur, instead continuing to praise FDR.

The Situation in Germany 1937

At the time of Roosevelt's Chicago speech, Germany was leading the world economy recovering from the economic crisis by achieving full employment

without inflation. This was despite the fact that the Great Depression had hit Germany harder than other industrialized nations. The old parties from the Weimar period were either dissolved or dissolved on their own in 1933. Public support for Hitler's government was probably 90 percent of the population in 1937.

Although life for the German Jews was subject to restrictions (Nuremberg Laws of 1935; they drafted by Hans Globke later for Adenauer) and although they were persecuted (April 1, 1933: boycott of Jewish stores in response to boycotts of German goods by U.S. Jews), ten percent of the active lawyers were still Jews. This fact was explicitly confirmed by American diplomats in Berlin as late as 1938, five years after Hitler's rise to power. Moreover, great wealth was concentrated among 17 percent of the Jews. On September 17, Eleanor Roosevelt wrote to one of her lesbian friends that Hitler was right in his measures against the Jews, who had a unique wealth of power in Germany after the inflation of 1923. However, she also added that the world would also judge him by his actions. Further, the American upper class largely shared the views of Henry Ford in his work *Der internationale Jude* (2 vols., Leipzig 1922). Many of these considerations were brought to the attention of the American masses by popular preachers such as Father Coughlan, for example, the role of the Jews in the international money market and their responsibility for the development of Bolshevism in Russia (on this see E. Roth, *Jews Must Live*, New York 1934).

It is no exaggeration to claim that anti-Semitism in Germany was relatively weak compared to that in Eastern Europe. German public opinion was little different from that in the United States, England, or France. Moreover, Germany was a country where there were laws, tranquility, and, from 1933 on, enough to eat. This was in stark contrast to the shortages and mass violations of the law in Bolshevik Russia. The mastermind and beneficiary of this whole development in the East was, of course, Stalin, who even made use of the invented fifth German column to justify his latest purges.

Stalin's efforts to create a nation of mass man (Lenin's goal) and a robot society based on automatic obedience was far different what Hitler tried to practice in Germany and what was described the great poet Hans Grimm in a

series of lectures (*Hochwertigkeit und Vermassung*) in England. Mass man was the declared goal of the Bolshevists in a society where a party clique enjoyed prerogatives and the masses lived on a fairly low level. In Germany, on the other hand, even non-party members could gain recognition and prosperity for equal achievement. In the Reich, the whole system rested on recognition of private property and personal enterprise.

During a lecture in Sweden in 1937, enjoying the support of the well-known researcher Sven Hedin, Reich Women's Leader Gertrud Scholtz-Klink told the Swedes that, among other things, there were promising career opportunities for German women; the legal profession even though Hitler's decision at the 1936 party congress made it impossible for women to serve as judges as was the case in Social Democratic-ruled Sweden. If Hitler was troubled by the idea that women could serve as judges (and Mrs. Scholtz-Klink tried in vain to convince him otherwise), this can be traced to his romantic ideal of women. This did not mean, however, that he did not encourage women's pursuit of higher education (on this, see Gertrud Scholtz-Klink *Die Frau im 3. Reich*, Tübingen 1978, p. 519 ff.).

Lord Mottistone, Lloyd George's Secretary of War in World War I, warned in a stirring book, *In Search of Truth* (Berlin, n.d.), against old-fashioned and prejudiced

people in England who were incapable of appreciating social progress in Germany. Mottistone pointed out with equal emphasis that the need for a *labor service* existed in England as well. Of course, Germany had feudal vestiges just as England did. This point of view is examined retrospectively by Herbert Grabert in his book *Sieger und Besiegte - der deutsche Nationalismus nach 1945* (Tübingen 1966). When Hitler came to power, there were too many old-fashioned and prejudiced people in Germany, especially in the Wehrmacht, but also in important administrative areas. And these elements were of detrimental effect; some even indulged in espionage and sabotage. Without the FDR-Stalin alliance, these problems could have been overcome.

Halifax's push for war

Indeed, without the FDR-Stalin alliance, there would have been no World

War II, for Roosevelt was not willing to play the lackey for the British, as Woodrow Wilson had done in World War I, going along with the game devised by his London ambassador, Walter Page, and the British foreign secretary, Grey. Anyone who reads Woodward's *Documents on British Foreign Policy* must realize that Halifax immediately after the completion of the British airwheel network propagandized FDR with the same intention as Churchill tried to do after Pearl Harbor, namely so that all forces (men as well as material) of the USA would now be at England's disposal. Can anyone imagine that Halifax would have relied on Roosevelt if he had known that Stalin was his main ally? One may be assured that the noble lord would have left Poland to its fate without another thought. And he would never have written that speech which Chamberlain was forced to deliver in Birmingham on March 17, 1939. In this speech (see appendix) he famously expressed the conviction that Hitler's capture of the old imperial city of Prague should be seen as his attempt to conquer the world. When one recalls that Halifax confesses in his self-biography *Fullness of Days* (London 1957) that he could not help liking and admiring Goebbels, one wonders how he could make such inferior propaganda - his self-biography, by the way, is weaker than the official biography of Lord Birkenhead.

In 1939, England was the only world power in every respect. And Hitler was seeking an alliance with this very England, not a war. How then could he be ridiculously accused of planning world conquest? Would Italy and Japan have remained friendly to Hitler if they thought he was planning to swallow them up? But Halifax, knew his Englishmen, who, according to Lord Northcliffe, needed a newspaper for people who could see but not read (a kind of *picture newspaper*), another for people who could read but not think (everything from the *Times* down, including the weeklies, such as *Time* and *Tide*), but no newspaper for people who could both read and think, for there were too few of them, so that such a newspaper would not have been profitable. - A. P. Scotland, the security commissioner of Greater London, noted (*The London Cage*, London 1961) that before the Chamberlain speech, opinion of Hitler was better around London than elsewhere, but that Chamberlain's speech of March 17, 1939, alone turned the whole thing around.

Geoffrey Gorer (*Exploring English Character*, London 1958) states in his book that the English of the 20th century had to be convinced that a major war had to be fought on moral grounds before they were willing to support it. Bonnet, the French foreign minister, who was in London on March 21, 1939, shortly after the Birmingham speech, was dismayed to hear an English lady of the high nobility say at a reception that she would gladly sacrifice her six sons if Hitler could beIt seemed incomprehensible to Bonnet that the friendly relations of Munich, where Hitler and Chamberlainhad signed a treaty of friendship on September 29, 1938, after the Sudeten crisis had been settled by the Munich Agreement, could be completely reversed by a single speech Bonnet, the French Foreign Minister, had also signed a treaty of friendship with Ribbentrop on December 6, 1938, three months before his London visit on behalf of France. Both countries stated that there were no longer any unresolved territorial questions between them and that the existing border was final.

The speech Halifax had written for Chamberlain, despite its lack of logic and evidence, had managed to convince all too many Londoners that Hitler was a liar bent on world domination. The liars, however, were Halifax and Chamberlain. And Halifax wanted to expand English dominion, but this attempt inevitably had to fail because of the Stalin-FDR alliance. The result was inevitably a world in whose eastern part the USSR occupied a dominant positionand was also strong enough to have a decisive say in the western part If Halifax had known just a bit of what Bullitt told me in 1947, there would probably have been no war in 1939.

In his book *The Fall of the British Empire* (London 1969), Colin Cross clearly states in many places that England could have had a favorable treaty from the German side at any time. The English made the mistake of not negotiating such a treaty either before or after Churchill came to power. And this mistake cost them their world empire. Churchill gradually woke up after a conversation with FDR in 1942. But by that time the British were hostages, so to speak, in the hands of Roosevelt and Stalin. This becameveryat the wartime conferences of the so-called Big Three at Tehran (1943), Yalta (1945), and Potsdam (1945Although FDRwas dead bythe time of the PotsdamConference, President Truman acted like a robot and carried out

what he thought were Roosevelt's intentions. And although Attlee replaced Churchill after the 1945 elections, he found himself in the same minority position vis-à-vis Roosevelt and Stalin as Churchill had been before the propaganda success of Birmingham 1939 marked the beginning of the decline of British power, which had been the world's number one power for 175 years.

There is a cause-and-effect relationship between Roosevelt's Chicago speech of October 5, 1937, and Neville Chamberlain's speech on March 17, 1939, a year and a half later. FDR's turn from peace-loving states, including the Soviet Union, was repeated. A few days later, Admiral Drax and General Doumenc traveled to Moscow to ask Stalin, Voroshilov, and Molotov for a so-called joint security agreement. The fact that Halifax, in order to make war between England and Germany inevitable, had given the Poles a unilateral security guarantee against Germany on March 31, 1939 - in this guarantee the Poles could even decide that the Germans' entry into Danzig was a *cause for war* - made it easy for the Soviets to remain in the background in the early stages of the war initiated by England. Since the Poles had made it clear that the USSR was their main adversary, it was out of the question that the Poles would allow Russian troops to march through their territory and fight on Polish soil. This was all the more so because the Poles knew by now that Russia wanted to reannex part of its territory, conquered from the Poles in 1920-21, to its domain. It was easy for Stalin to explain to the U.S. representative why agreement with the British and Poles could not be reached under such conditions. In 1943, despite Katyn - Stalin had had 15,000 Polish officers killed there and elsewhere - it was easier for him to negotiate with the Polish government-in-exile in London. In retrospect, it can be said that Poland's fate as a permanent Soviet satellite from 1944 - with less genuine independence than in Congress Poland after the Congress of Vienna in 1815 - was sealed the moment the Poles saw Chamberlain's Birmingham speech as a signal for war and honored England's blank check guarantee against Germany in 1939.

"The Unnecessary War"

France behaved very cautiously and reluctantly in all this and was, so to speak, drawn into the Anglo-Polish front in 1939. Italy, on the other hand, was intimidated by military threats from England since January 1939. Mussolini finally agreed with British Ambassador Sir Percy Loraine on August 18, 1939, that Italy would remain neutral in the event of war. Although Mussolini had originally suggested Hitler's nonaggression pact with Stalin, the signing (August 23, 1939) did not obligate him to change his policy toward England-his fears about the offensive power of the British navy were not allayed. Several attempts on the part of the French and Italians to mediate in the dispute between England and Germany were unsuccessful (see Paul Rassinier, *Die Jahrhundert-Provokation*. Tübingen 1989, pp. 266-311). Hitler would not surrender to the British at Danzig.

The British had allowed themselves to be maneuvered into Churchill called in his war memoirs an "unnecessary war" (see W. S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, 1985, p. 12) because they mistakenly assumed that it was FDR's desire to provide them with the people as well as the sources of aid from the United States as unselfishly as Wilson had done. Had they realized that Roosevelt's favorite was named Stalin, they would have acted differently. Churchill himself meant something quite different by the expression "unnecessary war." I discussed this point of view in 1962 with the Anglo-Jewish writer Gilbert Martin, who further edited the Churchill biography by Randolph Churchill and who had written several books on pacification policy. Had the English supported French security system as it existed in 1925, after Locarno, further supported the French alliance system and strict adherence to the Versailles *Dictatorial Peace*, it would have been impossible for Hitler to get into a position of independence face of such close Anglo-French coalescence. By the time of Roosevelt's Chicago speech, however, Hitler had already realized Germany's independence because the British had shattered the French security system when they failed to resist German rearmament, Hitler's rapprochement with Italy, and the Wehrmacht's invasion of the demilitarized Rhineland.

The keystone in this development was the Anglo-German naval

agreement of June 18, 1935 (see Robert Ingram, *Hitler's Happiest Day*, Stuttgart 1962). Martin Gilbert agreed with me that by 1935 it was too late for Churchill's action to intimidate Germany to save the peace.

The British Conservatives, who had emerged victorious from the 1935 elections, had put themselves between two stools when they rejected the intimidation action because it would still have been workable, and then tried to carry it out because it was already too late. This was their main mistake, and had they understood FDR's attitude, they would never have committed it. That a rich plutocrat like Roosevelt would prefer Stalin to them did not occur to them; it did to the Polish leadership, which continued to rule Poland dictatorially after the death of dictator Marshal Josef Pilsudski (he died of cancer in Warsaw in 1935 at the age of 68). Pilsudski was more cunning than his successors. Had he lived a few more years, he probably would have refused to join the English game. Just as Chamberlain rejected FDR's plan for a European conference before the German-Austrian *annexation*, so Pilsudski - had he lived - would probably have rejected FDR's offer after the Munich Agreement of 1938.

My private correspondence with Georges Bonnet, which began in 1965, when Bonnet was still a member of the French National Assembly of the 5th Republic, proved his general agreement with my books *The Forced War* (loc. cit.) on 1939 and *France's Resistance to the Second World War* (Tübingen 1963) on the political conditions in France before 1939. He also agreed with my view that France was close to preventing the Second World War through its conference plan coordinated with Italy (Mussolini's offer of August 31; the conference was to be held on September 5).

We know by now from the files that England would have withdrawn from the alliance with Poland (August 25, 1939) if France had refused to support Polish policy. And this would have been in accordance with the slogan of Ezra Pound, who, when he visited the United States in 1939, said, "No war west of the Vistula!" - in other words, it would have been a short German-Polish war. The peace settlement from 1919 to 1922 in the German-Polish border area was so bad and so imperfect that there would have been no reasonable person to criticize Hitler if, after his many futile peace efforts with Poland, it had come to war. In addition, there was the unreasonable Polish

chauvinism, which Churchill called insane and ungrateful. A peace conference with Germany, Italy, England and France could have restored the good spirit of Munich (1938), if only because the Spanish Civil War had been over since March 28, 1939, and on terms that both France and England could accept - Stalin had kept his losses in check, having sent no support to Spain since 1938.

World War II was unnecessary in a much broader sense than Churchill meant. There was no need for "Triumph and Tragedy" - the chosen title of the final volume of his war memoirs, much of which he had himself written. There was no need for Operation Keelhaul after the war, when the Anglo-Americans handed over five million non-German refugees to Stalin, who then had them killed. Over ten million Germans also died in and after that war. Stalin lied about Soviet losses. He did not want to be reminded the millions of deaths of his purges. The machinery of hatred that started with the Chicago and Birmingham speeches had been directed at the wrong address. The war against Germany was never in the interest of the other Western states. It did, however, fit Stalin's imperialist plans.

Churchill and Bolshevism

Churchill justified his coexistence with Bolshevism in 1941 by saying that he was joyfully prepared to enter into an alliance with the devil and all the powers of hell in order to destroy Hitler. Thus he sought to excuse his favoritism and promotion of Stalin, whom he described in the House of Commons as "such a great man and wise ruler." Only four years earlier, in his book *Great Contemporaries* (Amsterdam 1938), Churchill had expressed the hope that if England were in a similar position to Germany after World War I, there would be a man like Hitler to rebuild the country and lead it to greatness. On a visit to Hitler's most important ally, Mussolini - who fully and enthusiastically supported Hitler in his fight against Bolshevism - Churchill publicly stated that if he were Italian, he would also be a fascist. The same Churchill, at an official reception in 1937, refused to shake hands with the Spanish Republican ambassador, saying that he was only a Stalin

straw man and that his hands were stained with blood. Moreover, Churchill had for years called Stalin the "bloody baboon of Bolshevism." When Churchill eloquently tried to explain his about-face, he had no idea that the man he considered to be completely under his influence had already been Stalin's secret ally for almost nine years: FDR!

Roosevelt's permanent envoy to Moscow, Norman Davies (*As U.S. Ambassador to Moscow*, Zurich 1943), was a wealthy Jewish businessman from Chicago who had been an ardent supporter of Bolshevism for years. FDR's chief adviser, Harry Hopkins, whom Churchill did not meet until 1940, was also among the Bolshevik supporters. Before Hopkins, who came from humble beginnings in Iowa, met FDR in 1928, he had already been strongly influenced by the Jewish professor Steinberg, who had persuaded him to go to New York to do social work as part of Jewish associations. In addition, he was married to a Jewish woman. Hopkins was also a close friend of Bernard Baruch for many years. Baruch is reported to have said to General George Marshall at the time of the Munich Conference in 1938

said, "We'll get Hitler yet; he won't get away from us!"

A few days after Churchill's speech in the House of Commons in 1941 and the outbreak of the German-Russian War, Roosevelt had sent Hopkins to Moscow with generous offers of free American aid. This event provides an explanation for the fact that the United States, which had been allowed to run a surplus for decades on the basis of protective tariff policies, ended World War II with a debt of \$350 billion (4 trillion in today's exchange rate terms)

Six months after Churchill's House of Commons speech, and just one month after the U.S.-inspired Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the man in the White House let the British prime minister know how much he disliked the British Empire especially in India and Africa. He also let much he had distrusted Queen Victoria as a boy, who was the idol of many conservative imperialists like Churchill. If British conservatives like Halifax, Chamberlain and Churchill had known that Roosevelt was in cahoots with Stalin instead of being a straw man of the British imperialists, their foreign policy would have been completely different and there would have been no war with Germany. For this very reason, Roosevelt had held back with his opinion until it no longer mattered.

When the Japanese hastily marched on Singapore in 1942 and were about to sink the British warships *Repulse* and *Prince of Wales*, Churchill should have been a man of backbone and honor. He should have retreated, as Asquith did in 1916, having been unable to change what had been done by 1942. But Churchill was ruthless and loved power more than his own lore. Since Charlemagne was exactly the opposite of Churchill, Adenauer had the Charlemagne Prize of Aachen presented to him. This German event speaks for itself.

But all this does not explain Churchill's statement about an alliance with the devil and all the powers of hell to destroy Hitler already in 1941. The vile war propaganda, which in other ways continues to this day, had not yet properly set in at that time. Ernst von Weizsäcker had not made his dubious claim of six million dead Jews to Allen Dulles in Switzerland until 1942. Walter Duranty declared that Stalin had killed more Jews than Hitler had ever arrested.

The so-called Atlantic Charter of^{‡‡} August 12-14, 1941 was an insult to the whole world, for neither Churchill nor Roosevelt showed any respect for the four freedoms proclaimed (freedom from fear, freedom from want, freedom of religion, and freedom to govern oneself)

Churchill, who was allowed to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire, was the accomplice of Stalin and Roosevelt in March 1941 when the legitimate Yugoslav government under Prince Regent Paul, Prime Minister Tsvetkovich and Foreign Minister Cincar-Markovich was overthrown on March 27, 1941. Churchill knew as well as anyone that Hitler had the right under international law to attack Stalin and his Bolshevik accomplices before the latter, in collusion with FDR and also with Churchill himself, would turn all of Europe upside down. Churchill had not only warned against German militarism before and during the First World War. He had also warned against the Weimar governments under Brüning, von Papen and Schleicher, long before Hitler came to power.

*England's manipulations in 1939 as
the First World War*

The hypocrisy and hypocrisy of official England, as well as of official English court historians, such as Trevor-Roper and Wheeler-Bennett, who blame Hitler for the outbreak of World War II, is proverbial, although it was precisely the English who stood as the fools at the end of the war. There

^{‡‡} At the meeting between British Prime Minister Churchill and U.S. President Roosevelt on Aug. 12-14, 1941 - the U.S. was still neutral! - on the U.S. warship *Augusta*, the Atlantic Charter was agreed upon as a declaration of war aims and published on August 14, 1941, without ever being initialed or signed. The Soviet Union agreed on Sept. 24, 1941, and another 47 states acceded in 1942-45 until the Atlantic Charter became the basis of the U.N. Charter. The main principles of the Atlantic Charter, which were later not adhered to, were: Renunciation of territorial acquisitions by the victors, change of sovereignty only with the consent of the affected population, right of self-determination of peoples, free trade and freedom of the seas, renunciation of force and disarmament of the aggressor states. See G. Zieger, *Die Atlantik-Charta*, 1963, text in the appendix.

would have been no war had not Halifax pulled chestnuts out of the fire for FDR and Stalin by inciting Polish desires for territorial expansion and convincing the Poles to abandon their promising friendly relations with Germany. By October 1938, Poland had asked Hitler for support should Stalin leave the area of diplomatic protest over the Teschen question. Pilsudski himself had asked Germany for good neighborly relations in 1933. The English blank proxy of March 31, 1939, was followed by the refusal of Foreign Secretary Halifax as well as the British Ambassador, Sir Howard Kennard, to recommend that the Poles even discuss Hitler's final proposals of August 29, 1939, for a peaceful settlement. The English also took no notice of Polish atrocities against the German minority, which were confirmed by neutral observers. Official England paid just as little attention to the secret, non-official conference of the Swedish negotiator, who was still trying to negotiate a peaceful solution to the conflict at the end of August 1939 (see Paul Rassinier, *Die Jahrhundert Provokation*, Tübingen 1989, p.278). Only in this way could FDR and Stalin remain successful. Roosevelt had already exposed himself as a warmonger since his Chicago speech of 1937, and Stalin had also been constantly pressuring the Finns since 1938 over Soviet territorial claims north of Leningrad. Of course, both the British and the Poles proceeded on the false assumption that in the long run it would be they, not Stalin, who would be the main beneficiaries of American support.

There is an astonishing parallel between the English manipulation of Poles in 1939 and the manipulation of Tsarist Russia in 1914. England had no sympathy for Russia in 1914, nor for Poland in 1939. Second, the question of general mobilization played a decisive role in both cases. Both Ambassador Sir George Buchanan in Petersburg in 1914 and Ambassador Kennard in Warsaw in 1939 made every effort to achieve mobilization directed against Germany - the Russian mobilization occurred on August 1, 1914, the Polish on August 30, 1939. For Buchanan it was far more difficult than for Kennard to sow the poisonous seeds because of the hesitation of Tsar Nicholas II - this also led to a two-day delay. How else can one call it when a diplomat from one country drives another country to suicide! Considering the German-Russian treaty, which isolated Poland as a small power, this was nevertheless surprising.

The English attitude toward tsarist Russia was clearly demonstrated

immediately after Lenin's return from exile in Switzerland in April 1917. King George V of England refused to grant asylum to his cousin Nicholas II. The Tsar himself and his entire family were killed by the Bolsheviks a year later. Already in 1915, the Russians were badly let down by the English when Churchill §§launchedhis Gallipoli action.Petersburg rightly interpreted this action as an attemptthe English to take Constantinople, having previously promised it to the Russians in a secret treaty with the usual duplicity

The provisional government of Alexander Kerensky experienced the same treatment in 1917. The English, who were well informed about the moral crisis of the Russian troops because of the constant defeats against the Germans in 1914, 1915 and 1916, made Kerensky start the great offensive of 1917 under General Kornilov, which was the last link in the disintegration of the Russian troops and opened wide the gates to Bolshevism. Officers who wanted to send their soldiers to the front were often trampled to death by their soldiers. The Russian custom of using women at the front dates back to this period. It was believed that the menwould followattacking femalesoldiers; however, this rarely worked out (see Maria Bochkareva,*My life as Peasant, Officer and Exile*,

§§Also at Churchill's instigation, England and France attempted to conquer the Turkish straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean in 1915/16. An attempt by British and French naval units under British Vice Admiral de Robeck tobreak through at the DardanellesMarch 18, 1915, after previousshelling, failed due to German-Turkish resistance under German Admiral Souchon, with two British and one French liner sunk.Then, on April 25 and August 6, 1915, strong British, French, and Australian forceslandedat various points on the Gallipoli Peninsula. This was defended so successfully by the Prussian general and Turkish marshal Liman von Sanders that the allied enterprise had to be abandoned on 20.12.1915, finally on 9.1.1916. The Alliedunits under Sir Hamilton comprised 410,000 British and Commonwealth and 79,000 French; their losses were 115,000 and 27,000 men, respectively. About 500 Germans participated in the battle for Gallipoli in leading positions. See H. Kannengießer,*Gallipoli*, 1927.

New York 1919). This book also contains a revealing conversation between Lenin and Trotsky, in which the two are rightly described as cynical intellectuals (pp. 264ff.).

In 1939 the Poles were abused early on and also deprived of the hope that England would stand by them against Russia, their main enemy, just as it promised to support them against Germany. This was done only to prevent a possible German-Polish understanding, which would ultimately have avoided war. In fact, Germany was the only country that could have given decisive help to Poland against Russia. any case, it remains to be noted that a few days before the Russian bombing of Helsinki on November 30, 1939 - negotiations were still going on in Moscow between the Finns and the Russians - the British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, Butler, declared in the House of Commons that England had never intended to protect Poland against Russia, even though Poland was England's ally against Germany, there was a Polish government-in-exile London, and the USSR had only recently seized 45 percent of Poland's territory

At the time Butler made his House of Commons statement, Poland was still at war with Stalin, as we know. This is probably a unique case in history of one ally being entirely oblivious to another ally's war with its principal enemy. Although Churchill and occasionally Roosevelt gave half-hearted encouragement to Western Poland between 1939 and Stalin's establishment of government of Lublin in 1943, both the Polish ambassador to the United States, Jan Ciechanowski (*Vergeblicher Sieg*, Zurich 1948), and the Polish-born Harvard historian Edward Rozek (*World War II Allied Diplomacy - a Case Study in Poland*, Harvard 1955, pp. 398ff.) agrees that neither FDR nor Churchill had given the Poles in the West hope for real freedom. Poland had acted foolishly in 1939 in placing its trust in Churchill and FDR in a kind of wishful thinking. This had become particularly clear at the Conference of the Big Three in Tehran (Nov. 28-Dec. 1, 1943), when FDR had appeared more as Stalin's accomplice than as Churchill's. How could Churchill, even if he had been sober and sincere and not a drunken liar, have protected Poland against Stalin when the latter had FDR in his pocket?

Adolf Bochenski, Poland's leading historian along with W. Konopczynski

and author of the best-selling *Miedzy Niemcy i Rossija* (Cracow 1937) - he was among those who escaped from Stalin to Iraq and were rescued by General Anders. In 1943 they were sent to Italy to serve as cannon fodder for the English - went into open fire with the Germans at Ancona in 1944, when he found out that England, instead of supporting Poland, intended to disband the Anders Legion after the war. At no time were the Poles given hope that they would be allowed to restore their old Poland in any form. That would be for Stalin to decide. The same can be said of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Although Bulgaria, unlike the other Balkan states, had not entered the war against Stalin, it was clear in Sofia that the outcome of the struggle in the East would also decide Bulgaria's fate. This would also touch on territorial issues, such as Macedonia, which had been taken from the Yugoslavs in 1941. When Molotov was in Berlin in November 1940, he let it be known that the Bulgarians knew Stalin considered the country his sphere of influence. Hitler refused to accept this claim. Seven months later, the war would decide this.

Eduard Benesch, the Czech, was probably lied to by FDR the most of all, although even before his death FDR tried to ensure that the Czechs did not fall within Stalin's sphere of power. A Czech professor I know described the invasion of Brunn in southern Moravia by the Soviet "liberators." The Czechs there behaved relatively orderly at first toward the German civilians, women and children, in contrast to the atrocities in Prague and the northern Sudetenland (especially in the areas where Eisenhower's troops were temporarily stationed). When the Russians came to Brunn, people lined the streets. However, they had to watch as the liberators took everything from them: Bicycles, watches, clothes, in short, everything. The Czechs, who had a high standard of living and knew no rationing, now mostly let the innocent Germans pay for it, until in February 1948 the Communists seized power and immediately devalued the Czech currency. Most Czech Jews had by then emigrated to the USA and Israel (see Kurt Glaser, *Die Tschechoslowakei*, Frankfurt/Main 1964). Since 1948, the CSSR has been one of the poorest, most humble and decrepit satellites of the USSR. The trip Benesch made to Moscow in early 1945 on the advice of Roosevelt and Churchill did nothing to guarantee Czech independence.

Churchill's success also seems incredible when he succeeded in

persuading the Polish government-in-exile under Sikorski to recognize the USSR diplomatically after Stalin's invasion of Poland in 1939. He managed to do so with the urgent advice that this would allow the Poles to obtain better terms from Stalin later. Sikorski, who then died in a mysterious plane crash near Gibraltar on July 5, 1943, traveled to Moscow encouraged by Churchill, on December 3-4, 1941, shortly after the outbreak of the German-Russian War, to obtain from Stalin the release of Polish prisoners of war in the USSR. He wanted to enlist as many as possible as fellow combatants alongside the British, but found that some preferred to fight in Stalin's service. Sikorski discovered in Russia, however, that they were only recruiting soldiers; some 15,000 Polish officers had disappeared without a trace. When Sikorski then asked Stalin about their whereabouts, the Soviet leader claimed that he had not the slightest idea of the officers' whereabouts. He had himself connected with Voroshilov in Sikorski's presence and told him to look into the matter. When the Katyn massacre became known in 1943, Stalin broke off diplomatic relations with the London Poles.

Although the International Red Cross and numerous well-known neutral experts proved Stalin's guilt in the Katyn massacre as early as April 1943 (see Janusz Zawodny, *For Example Katyn*, Munich 1975), it was not until late 1950, after the outbreak of the Korean War, that the U.S. Congressional Select Committee came to the same conclusion (and the Soviets officially admitted their guilt for the first time on April 13, 1990).

At the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial (1945-46), the Soviet prosecutor Rudenko, with the acquiescence of the cynical and depraved Americans and English (Robert Jackson, Maxwell Fife and Geoffrey Lawrence), was able to blame the Katyn massacre on the Germans. The Allied decision that only documents incriminating Germany could be published in the Red, Blue and Green series created as one-sided an investigative result at Nuremberg as Trotsky's three-volume report on the Russian Revolution of 1917.

Thanks to the courtesy of Director Glenn Campbell of the Hoover Institute, I had access to the documents of the Nuremberg defense lawyers on the question of the Weizsäcker claim of the murder of the six million Jews. To this day, I am the only one who has worked through these documents (see *Falsehood in Peacetime: the Genocide Mirage*, Stanford, or the Los Angeles

version of the same text from 1969, though with many typographical errors since I have not proofread, entitled *The Myth of the Six Million*). With this material, it was easy to bust the Weizsäcker claim as well as Rudenko's Katyn myth

By the time the U.S. admitted what Stalin had done at Katyn in 1950, it was too late for the Poles.

More British badness

Sir Bernard Pares, in *The Fall of The Russian Monarchy* (London 1933) complains that bad English advice as well as open duplicity played a major role in the destruction of the Romanovs (the Tsarist family) in 1917 and in the rise of the Bolsheviks. Dietrich Gerhard (*Rußland und der Aufstieg Englands*, Berlin 1933) also points out the unpalatable treatment of the Romanovs by the English. This is also well illustrated by Bruce Lockhart (*British Agent*, London 1933). Lockhart discusses the final dirty tricks that led to the destruction of Nicholas II and Kerensky. Gerhard's comprehensive account starts in the Middle Ages, when the Hanseatic League and the Venetians were the only merchants in a feudal England still suffering the effects of the Hundred Years' War, which ended in 1453. In the same year, the Venetians suffered a decisive setback when the Turks conquered Constantinople. In addition, wars between individual hostile noble families had to be endured. And although the English population remained largely neutral, it nevertheless suffered from the horrors of war.

Then followed the period of global trade boom, which was initiated by Columbus' voyages of discovery in 1492. Portugal, Spain, Holland and France led the way in the early days in navigating the world's trade routes and in founding colonies. The English gradually tried to keep up - selling wool to the Flemish textile industry, for example. But their progress was slow. Trade with Eastern Europe across the Baltic was controlled by the Hanseatic League, the Danes and the Dutch, leaving no room for the English upstarts.

Richard Chancellor (d. 1556), who took his cue from Columbus in circumventing Turkish restrictions on Mediterranean trade, opened a direct

sea link from English trading ports on the North Sea to Archangels on the White Sea, which was ice-free for six months of the year. The great time of the Hanseatic League in Russia was over. Just like London, which had not had a Hanseatic office since 1598, Novgorod no longer had a Hanseatic branch at that time. The English merchants who followed Chancellor filled the commercial void in Russia and advanced via the Volga and the Caspian Sea to trade with Persia, which had aroused the special interest of the Russians since the 15th century. Gerhard argues that the trading wealth that England acquired in Russia under Henry V (1387-1422) and Elizabeth I (1533-1603) provided the basis for naval and commercial power in subsequent imperialist ventures in America, India, and China.

Nietzsche is right when he says that small favors bring gratitude and large favors bring ingratitude. With the help of Frederick the Great, London had finally managed to acquire the largest colonial empire in the world; the Peace of Paris of 1763 confirmed the fact. Frederick's gratitude was that the English cut off his supplies after their two great victories over the French in 1759. To Pitt the Elder's credit, it must be said that he would not have done this to his only Prussian ally. This was left to his successor, Lord Bute, in 1760. The Peace of Paris (1770) also meant political survival for Prussia as well as the end of Habsburg attempts to reconquer Silesia after three futile wars. One is reminded of the three futile attempts of the Swedish Vasa kings to reconquer Finland after the death of Charles XII.

1791 Only twenty-one years after the Peace of Paris, as well as after the eight-year interlude of the American War of Independence the Younger Pitt told the House of Commons that England might possibly go to war against Russia to prevent the Russians from taking from the Turks the port of Okhakov, a rather insignificant port near the mouth of the Bug River on the north side of the Black Sea (see Gleason, *op. cit.*, pp. 43ff.) Although at this time the dislike of the Russians was new in the House of Commons, the prospect of a crusade against the Russians as allies of the Turks was well received; preparations were made accordingly. But no war occurred because the French waged war against Austria (1792-97) and Prussia (1792-95). Prussia concluded the Separate Peace of Basel with Napoleon in 1795 and remained neutral to France until 1806, when it again entered the war against

France on the side of England. Austria initially held out against France until the Peace of Campoformio in 1797.

Without this French blunder, which was due to the inexperience of the new rulers, there would have been a "Crimean War" more than sixty years earlier. Many more states participated in the actual Crimean War (1853-56), with England even carrying the intention of expanding this war into a world war.

The dislike for Russia, and this has been well elaborated by the researcher of Russian diplomacy Anatol Ignatiev in several studies, was characteristic for the English foreign policy of the last 200 years or so. To a lesser extent, the English have also had an aversion to the Poles since the Congress of Vienna in 1815, and to the Czechs since Versailles in 1919, when it was not the English who were double-crossed by the Czechs, but Wilson.

England's xenophobia

Distrust and dislike of foreigners as well as provincialism were facts that Europeans had to reckon with, despite the British world empire. Without a doubt, Thomas Hardy (he died in 1928) and D. H. Lawrence (he died in 1930) are the two greatest English novelists of the 20th century. Evely Waugh, for her part, is Welsh. John Osborne, the author of *Angry Young Man*, did not show the artistic class of his great predecessors, despite the dramatic skills he had shown in his Luther play, among others, and despite his influence on English youth.

In Hardy's greatest novel, *The Mayor of Casterbridge* (1886), the English hero is gradually destroyed by a Scot, a stranger to the area. And the latter's typically Scottish traits juxtaposed with the English ones, are illuminated ad nauseam. Hardy goes so far as to suggest that the Scotsman usually destroys the Englishman when it comes to a fight between the two.

D. H. Lawrence was only 29 years old at the outbreak of World War I and had married shortly before. His wife was Frieda von Richthofen, the sister of Manfred von Richthofen, the "red baron" and fighter pilot of World War I, who was shot from the ground in 1918, probably by an Australian soldier,

but still managed to land his plane.

Lawrence, this great mind, was so incensed by foolish alliance and encirclement policies of the British Conservatives and Liberals that he tried several times to be arrested as a German spy. He even claimed that he was supplying the Germans with very important intelligence. When this failed, he and his wife followed the example of Francis Neilson and emigrated (Mrs. Neilson divorced her husband because of this). They settled in the artist colony of Taos in New Mexico. Unlike Neilson, they did not become part of the American scene. Neilson also remarried, to the wealthy Helen Swift. He devoted the rest of his long life to revisionism in several books as well as in print. In what is undoubtedly his greatest novel *Sons and Lovers* (1913; Engl. 1925), Lawrence portrays his hero's father as a Cotswolds miner who is brutally victimized by non-local London plutocrats.

If thus already London and its "City" (the center of English financial power) was a distant and foreign place for Lawrence, if for Hardy Scotland was distant and foreign, what could be more natural for Chamberlain in the House of Commons on March 15, 1939, than to describe Czechoslovakia as "a distant country" which he knew nothing; this was the day after the signing of the Hitler-Hacha Treaty. Chamberlain also reminded the House of Commons - and anyone can check this out in Hansard - that Czechoslovakia was a country whose existence England once wanted to guarantee but never did. And since that country had now dissolved, the question of a possible guarantee of its existence no longer arose.

With the exception of some warmongers, such as Eden, Duff Cooper, and Churchill, and contrary to later propaganda claims, Chamberlain's speech was not poorly received. Moreover, there was nothing to suggest that Chamberlain was somehow in trouble with his large Conservative House of Commons majority. He had more trouble with breakaway Conservatives when he tried to defend the Munich Agreement the fall of 1938. So Churchill was surprised two days later when Chamberlain delivered his warmongering speech written by Halifax instead of the expected peace speech. The Czech question, which had been understandably and satisfactorily justified in London only two days before, suddenly became a vital political issue for England as a result of Halifax's hype. Added to this were fabricated

assertions of Germany's claims against the Romanians (Tilea^{***}). The Birmingham audience could hardly have been less surprised at what they heard from Chamberlain than the Chicago audience listening to Roosevelt's speech in 1937.

To put this confused speech of Roosevelt's as the real starting point of the Second World War may at first seem a bit exaggerated. However, if one compares this challenging, nonsensical and war-mongering speech with that of Chautauqua, New York, two years earlier - in the meantime nothing had happened internationally and the Spanish Civil War was over - then a certain mental confusion must be imputed to this speech. The same is then true of Chamberlain's speech in Birmingham. Neither speech was based on real facts. I agree with William Shirer (*Berlin Diary*, New York 1941) when he concludes

^{***}On the day after the German invasion of Prague, Virgil Tilea, the Romanian envoy who had been in London since January 1939 for economic aid to Romania, appeared in the British Foreign Office on March 16, 1939 and made the completely fictitious claim that a German economic delegation currently in Bucharest had made ultimate demands on Romania and that German aggression was imminent. On March 17, 1939 he repeated these false claims to the British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, in order to persuade England to provide generous financial support. Halifax, who was interested in aggravating the crisis, immediately communicated these statements to other governments without verifying their accuracy or taking into account the fact that the Reich did not have a common border with Romania and thus military action was not possible. On the same day, Sir Vansittart informed the London press, which, like the radio, then reported on March 18, 1939, with further exaggeration, about the "German ultimatum" to Romania and the alleged delivery of all Romanian mineral resources to the Reich. Immediate denials by the Romanian foreign minister, the Romanian king and the British ambassador in Bucharest were of no avail, nor was the stern reprimand that Tilea received from his government for his high-handed statements that could not be justified by anything: the British press and radio maintained the inflammatory propaganda against Germany, claimed an imminent German invasion of Romania and created a strong anti-German mood. As a result, the attitude of the British Foreign Office was opposed to an understanding with Germany, was able to assert itself fully against Prime Minister Chamberlain, who until then had still been committed to understanding

that the lack of enthusiasm of the Berliners at the military parade on the occasion of Hitler's 50th birthday on April 20, 1939, was not in favor of another war - and this may also be assumed of participants in the parade.- Porter Sargent, who saw the Shirer manuscript immediately after its return from Berlin before it went to the printer, stated that the original was much friendlier to Hitler and Germany than the version then printed can be said that the experience with his publishers completely turned Shirer around. This was evident ten years after Sargent's death in Shirer's book *Aufstieg und Niedergang des 3. Reiches* (Cologne-Berlin 1961). In this book, Shirer praises only those Germans who were pro-Communist or Communist.

Lack of enthusiasm for war in Germany

Despite continuing terrible burdens from the Versailles peace dictate (the Danzig question, the Polish corridor, and eastern Upper Silesia, which had come to Poland in 1921, with a total of 80 percent of all Silesian coal mines Hitler wanted only the settlement of the Danzig and Corridor questions in order to have friendly relations with Poland), the lack of public enthusiasm for war in Germany on the eve of World War II was also based on the fact that Germans still remembered World War I and preferred negotiation to another war. In Poland, on the other hand, enthusiasm for war was almost universal and widespread, especially since the bellicose, distorting and partly untrue speech of Polish foreign minister before the Sejm on May 5, 1939. While, for example, none of the 21 Weimar Reich governments had been willing to recognize the border with Poland, which dated back to the Versailles Dictate, Hitler offered such recognition. To refuse such a concession had to border on lunacy. Beck also put a false tongue in the matter of honor when he claimed that Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, who was visiting Warsaw with his wife in January 1939, did not want to treat Poland as an equal power. This is simply untrue. On the contrary. Beck flattered Mrs. Ribbentrop (she died in 1973) throughout the visit, and relations among allies could not have been better.

Hitler had announced a pro-Polish policy since his first cabinet meeting in 1933. He had done everything to win over Poland - the annual Göring visit to Poland should also be mentioned, as well as the hospitable reception of

leading Poles in the Reich, as confirmed to me by many Poles. No Weimar government could have afforded such generosity. It would have been swept away within a short time if it had offered what Hitler offered the Poles in the period from October 1938 to August 1939. For example, when the British sent General Ironside to Poland in August 1939, he saw Polish soldiers being hit by bullets from their own rifles during maneuvers. And in the five months since the

The English had not delivered a single cartridge. Does not all this show where Poland's real friend was before she joined England in pressing for war? Colonel Adam Koc, who had been sent to England as a result of the Halifax Guarantee to obtain war material, told me personally in Sea Cliff, Long Island, that the refused aid showed how much the English indeed disliked the Poles.

Julius Lukasiewicz, Beck's ambassador in Paris and Moscow and author of *Poland can be a Great Power* (Warsaw 1937), declared in a New York City hotel a few days before his suicide that the years of Russian domination in Poland would end with the destruction of the Polish state. It had been his greatest mistake, he said, to trust the assurances of U.S. Ambassador Bullitt in Paris in 1939 that appropriate U.S. pressure would cause the British to come to Poland's decisive aid after the next war. England emerged from the war a decrepit man, America was beyond debt and incapable of any further military action. Moreover, FDR and Churchill had in the meantime already surrendered all of Poland to Stalin. In his last days, the top Polish diplomat repeatedly declared that Stalin would play cat and mouse with the Poles until there was no more Poland.

Mistakes made by others to the detriment of Germany

Even when FDR had dropped his mask and openly admitted that, as an ally of the USSR and Great Britain, he thirsted for war against the Axis powers (his Chicago speech of October 5, 1937), Hitler knew from the American media and opinion polls that 90 percent of Americans believed that Wilson had been wrong and that it had been a mistake to enter the war, in short, that World War I should not have seemed doubtful, if not impossible, that

Roosevelt could be the first politician in the world to call for this war under such conditions - except, of course, for Jewish lobby. Who could have believed in 1937 that the Japanese, who had fought the Russians twice in 1938 and 1939 without declaring war, would refuse to help Germany against the Russians in 1941, but then did FDR the great favor of attacking Pearl Harbor, as he had hoped they would. Gross blunders made elsewhere diminished Hitler's chances of success.

Hitler was unable to achieve any foreign policy success with Japan. Until 1941, this was also the field of activity of the spy Richard Sorge, who forwarded everything to Stalin. Against the resistance of the Japanese ambassador in Germany Oshima and the Japanese foreign minister Matsuoka the secret preparations were made, which were advanced above all by the Japanese navy, supported by emperor Hirohito as well as the Tenno and led to the fateful Pearl Harbor blunder. This attack was intended by the Japanese as a response to Roosevelt's unlawful blockade as well as his outrageous ultimate demands of November 26, 1941.

The fact that no lasting alliance was formed between Germany and England on the basis of the considerations mentioned in *Mein Kampf* is ultimately the result of the Roosevelt-Stalin alliance. But similar to Bismarck, who after all had rendered some services⁺⁺⁺ to Disraeli at the Berlin Congress of 1878, such a failure was a temporary setback, but by no means an essential misfortune. Hitler had success with France and Italy. There was no possibility of cooperation with Spain since the English had gained decisive influence there at the end of the Civil War.

⁺⁺⁺At the Berlin Congress (June 13 to July 13, 1878), Bismarck, as an "honest broker," was able to settle the tensions between Austria, Russia, and England that had arisen in years before during the Oriental Crisis and after the Russo-Turkish War in the Peace of San Stefano (1878) led them to a reasonably just settlement. In particular, he succeeded in preventing the impending Russo-English War by which the British wanted to thwart Russia's grip on the straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. After initial antagonisms between British Prime Minister Disraeli and Bismarck, a good relationship then developed between the two after Disraeli also realized that he and his country had a great debt of gratitude to the unselfish Bismarck.

Regardless of Hitler's illness in the summer of 1941, the failure to keep to the timetable in the first year of the Russian campaign and the repeated insubordination of some troop leaders a Japanese attack in the east in 1941 would have decided the campaign in Hitler's favor because Moscow could not have been held without the support of troops withdrawn from Siberia. This view is also held by Russian military historians and in the memoirs of Russian commanders, especially Koniev. In the event of a Japanese attack, the Soviets would not have been able to shift troops from east to west.

must be credited to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop that from July 1941 onwards he tried to speak to the conscience of Japanese, whose rocking policy was becoming obvious clear arguments. He also made them aware of the possible consequences. At the time Truman dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (which happened to be home to half of Japan's Christian population), the Japanese Kwantung Elite Army was in northern Manchuria to repel a possible Soviet attack, despite the fact that Stalin and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka had signed a non-aggression pact in April 1941. Faced with the atomic holocaust these troops were ordered not to offer any resistance to advancing Soviet forces on August 9, 1945 - the Soviet declaration of war had been made the day before. The result was that the soldiers of the best Japanese army ended up in Siberian labor camps - although the Japanese are accustomed to extreme cold, only about ten percent of the Kwantung Army soldiers returned home. Such losses would not have occurred in a Japanese attack on Russia in 1941.

C. C. Tansill (*Die Hintertür zum Krieg*, Düsseldorf 1958) shows how Stalin's predominantly Jewish agents in the U.S. Harry Dexter White, gave Roosevelt a helpful hand in making those preparations that led to December 7, 1941 (Pearl Harbor). The father of American revisionism, Harry Elmer Barnes, has called this date the most significant in the history of world Jewry. This, of course, included Bolshevism. That Stalin did not like Jews, even though his third wife was the sister of Jewish Politburo member Lazar Kaganovich, did not matter. Although Pearl Harbor was primarily a victory for FDR and a doom for Hitler and the German people, Barnes does not speak of it as a great day in American history. Nevertheless, after twelve years of economic crisis, many Americans saw the coming war, which would not touch them, as a

bleeding to make good money, but which immediately went back to pay for higher priced goods. In his article "The End of Old America" (in *Modern Age* - magazine Spring 1958), Barnes not only reaffirmed his earlier judgment, but also began to point out, almost twenty years before John Kenneth Galbraith, the signs of a steady decline of the United States, which he indirectly attributed to FDR's success in the Pearl Harbor case. Roosevelt had thus entered the European war against Hitler through the back door, so to speak - and the U.S. was now involved as it had been in the First World War.

When Wilson got his war in 1917, thanks to the help of his strategy adviser Bernard Baruch - Baruch advised him, among other things, to order the Navy to arm merchant ships; Congress rejected his approval, much as it had done most recently with Reagan's Nicaragua policy - he put considerable power in the hands of his first man. At a guest lecture at the time, Wilson also said he was making a good president (on this, see George Creel, *Rebel at Large*, New York 1947).

Creel was an independent journalist from Missouri and the son of a farmer. He had a weakness for Mexican history because relatives of his had emigrated to Mexico after the Confederate defeat in the Civil War, not wanting to live under the "Yankees." However, he had never been to Europe and had not read a single book on European history. Wilson gave Creel millions of dollars of public money so that "people would want Germany destroyed and hate the Kaiser" (loc. cit.). This is exactly what Creel initiated. His CPI - it should not be confused with Roosevelt's later OWI (Office of War Information) - received a billion dollars and was operational within two weeks.

In a country where people had rejected war until it broke out, war hysteria now reigned. One could safely say that because of Creel, who had no idea of the matter but was a brilliant propagandist, the homes of hundreds of citizens went up in flames and thousands of citizens were beaten up. Creel then later met FDR. Like Baruch, he was not personally attracted to Roosevelt. Baruch, of course, could not personally control Roosevelt as he had managed to do with Wilson. Creel missed in FDR the polished and elegant rhetoric and lofty idealism that distinguished Wilson. FDR appeared to Creel to be only earthy, cunning, and devious. When Creel met FDR, the situation had not changed:

war was again raging in Europe. Once again, Americans did not want entry into a European war. Their president, however, had long since made that entry.

Like others, Creel had learned much from his experience with Wilson—though not about Europe. Several chapters of his memoirs, which focus on Wilson's mistakes, point to this. Like so many other Americans, Creel did not see why U.S. America should repeat the fiasco of 1914 to 1919. As an experienced propagandist, he grabbed the devil by the tail and asked Roosevelt straight out what he had against Hitler. FDR's answer: Hitler was a "case for the neurologist"; moreover, he possessed dangerous weapons and therefore had to be destroyed. Were not Reagan's words after his attack on Ghaddafi an exact copy of these words? Might not Roosevelt's unsuccessful program to prepare America for a new world war in the 1930s rather called product of a diseased brain?

Creel had once met United Mine Workers president John L. Lewis in Colorado. In 1940, Lewis fought Roosevelt over the latter's intention for a third presidency, and he also fought against entering the war. The result was that Lewis, who was a decent man, was persecuted by FDR from that time until his death. Would it not be decent to say that the psychopathic traits to be found in the White House—which began with Wilson and solidified under FDR, were the best argument for abolishing the office of U.S. President and replacing it with a government responsible to Congress? How many more millions of people must die at the hands of American presidents before such a change occurs? Fortunately, the looming economic decline of the U.S. will put an end to these tragic American military games.

As for the staying power of the Bismarck Empire, Hitler believed that a restriction of civil rights, as had been done in France by Clemenceau and in England by Lloyd George, would have enabled Germany to hold out and negotiate a decent compromise peace. American historians such as Thomas Bailey and Ralph Luth (*The Fall of the German Empire*, 2 vols., Stanford 1926) agree with Hitler on this. Once the diplomacy Ludendorff advocated with Wilson got rolling in 1918, a U-turn was no longer possible, and the Germans' Second Reich was lost.

The development in the Far East

It can be said that the Great Depression swept away ⁺⁺⁺the still solid structures of the Weimar Republic (1919-33). Dixon Webster (*The Great Depression 1929-1941*) points out that the economic greats of the Roosevelt team- unsuccessful with all their economic measures, so that the crisis lasted more than twelve years. Only the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in response to the so-called Note of U.S. Secretary of State Hull of November 26, 1941, with its unfulfillable ultimate demands on Japan, brought the turning point - its actual author was the Lithuanian Jew and Stalin spy Harry Dexter White. The main beneficiary of the Japanese attack, despite everything, was Stalin. He was saved from imminent defeat to Germany by the huge U.S. aid after December 7, 1941. Of course, Stalin had been receiving American aid since July 1941 and since Harry Hopkins' visit to Moscow on July 30, 1941, although the United States was still officially neutral. But this was insignificant compared to what came after Pearl Harbor and the open state of war. Moreover, FDR focused his war effort more on Europe than on Asia. Japan had already been decisively defeated in the naval battle at the Midway Islands on June 6, 1942. This allowed Roosevelt to focus even more on the European theater of war. Moreover, General Wedemeyer, in his book *The Managed War* (New York 1958) with General Marshall, showed to everyone's satisfaction that plans for an invasion of Europe had been worked out by the American General Staff long before there was any talk of war with Japan. This is also said to be true of the 1944 plans, the preparation of which officially attributed to Eisenhower

⁺⁺⁺The crash on the New York Stock Exchange on "Black Friday," October 29, 1929, triggered the "Great Depression. For Germany, this was aggravated by the consequences of inflation and the Western powers' irreconcilable reparations policy. Due to the lack of capital in Germany the withdrawal of short-term foreign bonds quickly caused the collapse of German banks, such as the Österreichische Creditanstalt on May 11, 1931 and the Darmstädter und Nationalbank on July 13, 1931. The incumbent Brüning government tried in vain to intervene with "famine decrees," tax increases, salary cuts for civil servants, and so on. The number of unemployed soon rose to 4, and in 1932/33 to more than 6 million, to which must be added at least another million unregistered unemployed.

A. M. Schlesinger, Jr. who, prior to Wedemeyer's opening, had embarked on a multi-volume biography of Roosevelt, was so disheartened by his openings about his hero that he abandoned his project. The thought that fully formed invasion plans against a country thousands of miles away had been promoted by a man obviously elected as a benefactor of mankind and leader of a welfare state was so brutal that many of FDR's warmest supporters turned away from him after the fact. Beginning in July 1941, citing events in Vietnam that did not affect FDR in the least, Roosevelt allowed Japanese trade to impede and took belligerent action against the Japanese as soon as Stalin entered the war. Crazy or not, based on given international law, the Japanese were justified in attacking Pearl Harbor. However, by doing so, they got Hitler into huge trouble.

Europe's situation after the French campaign in 1940

At the time of the armistice with France on June 22, 1940, the situation of the Third Reich indeed looked consolidated. It can be compared with the situation of the Second Reich after its foundation in Versailles on January 18, 1871. In the meantime, Germany had become the leading industrial power in the world in many fields. In restoring Germany's military glory, the campaigns in Poland, Scandinavia and France decisive King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy could never have forced a reluctant Mussolini to declare war on France and England on June 10, 1940, had he not assumed that peace negotiations with England would begin immediately after the impending surrender of the French. Public opinion in the United States assumed that there was now no challenger to Hitler in Europe. A glance at the map - Germany now faced England from Trondheim to Brest - convinced even the uninformed that an English defense was not possible in the long run and that Churchill would accept the favorable peace terms that Hitler would surely offer him (see also Hitler's peace speech before the Reichstag on July 19, 1940). These observers did not know, however, that because of limitations in defensive measures Schacht and others Germany producing fewer tanks and only as many aircraft as the British, even though England had its radar air defense system and English industrial capacity was only half that of

Germany. As early as April 1940, the English had received from Canaris the German secret military code. Also, the British defenses were many times stronger than the German defenses. In addition, the British received tremendous financial and military aid from the United States under the amended U.S. neutrality legislation. This legislation had been unlawfully amended by the U.S. Congress under pressure from Roosevelt after the outbreak of war in 1939 (see Burton Klein, *Germany's Economic Preparations for War*, Harvard 1959).

Mention should also be made of the trip of the leading Labour politician Sir Stafford Cripps to Stalin shortly after the surrender of the French. Stalin was angered by the relatively easy victory of the Germans over the French (see Smith, *Stalin, the Red Czar*, op. cit., p.226) and brutally violated the German-Russian nonaggression pact of the previous year by occupying northern Buchenland (Bukovina) and parts of Moldavia (Bessarabia) in the Balkans after the June 26, 1940 ultimatum to Romania. He also agitated against Hitler first in Bulgaria and Romania, then throughout Europe. Cripps reported Stalin's hostility toward Hitler to Churchill.

A month after the French surrender, it was clear to Hitler that three different factors could play into his peace and alliance efforts with England to help Germany achieve the stability it had received from Bismarck seventy years earlier. Like Bismarck, Hitler hoped to arrive at a German-English alliance via a general agreement, as outlined by Collin Cross (*The Fall of the British Empire*, London 1969, pp. 270ff.). Such an alliance could have preserved the British Commonwealth as a significant political factor.

The first factor was obvious: Hitler could force England to surrender militarily with the weapons at his disposal (see Admiral Ansei, *Hitler confronts England*, New York 1962). The second factor was U.S. interference and military aid to England. Hitler reckoned that such aid might be limited and possibly even cut if FDR failed to bring the U.S. into open warfare. And he vowed not to give Roosevelt any pretext (on this, see Saul Friedländer, *Auftakt zum Untergang*, Stuttgart 1965).

The third factor Hitler had to reckon with was Stalin. The latter had more and more frequently and deliberately broken the treaty of August 23, 1939 and September 28, 1939, which had been concluded voluntarily with Hitler -

for example, by further seizing Romanian territory (i.e. beyond Bessarabia, which Germany had conceded to Stalin on June 26, 1940, despite the German minority there). Since the waiting game with the USA continued and even the continuation of the war against England could harm it, but could not lead to a final decision, the fact of dealing with the third factor, the USSR, remained in the rooms of these considerations. Stalin's resumed anti-German policy made it unmistakably clear that he could become a possible active ally of England. And thus Germany was exposed to a nightmare of a two-front war, the nightmare already faced by Frederick the Great and Wilhelm II. This starting *la ge* had brought defeat to the Kaiser in World War I, and Frederick the Great survived in the Seven Years' War only because the Russians changed fronts after the death of the tsarina.

Nothing could be more wrong than to assume that Hitler sought war for war's sake with Russia. When the Soviet prosecutor Rudenko asked the art collector Hermann Göring at the Nuremberg trial what he had collected in Russia, the answer was "lice"! Although armed to the teeth, Russia was a country scarred by poverty and mismanagement. Hitler would have preferred a negotiated peace with England because it would have eliminated the danger of a two-front war in both the West and the East. Although England was not in a position to build up a new front immediately, the situation could change unawares without a peace settlement because it gave hostile Stalin the opportunity to attack Germany in the rear. Security dictated that Stalin be eliminated first.

Thus, the dilemma Hitler faced in 1941 resulted from the three aforementioned factors of insufficient defense preparations - otherwise he could have put pressure on England to reach a compromise peace - and from the policies of the two global allies, Roosevelt and Stalin. The latter revealed his continued hostility toward Germany by violating the treaty with Germany as early as June 1940. This development reached its climax in March 1941 in connection with the Yugoslav revolution as well as the friendship pact that Stalin concluded with the anti-German Yugoslav revolutionaries of the Simovich government on April 5, 1941. Certainly Hitler's pre-emptive strike against Stalin on June 22, 1941, was as legal under international law as was the Japanese strike against Pearl Harbor because of

the U.S. blockade of Japan and the ultimatum that followed. When Hitler said at the Nuremberg Party Congress in 1936 that Germany would be swimming in plenty if it had the Urals, he did not mean that he wanted to take possession of the Urals, but only to make it clear that the system in whose possession they were was not functioning properly.

The barbaric treatment of Rudolf Hess,* the uninvited envoy who flew through military air zones all the way to Scotland on May 10, 1941, gave Hitler the final proof that the British only did not fear a German-Russian war might permanently upset the European balance, but even included it in political blindness. Indeed, the British should have realized that such a war would have a clear winner who, from the British point of view, would in any case gain supremacy and an outsized power. In my debate with Martin Gilbert (see above), the latter conceded that Churchill would certainly have hesitated and even made a compromise peace with Hitler had he known at the time of the FDR-Stalin alliance. But especially if he had known that Roosevelt had nothing in common with Churchill's war and postwar ideas. The diplomatic opportunity of May 1941, which Hess had chosen favorably, was unique and not to be repeated.

On Soviet Policy 1940-41

Adherence to the German-Russian non-aggression pact of 1939 suited Stalin very well. He assumed that Hitler would be drained in a bloody war of position with the French and English, while he could devote his time to the Russo-Finnish war, in which the Russians outnumbered the Finns by a ratio of 50:1. It was characteristic of Stalin that, without prior declaration of war, he bombed the Finnish capital Helsinki on November 30, 1939, and completely depopulated Finland's second largest city, Viipuri (Viipuri). He also enjoyed bringing Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania under his thumb. He established naval and land bases there from October 1939, against the wishes of the governments concerned.

Hitler's blitzkrieg successes in France and Scandinavia changed the tide for Stalin. Possibly it was those military successes that led Churchill to believe Hitler was worse than hell. The violation of Norway's neutrality by England

forced Hitler against his will to launch the Norwegian campaign from April 1940. And it is also true that Hitler had offered England and France a compromise peace even before the French campaign.

Even before the signing of the Franco-German armistice Stalin violated the German-Russian agreement on Romania in June 1940. Moreover, in secret collaboration with FDR and Churchill, he launched a propaganda, espionage and sabotage campaign against Germany. The goal of the Yugoslav government was neutrality. The Yugoslavs were neutral not only out of conviction, but also out of the fact that there had been serious internal discord between Croats and Serbs since 1929. These became particularly pronounced when the Yugoslav government was overthrown: more than two million Serbs and Croats subsequently died in the internal strife.

The result of Soviet and Anglo-American interference in Yugoslavia was the overthrow of the Yugoslav government on March 27, 1941, then the German Balkan campaign beginning on April 6, 1941, and in the following years the rise of the partisan and fanatical Bolshevik Tito. Tito established 50 concentration camps in which many more people perished than in those of the twelve years of the Third Reich. Like Lenin, the founder of Bolshevism and the concentration camp system in Russia, Tito enjoyed a good Jewish press (see Isaac Don Levine, *Lenin*, New York 1924). For the same reason, until recently, the Israeli concentration camps in Palestine also had a good press. Only recently have Jewish voices been heard denouncing Israeli abuses.

As in the earlier confrontation with Poland, Hitler had ample reason to wage war against Stalin because of the latter's continual violations of the German-Russian non-aggression pact under international law. Churchill had always regarded Stalin and his regime as contemptible. During the Russo-Finnish War of 1939-1940, Churchill had even wanted to invade Russia. At the same time, he regarded Hitler as a political leader that England would need if it were in a similar situation to that of Germany in 1918. His praise of Stalin a year later can only be explained by a complete political U-turn, with the end justifying the means.

No sooner had the German-Russian war begun on June 22, 1941 after a month-delay^{sss} than the question of an independent Ukraine arose again, especially since by November 1941 the rapidly advancing German troops had completely occupied Ukraine with its sixty million inhabitants

At the Cape Code 1 men's club, I discussed this issue with the excellent Ukrainian historian Basil Dymitrishin, author of the book *Moscou and the Ukraine*, as well as several individual accounts, including one on the Waffen SS in the Galicia region, where Dymitrishin was born. As a Ukrainian nationalist, he regretted Germany's failure to invade the USSR in 1941 with a clear plan for Ukrainian independence. Although I fully sympathized with his point of view, I recalled that Charles XII had failed at Poltava in 1709 because of the Ukrainians. The same lack of reliability had been shown by Hetman Skorpadski in 1918 against the Germans. The Poles under Pilsudski would also have been victims of the unreliability of the Ukrainian leader Petljura before Kiev in 1920. The question of whether Ukrainians are *Great Russians* or a separate nation has been raised since the time of the Cossack uprising against the Poles in 1648, and despite superior Ukrainian historians, such as Doruschenko Hrushevsky, Dymitri-schin, and Faris Boris, the question has never been definitively answered because the Soviet rulers of Ukraine have so far prevented any discussion of the issue. The time may come when the Ukrainians, together with other peoples of the southern USSR will take their matter into own hands and prove that they are independent nations. Until such a time, however, foreign observers should keep a low profile.

On the other hand, states that are cut out of the territory of a belligerent in wartime without the latter's consent not receive international recognition. The case of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918 was different. Joffe, Lenin, and Trotsky agreed to give independence to Poland, Finland, Ukraine, and the Baltic states. Stalin would have agreed to a policy of independence toward Ukraine only if he had been completely defeated, despite Roosevelt's support (Erich

§§§ reason was the Balkan campaign because of the Yugoslav revolution and the continuing Greek-Italian war, which was ended the brilliant victory of the German paratroopers over Crete

Kern, in his book *Der große Rausch - Rußlandfeldzug 1941 - 1945*, Zurich 1948 u. Göttingen 1962, Germana very good argument for a separate Ukrainian state)

Alexander Daliin (*A House Built on Sand*, 1958), the son of the famous Russian Jewish Stalin critic David Dahin, collects in his voluminous work almost every possible argument to accuse Hitler in a pragmatic way of having pursued a short-sighted policy to defeat Stalin, contrary to his interests and his aims. One of Dahin's main arguments is that Hitler should have immediately given governmental responsibility to the peoples of the Soviet Union, and he should have armed them against Stalin. How successful such a policy would have been, view of partisan politics answered. One is reminded of the fate of the Reich Commissar for White Russia Wilhelm Kube in 1943. Kube served Hitler as a kind of model official. He cared for the people in his area in every way. His maid was devoted to him. But after some of her relatives were kidnapped and tortured, she allowed herself to be persuaded to place a bomb under Kube's bed, which killed him on 22.9.1943. One is reminded of Dedijer's attempt to clear the Tito partisans (*The Partisan Movement*, New York, with a foreword by Eleanor Roosevelt) - for example: partisans were moving peacefully near a Croatian monastery when suddenly monks pulled out submachine guns from under their cowls and shot down the partisans. Such an event is hardly imaginable. According to Dedijer, the partisans were then forced, albeit reluctantly, to destroy the monastery, etc., etc.

There are some reasons to believe that Hitler would have received many volunteers from the Soviet area. But he did not have an unlimited supply of modern weapons to supply other troops with war material besides the German armies and their allies such as the Finns, the Romanians, the Hungarians, the Croats and the Italians. In issue 1/85 of the *Journal of Historical Review*, Walter Sanning points out that Stalin took most of the administrators, technicians, and possible military personnel with his well-ordered withdrawal, leaving Hitler with a huge economic burden. The Germans had to take care of a large population supply-wise. To some extent, the German military administration coped brilliantly. In his book *Priests in Hitler's Army* (Stuttgart 1962), the Catholic field chaplain Walter Perlau reports from the middle section of the Russian front in 1942 and 1943 that the

Russian youth behind the German front were just as aimless as the Polish. When asked about the meaning of life, the typical answer of Russian youths was "more vodka.

This is simply because, compared to Stalin's knout, life under the German occupation was orderly and good. In the rare cases when German soldiers raped Russian women, they were punished, some even by death. When Soviet troops reached German soil, Jewish propaganda chief Ilya Ehrenburg urged Soviet soldiers to violate and kill their innocent civilian victims. And most did so with glee. What the Americans allowed themselves in terms of rape, looting and theft as well as murder in the western part of the Reich is also considerable. This is no surprise to someone like me, if one is familiar with the bestial and lying propaganda films shown to U.S. soldiers before the big landing in Europe in 1944. The typical American woman abuser, often in the presence of numerous witnesses, was quick with his answer: "She wanted it that way!"

Stalin had no less than 50 Jewish front generals when he advanced into Germany in January 1945. And these did not hesitate to pass on Ilya Ehrenburg's appeals to the soldiers. Stalin silenced Ehrenburg only in the last month of the war and threatened to punish him for racism.

In the American zone, a twenty-one-year-old Marxist named Henry Kissinger (his parents, who were from Fürth in Middle Franconia, were also Marxists) became occupation commander a town; his measures there were more than draconian

When war reached the USSR in 1941, Stalin did not care for the local Russian population; he moved the factories behind the Urals along with the skilled workers they needed, leaving the mass of the population without markets to buy and sell. The war with the Reich was largely Stalin's fault, in that he had concentrated a strong invasion force against Germany on its borders, in that he openly courted friendly relations with England - thus violating his own treaty obligations - and in that he turned down moderate terms of agreement with Hitler. As W. Sanning points out in the cited article, the Germans generally succeeded feeding the population. But in the long run this represented a huge bloodletting for German supplies.

The Anglo-American area bombings took place continuously since May

11, 1940 - the day before Churchill had received unlimited powers as the new head of the British government with FDR's blessing. It is not an exaggeration to state that these bombings constituted as many war crimes and punitive measures against a civilized state as surpassed anything ever seen before. And the perpetrators were obviously civilized states as well. Hitler's occasional retaliatory strikes against England were comparatively insignificant.

Treason in Germany

Ernst von Weizsäcker, the traitor in the German Foreign Ministry and there, as State Secretary, the highest-ranking official after Reich Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, made no secret of the fact that he was an opponent of Hitler's policy on the eve of World War II (see Hamilton Fish, *Der zerbrochene Mythos* - Roosevelt's Kriegspolitik 1933-1945, Tübingen 1989, pp. 107ff.). Treason was as much a daily occurrence in the Third Reich as it was during the 1st French Republic at the end of the 18th century. The only difference was that more traitors managed to keep a low profile in the highest positions. This was true for a dozen generals from the high nobility, went over to the Abwehr chief Admiral Canaris to Schacht and some other henchmen in the economic sector up to many diplomats - the embassy in Tokyo, for example, protected the Russian master spy Richard Sorge.

As Bullitt assured me in 1947, von Weizsäcker circulated the myth of the six million Jews killed. He had communicated this to Allen Dulles, the chief of U.S. counterintelligence in Switzerland. From this source it had come to the American Jews in 1943. In the meantime, this assertion has become official Bonn policy, as the great Auschwitz show trial in Frankfurt from 1963 to 1967 proved. Needless to say, the claim of German traitor is highly controversial. The fact that Bonn pursues such a policy is based on the fact that politicians like Adenauer and Brandt tried to keep as much distance as possible from Bismarck, Wilhelm II and Hitler. Without U.S. military support, the Bonn Republic would collapse overnight just as the East Berlin regime did without Russian support. The English contemporary historian David Irving had the German edition of his book *Hitler's War* (Munich 1983) withdrawn because one passage was deliberately mistranslated: after the defeat at Rostov, Hitler

had declared that he would take action against anyone who did anything to the Jews during the war simply because they were Jews. The translation then stated that "now the time had come to take action against the Jews"

Since the revelations of Ostrogorski, the best expert on American party history, it has been proven American politicians are the biggest liars in the world. It should therefore be an open secret to what extent their influence has been felt in Bonn.

It is certain that the frequently mentioned cruelties of the Germans could never measure up to those of their opponents. Harry Elmer Barnes pointed this out again and again in his late publications. And this is true even if one assumes the figure of six million Jews murdered, which is of course doubtful. Walter Sanning (*Die Auflösung des osteuropäischen Judentums*, Tübingen 1983) proves that there were not so many Jews in Hitler's area of rule. Moreover, the world today is full of survivors and their descendants. Sanning, who is an excellent statistician, estimates that in the period 1933-45 at least four times as many Jews were killed by Stalin than by Hitler. When, a short time after the unannounced Soviet invasion of eastern Poland - the German invasion did not come as a surprise; it triggered Poles' cruel attacks against the ethnic Germans as well as a hostile alliance policy - Stalin asked Jews who had fled to eastern Poland whether they wanted to stay here or return to western Poland, he had all those who answered "yes" to the last question shipped to northern Russia in open wagons and without food.

In its report on its activities during the Second World War, the International Red Cross in Geneva in 1947 speaks of about 300,000 deaths in the concentration camps of the Third Reich during the years 1933 to 1945; half of them were Jews. Many of these deaths were also due to Anglo-American area bombing, directly by bombing residential as well as factory buildings, and indirectly by epidemics that could no longer be controlled, such as the typhus epidemic in Bergen-Belsen, when the bombing cut off communication with the outside. Oswald Pohl, who conscientiously supplied the camps with everything all along, was a broken man after a tour of the camps in April 1945, when he was only able to see part of what the Allied bombers had done (cf.

David Hoggan, *The Myth of the Six Million*, Los Angeles 1969, p. 77

ff.) mentioned before that Eleanor Roosevelt had shared the typical view of the American upper class ("WASP = White Anglo Saxon Protestant") towards the Jews until September 1939. However, she did not so much want to boycott them as to push back their influence. FDR shared their opinion when, for example, he told Ibn Saud, the King of Arabia, that he would gladly give him five million American Jews.

The end of the Third Reich

Hitler's Third Reich was literally torn apart in the final hours of its demise. John Toland is quite decent at the end of his biography of Hitler when he states that Nazism went down with Hitler, although he would certainly have had a hard time explaining this to the soldiers and officers defending Breslau on May 6, 1945. Toland and the rest of the world have this impression because the cruel, merciless occupiers of Germany, especially the Americans, have just a fanatical ignorance. Creel also had this ignorance when he led his primitive but highly effective propaganda crusade against Kaiser Wilhelm II. The latter came to lose his throne only because Hindenburg, on the basis of his dealings with Noske and the Social Democrats, refused to defend the emperor or to let him defend him. He urged him to go to Holland.

Goering cut a brilliant figure before the Nuremberg Tribunal in defense of the Third Reich. He made it clear to the tribunal as well as to the world that he was still a National Socialist. In his Munich trial many years later, Otto Ernst Remer clearly stated that only fools would feel obliged to defend every detail of National Socialism. However, he could see no reason why much of Hitler's legacy could not be of use to the German people in the future.

This is the crux of the matter. The occupiers are fanatically determined to deprive the German people of any legacy of Bismarck, the last Kaiser and Hitler. This is the terrible meaning of the dirty formula "1945, year of zero", in other words: at this point everything started from nothing. The history of Germany is far more honorable than that of England. Why didn't they force the English to call 1988, the year of the 400th anniversary of the Battle of the Armada, the "Year of Zero"?

The Americans still have their commissary boot on the German neck. And

they still bend that neck, as they have done for the past forty-four years. But when the American claim to world domination and American imperialism collapse, when all Americans race home like rabbits, then it is time for Germany to take a closer look at the legacy of National Socialism

Huey P. Long was murdered in Louisiana in 1935. Yet every educated American knows of his legacy. In Argentina, too, people know about the legacy of Juan, Evita and Isabelle Peron because Peron brought social justice and stood against the Rockefellers and American imperialism. Long will be remembered for opposing FDR and winning long overdue pro-people reforms for his state

But all this is nothing compared to the emergence of community spirit, the enforcement of social justice, and the elevation of a beaten and abused Germany to a leading world power in the 1930s. This heyday, before it was successfully attacked and destroyed from the outside, lasted less than a decade. Is it surely inconceivable in the long run that this period, too, represents a historical legacy for the German people?

Divided Germany and Revisionism

"There is much to suggest that before the end of this century the German territories - West Germany, Central Germany, Austria - will be united."

Prof. David L. Hoggan, 1987

West Germany's Coming to Terms with the Past

The best possible approach to compare Weimar Germany not only with the preceding Second Reich ("We Germans fear God and nothing else in the world!") and the Third Reich that followed it ("Common good comes before self-interest!"), but also with the American puppet state of West Germany of 1949 - a paradise of forbearance compared to the GDR and Austria - is again offered by Harry Elmer Barnes' book (*Revisionism and Brainwashing*, loc. cit.). In it, Barnes compares, among other things, his friendly reception in the German Reich as a foreign revisionist defending Germany in 1926 and 1927 with the rejection of foreign revisionists in today's Federal Republic

Shortly before my lecture tour through West Germany and Austria in 1964, I still visited Barnes - for Austria I received a life ban on entry. What recently happened to the Austrian Federal President Kurt Waldheim is nothing compared to what I was offered in Austria, with the exception of Graz

I reminded Barnes that he had not been back to Europe since 1950, and at that time he had spent most of his time speaking to revisionists in France and Italy. I told him that in 1947 American propaganda had not yet worked and that most Germans I had spoken to were free of prejudice and still regretted the fate of their Führer. Five years later, in 1952, when I was still in the country, everything had changed. A former World War II front-line soldier, whose sister was in a Warsaw prison because she

had married an SS man, wrote a paper on the demand for unconditional surrender. He claimed that Roosevelt had pursued a humane policy. And like the rabbit hypnotized by the snake, he was no longer amenable to any arguments.

**"We Deut die fordieren Golland
von absolut nichts und nobody
on der Welt."**

Bismarck's saying of

February 6, 1888 was widely distributed as a postcard shortly before the war with the text: "And it is the fear of God that makes us love and cultivate peace"

A tall blond Pomeranian said that it was just compensation for Hitler's misdeeds that his native Pomerania had fallen to Poland. Toward the end of my lectureship in Munich, students told me that my lectures were one-sided because I was too critical of Wilson and Roosevelt too generous to Hitler the German people. Many students regarded Bismarck as an arrogant rascal, and Ernest Hemingway was a popular writer because they liked the way he described the shooting of Germans. In connection with the Scholl siblings, Hitler was also not credited with letting their professorial foster father, Professor Huber, finish his book on Leibniz. To tourists they also gave a completely distorted account of the Dachau camp. All this made it clear to me that I was on hostile ground when I began my lecture tour in 1964. In the Weimar Republic foreign revisionists were welcome, in the FRG they are rejected.

What we encounter here is not something that should be taken personally or that I have taken personally. History moves in correspondingly large cycles, which the historian Karl Lamprecht describes as psychological viewpoints of history. Here is an example. Hellmut Diwald (*Deutsche Geschichte*, Propyläen, Frankfurt 1978), in his summary of the Seven Years' War, corrects the great Leopold von Ranke, who did more research in this area than anyone else. Diwald also says of the arguments that lead Ranke to his conclusion. In Ranke's view, both belligerents were in the right - Frederick the Great in his courageous warfare over Silesia and Maria-Theresa for her heroic but ultimately unsuccessful defense. According to Diwald, only the daughter of Charles VI was in the right.

Certainly there are wars in which one side is in the right, as Germany was in the First and Second World Wars, and the other side is in the wrong, as England and her allies were. - Ranke, in his *German History*, has examined the facts in detail, as has Sidney B. Fay (*Der Ursprung des Weltkrieges*, 2 vols., Berlin 1930). Anyone who has read Fay's book must conclude that Germany was the victim, not the cause, of the conditions from 1914 to 1918.

The situation between 1740 and 1763 was completely different. Ranke

shows that Prussia had a claim to three of the seven Silesian duchies Frederick William I had negotiated this with the Habsburgs for the purpose of rounding out Prussian territory in this area, and the Habsburgs were compensated for this with property in the Rhineland. Frederick William I, who ascended the throne in 1713 when the War of the Spanish Succession ended with the Peace of Utrecht (Austria continued for another year until the Treaty of Rastatt), loved his soldiers. He was more in favor of good defense than wars. He stayed out of the War of the Polish Succession, in which Prince Eugene suffered his first defeat. When Austria challenged the Rhineland-Silesia agreement, the "Potsdam leader" (title of a biography of Frederick William I by Robert Ergang, New York 1941) waited. But his son, later Frederick the Great, took up the sword after ascending the throne. How can Diwald claim that the Hohenzollerns had no reason whatsoever? And how can Diwald look down on the great Ranke?

Those who say that Bismarck made the Germans seem small because he did so much for them are wrong. And I am also sure that this is what people would have said of Hitler had he not been interrupted in his work by the war of 1939 and, above all, by the inevitable clashes with the vicious allies Roosevelt and Stalin. In 1982, a wealthy German businessman named Köster brought his son to Menlo College, where I was teaching at the time - at the time of my lecture tour of West Germany and Austria in 1964, I was teaching at California State University of San Francisco. I was standing near the Menlo principal, O'Brien, talking with a local German-American named Bill Moser. I overheard Köster say to this Menlo administrative official, in fluent but not accent-free English, "The stupid thing with you Americans is that you have absolutely no idea what a terrible person Hitler was!"

Of course, this is the statement of an ignorant dolt, because everybody should know and does know that the USA has been overrun with lying propaganda about Hitler like no other country in the world in the last fifty years. Of course Köster, who has been to the USA more than once, knew this just as well as I did, perhaps even better. He had clearly chosen his statement in order to put himself in an advantageous light. Honesty and decency fell by the wayside. However, I encountered this attitude of mind among many

members of the German American Club in San Francisco when well-known German speakers, Klaus Mehnert for example, came to ridicule and despise Hitler in particular and Germany in general. From the beginning I was branded a black sheep in the club when I once told two German businessmen in conversation that I had long been acquainted with the highly educated and charming Frau von Ribbentrop, widow of the executed Reich Foreign Minister.

Since this West German hatred (not to mention the Central German GDR hatred) of the true, the good and the beautiful, which of course also blocks genuine access to the eras of the Second Reich, the Republic of Weimar and the Third Reich, extends into the psychological, I had turned to Dr. Thomas Engelsing at the end of my comparison of the three forms of government. Dr. Engelsing, whose ancestors come from Holstein, was born in Berlin and lived for a long time in Munich. He holds the highest psychiatric award from Harvard University and the highest psychological award from Cornell University. Dr. Engelsing also happens to be the director of the largest drug rehabilitation center in the south San Francisco Bay. He is also responsible for directing seven educational programs.

Dr. Engelsing has been annoyed since 1981 by President Reagan's foolish attempts to whitewash and valorize the Vietnam War with its huge black market, its drug abuse, its sexual abuse up to and including rapes that often ended in the death of their victims, and the incessant slaughter of unarmed civilians of all ages and sexes. Lord Bryce's World War I propaganda about German atrocities in Belgium, which later turned out to be a lie (see Ponsonby, *op. cit.*), pales in comparison to the depravity of Americans in the war that lasted more than fourteen years. The Vietnam War did not end in a "draw" as in divided Korea, but in utter and ignominious defeat for the Americans. Why the Americans encouraged the French to stay there longer after 1945 - their defeat was sealed in 1954 - , and then why the Americans stayed there six years later until their defeat, has never been explained. Now millions of Vietnamese, along with millions of Mexicans, Koreans, and Chinese, feel emboldened to immigrate to America in a kind of last-ditch effort to roll over the whites in a surge of people of color.

Dr. Engelsing testifies that after thousands of conversations with former Vietnam soldiers, he has not met a single one who has described the American mission and war in Vietnam as justified and justifiable.

Dr. Engelsing says of himself that he comes from a patriotic family from which many outstanding scientists have come. He also brought all his relatives to America, so that they could avoid self-hatred, self-degradation and self-deprecation.

Germany would miss out on. Like me, he regards Bismarck, Wilhelm II and, above all, Hitler as the greatest political leaders of modern times, and he is an even greater admirer of Frederick the Great than I am. Compared to the aforementioned, Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill are for him not only lesser measures, but also intellectual cripples.

I asked Engelsing how he could be satisfied under such circumstances to work in the U.S., where at present Reagan, a second-rate disciple of FDR, was in power, in a country where, unlike Germany, at least 40 percent of the 239 million inhabitants are more or less illiterate, that is, can read little or hardly at all. He said this is not easy, but it helps him that he does not feel emotionally tied to the fate of America, for which he has no great expectations. He is able to spend an extended vacation in Europe each year, primarily in Germany, but also in other European countries such as Greece and Italy. He also let me know that he did not marry because he did not want to explain to his children why the Germans did not like Hitler.

I reminded him that at the time of the Weimar Republic even the Austrian Marxist Karl Kautsky was a revisionist, not to mention Alfred von Wegerer and his *Berliner Monatshefte* (continuation of his extremely revisionist journal *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*). Almost all leading public figures, of whom Gustav Stresemann and Reich President von Hindenburg were the most outstanding, had rebelled against the "Versailles Dictate" and at the same time resisted the Allied dogma of Germany's sole guilt for the First World War.

Engelsing reminded me how Adenauer's successor, Erhard, had allowed the unjust currency reform carried out at the instigation of U.S. General Lucius D. Clay to be portrayed as his doing, and that Adenauer himself was

willing to accept a constitution dictated from outside, which was also based, among other things, on Stalin's 1936 constitution, in which every freedom granted in one paragraph was revoked in the same or next paragraph.

Engelsing further mentioned that he had been more hopeful for the German people in Munich in 1946 - when he was starving - than in 1955, when the economic revival, which was ultimately a result of the U.S. involvement in the Korean War, was already becoming apparent. At the same time, however, most Germans let it happen that they were wasting away, mentally manipulated by the terrible U.S. propaganda. He further expressed the opinion that the manipulated Jewish question was not the decisive factor. In his opinion, the decisive factor was the self-centered American empiricism that had infected Germany and made it weary of itself. This, he said, was the result of American occupation and control of all of West Germany, of over two-thirds of all German territory. I asked him: what if the Americans were forced to withdraw because of the economic decline? Then he would return to Germany.

West Germany and the USA

West Germany is under extensive U.S. control. In addition, there is now already 40 years of military occupation by soldiers known rapists and drug addicts. Central Germany is one hundred percent under Soviet control - Berlin, divided into four zones, is an exception. The eastern territories, from which Germans were expelled, are also completely under Soviet, Polish and Czech rule. In Austria, because of the 1955 treaty, the Soviets have great influence; if the Russians had objected to the election of Kurt Waldheim, they could have objected to his election. Thus, "modern Germany" forms a mess, which is the result not of peace, but of the most terrible war of all times. Only a blind man would not be able to recognize that half a century later the war is still going on (see F. A. App, *Der erschreckendste Friede der Geschichte*, Salzburg 1947).

Has US-America ever apologized for Roosevelt's outrageous and insulting "quarantine speech" of October 5, 1937? Has England ever apologized with a word for Chamberlain's untrue and insulting speech of March 17, 1939 about German intentions to conquer the world? Did Gorbachev or any other

high-ranking Soviet politician apologize for the bloody revenge campaign of an Ilya Ehrenburg in 1945? As long as at least such a thing does not happen, one cannot speak of an end of the Second World War.

The worst thing, however, is a development that I saw coming forty years ago in conversation with young people in Germany. Since Germany had so many enemies in both wars, it was only natural to pick one of these enemies to make a friend of. So why not US America, which more than others, including England, had a large percentage of German blood. On the surface, this seemed quite logical in the postwar Germany of 1947. However, I cautioned against this assessment of the wickedness of both Wilson and Roosevelt toward Germany, U.S. America had become, for the foreseeable future, the worst enemy Germany had ever had in its entire history. No enemy had ever hated Germany so much and wanted her destruction forever as the USA. I was not believed in 1947, and I am hardly believed today. The mental illness and confusion which prevail in Germany are due to the inability to recognize in U.S. America its worst enemy.

present it looks as if the American occupation of Germany would last for centuries, perhaps even a millennium and this with the approval of the pro-American West German politicians, were it not that an economic collapse of US America is already happily on the horizon, which would of course also have consequences for the social and political system. As a simple, soil-rooted, naive settler republic, U.S. America has gradually become sick with the burden of imperialism, world domination and world politics. Surely it can find its way back to itself if it stops meddling in the affairs of the eastern half of the world.

Who wanted world domination?

In view of all the false accusations against Hitler, it seems almost ironic to note that at no time during World War II did he have any ambition for a global policy. His three main adversaries, however, clearly pursued global political goals. Churchill sought exactly the same thing in World War II as Earl Grey and Lloyd George had in World War I, namely, the consolidation and expansion of the British world empire. Stalin kept repeating that he

wanted not only to create vassal states in the catchment and border area of the USSR, but at the same time to implement Lenin's program of a world revolution. Roosevelt regarded this as an understandable and justified concern (see George N. Crocker, *Schrittmacher der Sowjets*, Tübingen o. J.).

From 1933 onward, Roosevelt saw himself as a partner with Stalin in a world-encompassing policy that would then possibly lead to a "One World" system. In this respect, he was pleased with the book of the same name by his Republican opponent in 1940, Wendell Willkie (*One World*, New York 1942). He had also sent him on a friendly visit to the USSR in 1941. Willkie, who had been with the Democrats until 1938, was built up and set up as FDR's opponent in 1940 based on the tactics of the Republican Party apparatus. After Alf Landon, who was preferred to Hoover in 1936, another weak Republican candidate, Thomas Dewey, entered the race against FDR in 1944. A weighty challenger like Huey Long - he had supported Roosevelt under certain restrictions until 1932 - who had wanted to run against Roosevelt in 1936 was murdered by the Jew Dr. Weiss in 1935. Thus, Americans never had a proper opportunity to assess Roosevelt's political program and policy goals. All three candidates were "*FDR knock-offs*."

Unlike Roosevelt, Hitler, Wilhelm II and Bismarck had never hidden their political intentions and goals from the German people. This was also true for the majority of Weimar politicians. Bismarck never concealed the fact that he wanted to preserve Prussia's supremacy after Austria's exclusion from the Second Reich ("Kleindeutsche Lösung"), albeit under new restrictions by national German policies and all-German considerations. Nevertheless, he was generous in granting the other states of the Second Empire a higher representation in the Bundesrat than they were entitled to on the basis of their population size. The constitution of the Second Empire gave Prussia an effective right of veto - for example, against a motion by a member state to dissolve the federation, the Second Empire. Of course, the other federal states were also granted their own constitutions, with Hamburg, Lübeck and Bremen becoming republics, Bavaria and Saxony kingdoms within the Empire. Bavaria and Saxony also had special rights in the military, the postal service and the railroads.

The difficulties of the USA

Materialism is undoubtedly a more or less undeniable trait in all countries. However, the USA must be considered today as the most materialistic country par excellence, as it was the case with the Roman Empire in the 4th century. There is more talk about religion than in the days of settlement, when preachers had more power than today. The materialistic decline is the main topic of my book *Das blinde Jahrhundert* (Vol. 1, Tübingen 1979). This book also deals with the weakness of current American politicians and their inability to cope with the increasingly difficult problem of trade deficits and public and private debt. For the first time since 1914, the United States has become an international debtor nation in recent years, and the largest ever. The media has done nothing to alert citizens to the implications of this. If Americans are the largest debtors, it means they have to work harder than other nations at a time when Americans are becoming as casual and comfortable as Poles. It seems almost impossible that they will ever be able to balance their budget and pay their foreign debts.

The best recent book for the interested layman that can help see the reality and understand the problem is David Stockman's *The Triumph of Politics and the Failure of the Reagan Revolution* (New York 1987). Stockman was Reagan's budget expert and in charge of budgeting from 1981 until recently. In his book, he also describes a 1981 cabinet meeting at which economic issues were discussed. Although Reagan was a big "New Deal" supporter and FDR admirer, one of the things he campaigned on was a call to reduce the bloated federal bureaucracy. At that meeting, Edwin Meese, a somewhat disreputable businessman who was also still involved with the law because of bribery scandals but became Reagan's chief advisor after Reagan took office (he later served Reagan as Attorney General), suggested to Reagan, over the vehement objection of Stockman, that the issue of federal finances should be put on the back burner because it was not very popular at the moment. Instead, taxes should be cut first. The result was that taxes were cut hugely - not for the little people, but for big business. At the same time, federal spending was rising rapidly, mainly because of Caspar Weinberger's so-called defense budget. Weinberger himself complained that he was being

cheated out of about \$100 billion a year by the big defense contractors.

It should be clear to everyone that Reagan, who is not particularly intelligent, who, like FDR, knows nothing about economics, who, moreover, was surrounded by bad advisors and was full of ambitious military plans, was just multiply all American deficits faster than any other person in charge before him. In a speech on the occasion of the visit of the Japanese head of government, Nakasone, Reagan accused Republican President Herbert Hoover of having brought the so-called twelve-year economic crisis to the Americans because he had signed the protective tariff package worked out by Smoot-Harley. Coming from Reagan, this is a silly statement. Probably after the Korean War, the red Democrat Reagan became the Republican Reagan; yet he still attacks Herbert Hoover while praising FDR and Kennedy to skies. In any case, Smoot was one of the best economists in the Senate. When Hoover signed the protective tariff bill, there were already 15 million unemployed out of 130 million working people in the United States. If Reagan understood anything about cause and effect, he could not claim that the Protective Tariff Act of 1931 could have caused the economic crisis of 1929, which was already at its height by 1931. So much for Meese, who gave Reagan the foolish advice to first cut taxes and then cut spending.

Stockman was able to cite examples that did the opposite of what was intended. But these were brushed aside. In his book, Stockman made the ill-doubted claim that Reagan's two-term presidency, a period of eight years, had already failed hopelessly and irrevocably in the first three months. However, Stockman is also one of the first to concede that Reagan is a very popular and well-liked president because he is very experienced and knows how to handle the public carefully and well. And yet, according to Stockman, he will go down in history as the last U.S. president before ruin.

When "progressives" were on the rise in California (Hiram Johnson was governor at the time), many people began to believe that honest, forthright, and courageous politics were entirely possible. At that time, Franklin Hirschborn, a journalist at Stanford University, wrote the essay "Scum at the Top" (see *Hirschborn Documents*, Stanford). Hirschborn was like Gustavus Myers (see *The Blind Century*, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 149): he went back to the

origins.

In 1987, among other things, the bicentennial celebration of the second and currently valid U.S. Constitution was held. Chief Federal Judge Burger, appointed by President Nixon, had taken early retirement, so to speak, in order to properly prepare for the celebration, which fell in the month of September. But for the likes of Hirschborn, Myers and Hiram Johnson (not to mention Ignatius Donnelly of Iowa, Bob LaFollette of Wisconsin, George Record of New Jersey, Henry U'ren of Oregon and Rush D. Holt of West Virginia), the signing and adoption of this Constitution was a step in the wrong direction. The goal of this Constitution was to make a legacy debt be paid equally, thus burdening future generations with debts and taxes that could only benefit some plutocrats. Often, as in Pennsylvania, fraudulent methods were used at the time to get the new Constitution adopted even in states that opposed it.

To please George Washington, a super-presidency was created, granting him more rights than the English King George III had ever possessed in America. Thus the possibility was created that evil would set in from the top: with a false system of government and administration, bad and weak personalities and venality and corruption are the rule - August Belmont, the Jewish chairman of the Democratic Party after the American Civil War, said to Democratic presidential candidate Sam Tilden: "We want men for presidents who will not steal, but who will do nothing about those who do steal." That's angelic to the ears of a disingenuous plutocrat pulling strings in the background. In any case, this is how people get into the presidency who steal either directly or indirectly.

Henry Ford Sr. who had hired the Peace Ship for Europe in 1915 for an ultimately unsuccessful mediation, and who in 1940 had urged Charles Lindbergh to run against FDR in the presidential campaign to prevent the U.S. from being drawn into another European war by Roosevelt, found himself in 1941, before the Japanese attack on

*Two centuries of democracy in
America, and still no real "people"!*

Pearl Harbor, at his Rouge River factory, to make huge profits building tanks and trucks. The key to Roosevelt's success was bribery.

Reagan is the only FDR successor who can rightly be said to revere FDR. Although the other successors (Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter) either disliked or disliked Roosevelt, all acknowledged that he was one of the most popular American presidents, winning four elections.

Roosevelt had little regard for the Constitution and claimed he could stop any amendment with ten million dollars. He also had little regard for the law. This is evidenced, among other things, by the fact that he and Joseph Kennedy, Sr. were still making a fortune illegal Canadian liquor shortly before Prohibition was repealed. This was despite the fact that the Constitution clearly stipulates that it is the president's job to submit legislation to Congress.

Nixon forgot this when he instigated his aides to commit burglaries (Watergate). Reagan disregarded this when he continued to supply arms to the so-called "Contras" in Nicaragua, even though Congress had passed a law making such action a crime under American law. Similarly, the mining of Nicaragua's Pacific port of Cortina. By a vote of seven to zero, the World Court condemned this action by the Reagan administration. Reagan's typical remark that the World Court's decision was of no consequence to him overlooks the fact that the U.S. recognized the Hague agreement in 1907 and has so far not denounced Reich Chancellor Brüning had to drop his plan for a customs union with Austria in 1931 after a Hague decision, which probably came about under strong French pressure.

Reagan's misfortune is and was that he believed he only needed to imitate FDR, and this would suffice as an answer to Roosevelt, who had berated Hoover as a money waster, spent more money in his first hundred days than his predecessor had in four years in office. Reagan also fiercely criticized Carter for spending. He came to power and not only doubled his own apparatus, but also ballooned the public debt to a level that makes Carter look like a bungler in this area. As a result of this Reagan policy, it can be predicted that the U.S. is going to the dogs economically faster than the most pessimistic economic policy makers had thought possible.

Twenty years ago (1967), the great German economist August Lutz had declared that the American economy was on the decline and that a collapse inevitable. However, he had not dared to predict a time. John Kenneth Galbraith had said the same thing ten years ago (1977). He stated that American politicians were too cowardly to initiate the last possible steps that could avoid the collapse. But he, too, did not agree on a time for collapse.

Reagan's inept handling of international law, U.S. law, as well as the U.S. economy, has settled the issue at least to the extent that, in the general view of international experts, the global system of U.S. military imperialism will not survive. American publicist Henry Luce called the "20th American Century" (see D. L. Hoggan, *The Blind Century*, vol. 1 & 2, op. cit.).

Reagan can never hope to become a second FDR, who cannot be caught up as world war criminal number one. Nevertheless, there is the possibility that Germany today may face a situation similar to that once faced by Hitler: the U.S.-made world economic crisis of 1929. And this problem may come very quickly to those responsible for the Federal Republic, the GDR, as well as the Republic of Austria. The American journalist Richard Threlkeld, on the occasion of the 750th anniversary of Berlin, expressed his hope, probably in a generous gesture, that the city could celebrate its 800th birthday as one again. The overall political situation as well as the political changes will be faster: one can make a safe bet that one will not have to wait until 2037, but that already towards the end of the 20th century Berlin will again be a unified city free from foreign occupation and as such the rightful capital of a reunified Germany.

The wrong German attitude

The necessary task for German intellectuals is now to develop political programs and plans for the time when the deadly embrace of American influence in Europe will be over once and for all. Erwin Guido Kolbenheyer (loc. cit.) once met an acquaintance in Munich who had just attacked him in a sneering manner in the U.S. licensed newspaper *Die neue Zeitung*. To his indignant question as to why, he received the answer: "The Americans, the Americans ..." Kolbenheyer forbade himself such a windy apology.

Kolbenheyer's indignation against German acquaintances, who put forward the Americans to excuse their pitiful character behavior, is quite understandable. - I well remember a discussion with fifty young Germans in 1947, when I warned the young people with the following words: "Your attitude toward the Poles, the British imperialists and the Soviets leaves much to be desired. The optimistic opinion that America has only temporarily gone astray is unrealistic because, first, America earned brilliantly from the Second World War and, second, the American population is totally contaminated by a diabolical war propaganda. In comparison, the propaganda of the George Creel office in World War I was almost harmless. Also unrealistic is the attitude that America, where Germans have settled since 1683 and have become the strongest ethnic group overall, will soon return to the kind of friendship that prevailed around 1870, when U.S. Ambassador Bancroft told Moltke that President Grant wished Germany to defeat Napoleon III's France. (See Gazley, *American and German Unification*, New York 1926) I was told in reply that Germany had so many enemies and that it was necessary to see that the country, with so many ethnic Germans, returned to a policy of genuine friendship. Of course, it is easy to see today that I had raised a central point at that time.

Forty years have passed since then, and one still does not see the slightest sign that the German-American friendship could become as it was in Bismarck's time. On the contrary, official anti-German propaganda is worse today in the U.S. than it was at the time of World War II. In the U.S., as in West Germany, there is no academic freedom of teaching. No one can teach or teach history, at any level, who is favorably disposed toward Wilhelm II or Hitler. The official opinion is that all good Germans left for America after the revolution of 1848. After that time, all leading German politicians were conscienceless and power-hungry animals. And the Germans after 1945 were nothing but cynical opportunists who could never be trusted. The smug and superior attitude of the poorly educated average American (just think of how little knowledge a man like Ronald Reagan possesses) is also the result of the flattering German attitude, as it was already visible in 1947.

Kurt Ziesel (*Das verratene Gewissen*, Darmstadt 1961) is obviously puzzled

by the incredible display of bad character, bad conscience, and outright lying characteristic of 98 percent of post-1945 Germans, because he never suspected that all this acting was due to a vain attempt to win the friendship of the Americans

Even the English felt sick at the thought of a collaborator like Adenauer, who later became the first chancellor within a constitution dictated from outside. Compared to Brandt, who succeeded him as chancellor six years after his resignation, Adenauer was an angel. The desperate attempt to win the friendship of the post-1945 American establishment continues. But such an attempt will not be a final and lasting success.

If Hitler had lived after 1945, he would have laughed at it, and he would have laughed at it the way he always laughed at the stupidity of others. He clearly recognized that the Germans are the most simple-minded people in the world in political terms. How else can one explain the fact that in their more than 1000 years of history they were united for only 74 years, unlike the English, the French and the Poles?

Ludwig Erhard, one of the later chancellors, complained to General Lucius Clay on the occasion of the currency reform why he, as the leading economist, had not asked him for advice on this reform. Clay had made his Jewish co-religionists rich in the process by granting Germans 20 marks. Clay's response was genial: "What do you want? I'll let you take the credit for all this crap. I'm going to announce that the plan to bring about economic normalization in

*A. M. Lang's caricature from 1952 shows that the German eagle
remains on America's chain - despite an open cage*

West Germany is to lead, was entirely in accordance with your considerations and practical efforts. Moreover, a separate monetary system will put an end to the Soviet mischief of creating a united Germany under their influence." - Erhard, a so-called free market economist, like most Germans, concentrated on winning the friendship of Americans and American Jews.

After two generations, during which the Germans played the stupid Auguste and court jesters to the stupid US imperialists, the Germans would be lost forever, were it not for that *deus ex machina*. And this lies in the rotten and self-destructive US-America itself.

Whether the Germans like it or not, they will have the opportunity to return to that idealism and moral purity which they had under Bismarck, Wilhelm II and Hitler. The days when they had to live in the American garbage heap are almost over. One is reminded of Alain de Benoist's nightmare (see *Die entscheidenden Jahre*, Tübingen 1982, p. 88) of waking up one morning in Brooklyn and eating a hamburger at a snack bar.

The "friendship" of West Germans (at 62 million, they constitute the largest part of the multiply divided German nation; border minorities also exist in the Russian-, Polish-, and Czech-occupied eastern territories, as well as in Italy - South Tyrol - , France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark) toward U.S. America enabled a Mr. Reagan to claim, during his speech at the Berlin Wall in June 1987, that American forces would continue to defend West Germans and their freedom.

Despite Adenauer's treacherous, if unsuccessful, attempt to prevent the return of the Saar to Germany in 1955, it should nevertheless be decently admitted that he continued the Franco-German friendship and cooperation that dated back to Hitler and Petain. 1963 it was renewed by de Gaulle. same was done later by Pompidou, Giscard d'Estaing and Mitterrand. This friendship and cooperation, the precondition for the success of these two countries in the 21st century, could not yet fully realize its possibilities because of the reprehensible ingratiation of the West German the Americans. Once the

Americans are gone, all this will change.

The U.S. Position on Germany

One is reminded in this context of the important book by the well-known German-Jewish intellectual Hans Habe: *Our Love Affair with Germany*, New York 1960. This book prepared the political stage in West Germany for Bahr and many other Jews. Like so many lectures by U.S. court historians Henry Steele Commager and Alan Nevins on U.S. television, it offered the prevailing, if utterly nonsensical, opinion that victorious America had behaved in a uniquely generous manner toward defeated Germany.

Let us take 1914, 1939 and 1949 as examples: - 1914: unilateral and unfair American neutrality at the outbreak of the First World War to military intervention to protect the economic interests of the Allies and to maneuver Germany into a revolution - 1939: de facto entry of the U.S. into the war under Roosevelt in characteristic violation of international as well as national laws from the first day of the war. First FDR's key speech of Chicago in 1937, then the destruction of Germany in 1945, whereby Germany, and this can be taken literally, bled from millions of wounds. - 1949: The NATO alliance, which I opposed (1949 Boston radio debate) because it was an obviously imperialist means of dividing Europe with the USSR and allowing the murderer Stalin to control the eastern part, and the US to control the western part. France later broke with NATO. With the help of Germany, it would have been even easier for the French.

Knowing the three events briefly outlined above, any sincere person would have to conclude that American policy toward Germany is characterized by cruelty and deliberate, soul-destroying sadism. And this hatred and persecution can be compared with what the English did to the Irish in 700 years. The expression "generosity" cannot be used to describe American policy toward Germany.

It would certainly not be an exaggerated claim that Reagan and the other FDR epigones shared the same hatred toward Germany as Wilson and Roosevelt. On August 8, 1914, Wilson declared in his Cabinet that the Allies would fight Germany like wild animals. And Roosevelt claimed on November 11, 1938, that it was difficult to believe that Germany was part of

the civilization of the 20th century. If it were otherwise, why did none of the above denounce the nefarious FDR-Stalin alliance of Tehran and Yalta? Why didn't Reagan denounce Pope John Paul II's lie during his second visit to Poland in 1983, when he claimed that Wroclaw was an ancient Polish city? Would Reagan remain as quiet if some politician reminded the world that the Israeli imperialists have no valid legal claim to Palestine?

US Presidents and Germany

It has already been mentioned that at the time of the Franco-Prussian War, the U.S. President was pro-German. So was former President Thomas Jefferson when he visited the German Rhineland in 1787 - Jefferson had nothing to do with the plutocratic Philadelphia Constitution, which was celebrated in 1987, especially by the select few. President John Quincy Adams was also pro-German and well informed about Germany.

The same is true of President Herbert Hoover, who visited Germany several times and, together with his wife, translated into English a very famous Saxon miners' song from the 16th century - at that time the Saxons were considered the best miners in the world. After World War I, Hoover wrote a book criticizing Wilson's unfair, one-sided policy toward Germany (see *America's first Crusade*, New York 1938). The main thesis of this book is that Americans can wage war like any other major industrial nation. But as hopelessly naive and provincial settlers (at the rate they are going, this may take another 500 years), they lack the skill and ability to make peace. According to Hoover, this means that America's participation in major wars will inevitably trigger more successor wars. It need not be emphasized that such thinking is deeply philosophical and is quite rare among U.S. presidents, indeed has been absent among the other U.S. presidents of this century.

William Henry Chamberlin, the author of *Geschichte der russischen Revolution* (2 vols., Frankfurt/M. 1958), is one of the best English-speaking experts on the Russian Revolution. As an expert he can undoubtedly be compared with Karl Staehlin and Erdmann Hanisch in Germany. In any case,

he is a better expert than many Russian historians, including Pokrovsky and Trotsky.

Chamberlin advised Hoover on matters concerning Poland, Russia, and Germany. He asked Hoover for permission to write a book on Roosevelt and Truman from 1939 until the outbreak of the Korean War. Hoover agreed. The book was written and given the title *Americas Second Crusade* ("America's Second Crusade," Chicago 1950). Anyone who knew Chamberlin as a reserved and moderate person would hesitate to brand him for exaggeration. But Chamberlin took a sharp line with FDR and his epigones.

If West German historians believe that they are raising the prestige of their fatherland vis-à-vis the USA by condemning Bismarck, Wilhelm II and Hitler books and praising Roosevelt and Wilson instead, then they are very much mistaken. It is true that one or the other of them may receive a visiting professorship in the USA. But their commitment to their own court historiography diminishes their ability to make an impact. President Nixon's contribution to German-American relations was to say that his wife was of German descent - John Kennedy, for his part, declared in his famous Berlin speech that he was a Berliner, meaning that he stood with the (West) Berliners on the defensive walls of freedom. Yet, twenty years after the Russian victory at Stalingrad, he still praised the Soviets, even though that victory ushered in the process that turned half of Europe into a giant prison and execution site. The Americans like flatterers and sycophants; and they even demand it. But this does not mean that they show gratitude because of it. No American politician today, 44 years after the end of the war, advocates a peace treaty with Germany.

John Winant, U.S. ambassador to England, one of those typical American diplomats with little knowledge, was assigned by Truman to stake out the U.S. share in the negotiations over the four sectors in the German imperial capital. Although the old capital was enclosed all around by Soviet-occupied territory, the mentally out of touch Winant failed to negotiate guaranteed land access for the three western zones. Then in 1947, Truman declared a Cold War on the Russians, and soon the usual U.S.-Russian rifts ensued, although the old FDR-Stalin alliance remained effective behind the scenes to

this day. To keep Truman in trouble, Stalin declared a blockade of Berlin and maintained it for a year (1948 - 49) until an agreement was finally negotiated for free access to the old imperial capital. Official America exploited the airlift greatly. It was not so much a friendly gesture toward the West Berliners as a pure question of power. One need only recall the air raid on Berlin of April 20, 1945!

Comments on the Constitution of the USA

Americans celebrated the 200th birthday of the Constitution, which was presided over by two of the wealthiest Americans - both of whom married wealthily. George Washington was a slave owner and owned the most slaves in America. Benjamin Franklin, a plutocrat, was still trying to obtain positions for his relatives in the English colonial administration in 1765, at a time when Patrick Henry and Sam Adams, the real fathers of the American freedom struggle, were already putting their lives on the line for American independence. Both opposed and fought the Constitution of 1787. They claimed, not unreasonably, that it gave dictatorial power to the President, provided a strong and ruthless personality was willing to use that power. They also complained that the U.S. federal government was being given too much power on its part. This criticism can probably be regarded as general knowledge today.

It is also worth recalling LBJ's (Lyndon B. Johnson) famous speech in Ann Arbor, Michigan, in 1964. In this speech on "creative federalism," LBJ lamented the imbalance of power between the central government and the state governments. The central government, LBJ said, had to give power back to the individual states. Local political power would always disintegrate. It need not be particularly mentioned that all these were loose words. LBJ never did anything for local governments before his presidential campaign, before he left in 1968 because of the Vietnam War (which ended on April 30, 1975).

Does the judgment of Lord Bryce, an unscrupulous English propagandist of the First World War - he wrote mediocre treatises on the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation and the USA - , that the US Constitution of 1787 is the most wonderful document ever written by human hand, mean an

honest and sincere statement? Or was the remark made only give more emphasis to his propaganda in the USA? His remark was in no way hurtful to England, for the English have no written constitution. And must the fact that the American Constitution is the oldest written constitutional document speak for its perfection? Did the age of the Polish Sejm in the 18th century contribute to its value as a legislative body?

Although Bismarck's empire and its constitutional system - like any other constitutional system, it was subject to change - lasted only 47 years (1871 - 1918), the Germans fought like lions for survival in the First World War. Does anyone want to doubt the wisdom of Lloyd George's statement in 1916 that the price the people had to pay for this show was too high, and the states that would lose this war would inevitably be plunged into revolution? And this was true not only for the dying Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy and the Russian Tsardom, but also for England and Germany. As for the USA, they lost the 1812-1815 war against England on points. They also lost the Korean War on points, and they suffered a crushing defeat in the longest of their wars, the Vietnam War. Had the U.S. been in the midst of World War I, rather than on its brink, and had it suffered defeat like the Confederate States in 1865, there is probably no doubt that the Philadelphia Constitution of 1787 would have been abrogated.

were no fatal or even significant weaknesses in Bismarck's Germany that brought it down, nor can it be said that it was Germany's fault if it fell victim to the hypocritical war policies of the United States and England. Possibly the 21st century grants some belated apologies to Germany's address

On the Berlin question

Berliners are now (1987) beginning to tire of cynical and plutocratic politicians, of whom Kennedy and Reagan might be considered good examples, using the wall that divides their city for cheap speeches that lack sincerity and genuine generosity. Divided Berlin is one of the main results of Stalin's and Truman's global diplomacy (on Truman, see Jules Abels, *The Truman Scandal*, Chicago 1955).

It would be really fatuous to assume that any of these American orators

care whether Berlin is reunited in the next hundred years or in the next thousand. With his Berlin Wall remarks of June 8, 1987, aimed at Gorbachev, Reagan had the satisfaction of imagining that he was making cheap points and that they would not even cost him anything. Moreover, he knew that there was no danger to the still intact FDR-Stalin alliance. It was an almost ideal thing for a >cheap< politician.

None of the examples given above indicates that the Americans have any real interest in Germany as a whole. The courting of American imperialists like Wilson and Roosevelt by West German historians, or of an FDR favorite like Tito, who died in 1980, cannot serve the German cause. The constant denigration of outstanding German leaders such as Bismarck, Wilhelm II, and, in a sense, Hitler, can only breed contempt. One may be assured that had the U.S. possessed these leaders for the past 150 years, they would have been praised to the skies.

Even reverence for the 200-year-old U.S. Constitution cannot change the facts that the office of the president in particular is a perennial failure, that Congress is corrupted by oligarchic coteries plotting for the long term, and that the Supreme Court since Earl Warren's time in 1953 has moved to interpret the laws in terms of radical social change.

But all this takes a back seat to the fact that global American imperialism is facing economic collapse. This will force the American imperialists to abandon their outposts in the eastern part of the worldorder to concentrate on the desperate struggle for survival in the western part of the world. In this struggle for survival, foreign aid, from whatever source, is always welcome. However, this will result in further dependence on foreign capital.

It may be objected that Germany is unprepared for such a global transition of power. This is certainly true, since Germany is still politically based on the status quo, fawning over the Americans in the West and the Soviets in the East. In Austria, they fawn over both Americans and Russians. But there are historical developments that drastically change the political line of states, whether they like it or not. And in the coming US economic crisis, Germany will turn out to be such a nation - unlike Germany, the USA is not a nation, but a conglomerate, a mash of many peoples, in which, however, no group

predominates. It would be wrong to speak of a nation in the case of the USA, as is the case with France and Germany.

The first angelic gift Germany will receive in the future will be independence and sovereignty, which Germany has not possessed since 1945. And there are many reasons to believe that this gift will be quickly realized, provided that the three German entities successfully pursue the reunification program.

US imperialism

The heart of the alliance that will prevail over the EC grouping at the end of the century, the centerpiece of the whole, so to speak, will be the original Community of Six with a united Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries with a total population of about 260 million. This will draw level with the two superpowers - slightly more inhabitants than the USA and slightly less than the USSR. This equality may remain for a while because it is impossible to predict when the Soviet empire will begin to dissolve, especially in Asia. Territorial losses are also conceivable for the USA, especially if the Latin element gains the upper hand in the southwestern USA (New Mexico, Arizona and California). But this development does not have the element of inevitability inherent in it as, for example, in the case of the USSR. On the other hand, a return to the Chapultepec doctrine of noninterference in Central American issues south of the Rio Grande is also quite likely. This would necessarily abandon the Monroe Doctrine, unless the ABC states (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile) decide otherwise. In this context, it is instructive to note that Mexico today ranks first among U.S. investment countries, as it did before 1914. The Germans, who have already risen to become Mexico's second largest investing country, are currently in the process of overtaking the Americans.

Ironically, with the decline of the U.S., Israel, a state that cannot exist militarily or economically on its own, will depend almost entirely on Germany, which has so far borne the brunt of Israel aid along with the U.S.. The same will be true of the present Soviet satellite, Poland. There is hope to assume that the Poles will return the looted German territories in exchange

for economic aid. There has been no peace treaty with Germany since the end of World War II - not even one equivalent to the unilateral treaty between Japan and the United States in 1950. Of course, Willy Brandt's foolish gesture of recognizing the Oder-Neisse demarcation line as a political border was the act of a fool with no legal effect, since Brandt was only a representative of the puppet government of one occupation zone and could not speak for all of Germany. area around Königsberg (northeast Prussia) had become Soviet must probably also be negotiated out by means of economic counter-gifts.

Although nearly 43 years have passed since the fall of the Third Reich in 1945, it would be idle to imagine that the idealism of those days, including the notion of a community built on "common good before self-interest," rather than plutocratic self-interest, has disappeared from the German soul. Just as it is difficult to describe the feelings of joy that overcame Europe when the Black Death was finally defeated, it will be equally difficult to describe the feelings of joy when the American imperialists withdraw from these countries and hang up their role as masters of the so-called "free world."

Since the Americans want to be the masters and leaders of these countries, the countries in question cannot become free until this terrible state of affairs ends once and for all. Even the French, freer than the others but still not quite free, were scolded like children in April 1986 when they refused to join in Reagan's military strike against Libya. Reagan did not have a single clear piece of evidence against Libya, and yet the U.S. attack included the diabolical plan to kill the Libyan leader and his entire family. The chastisement of France went on for several weeks. The French have not forgotten that they were maneuvered into their own Vietnam War after 1945, also receive economic aid Marshall Plan. The war, which ended at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, cost the French twice what they received from U.S. America (see Philippe de Pirey, *Operation Waste*, London 1954).

All these countries gain by eliminating the dirty machinations of the American imperialists. And the greatest beneficiary of this development will undoubtedly be Germany, the greatest U.S. victim of both world wars.

Despite the permanent occupation and interference by the coarse, provincial Americans and their Jewish advisers since 1945, Germany will most quickly escape their influence and, once they have left, will also forget them. For this is an inevitable and natural human tendency. When the mayor of Salzburg visited me at Stanford University in 1954, some provincial uncle asked him what he liked best about America. The mayor thought for a minute and said, "Your troops seem to behave better here than in my Country." Didn't Mayor Pacherl owe his American hosts this candor? Shouldn't someone tell official America in Europe that it has failed and to back off?

Revisionism today

German revisionists of today, like Dr. Stäglich and Thies Christophersen, who are gradually winning the battle against falsification of history pay very dearly for these victories: loss of titles (in the case of Dr. Stäglich), loss of employment, house searches, fines and prison sentences (in the case of Christophersen) They accept this because they know that the dirt that has been dumped on Germany cannot last and that the German people will, if necessary, one day find their way back to themselves.

story of the mass murder of the Jews goes back to then Secretary of State in the Foreign Ministry, Ernst von Weizsäcker who spread it since 1942 and also passed it on to the U.S. agent Allen Dulles in Switzerland, who then it on to the American Jews in 1943 (see in contrast David Irving in lectures 1988-90)

Germany's neighboring countries still remember that the German occupation under Hitler was decent and clean. Scientists from these countries, such as Professor Robert Faurisson, also score great successes in the fight against the American propaganda lie "number one".

Even the most ardent supporters of U.S. imperialism in European countries are gradually turning away from the U.S. as its transgressions become worse and more ill-considered. The prospect of doing good business with the Americans is also steadily declining. All these signs Germany will recover. Germany will come clean with itself again, will feel good about itself, as it did once before many years ago.

In the long run, the Third Reich and Hitler will probably receive the recognition predicted by Hitler's architect Hermann Giesler in his book published in 1977: as it was far ahead of its time, especially in the field of social justice and its peacetime achievements.

Attempts to blacken the Third Reich in the long run with reports on internment and concentration camps will remain unsuccessful. Reference has already been made to the Nuremberg statement of the former Bavarian Minister of Justice, Hans Frank, who was Hitler's preferred defense counsel during the Weimar period and later, as Governor General, was responsible for occupied Poland. Aware of the U.S. propaganda film *The Mills of Death*, he opined at Nuremberg that a thousand years would pass and German guilt would not be erased. Frank was not the only defendant who was temporarily impressed by the propaganda air as well as the reprehensible procedure, not to mention the fact that defendants were tortured and beaten. Frank later recanted his impromptu statement, saying that the crimes of U.S. America and England were far worse than those blamed on Germany. Frank's last book, *Im Angesicht des Galgens* (Munich 1953), is one of the best books of memoirs about the Third Reich, even if it has minor weaknesses - for example, when he tries to portray Rudolf Hess, a German expatriate born in Alexandria, Egypt, as more naive than he really was (visiting Rome in May 1935).

It is true that neither the Kaiserreich nor the Weimar Republic had internment or concentration camps although the number of political prisoners was at times very large especially in the Weimar Republic. Neither the Kaiserreich nor the Weimar Republic had to deal with influential Jewish opponents at their founding, as was the case with the Third Reich. With the seizure of power in 1933, World Jewry with Samuel Untermyer declared war on the Third Reich. The Weimar Republic also had to deal with the Communists in its early years.

As for the Jews, Thies Christophersen (see "*The Auschwitz Lie*," op. cit.) is correct in saying that instead of a one-day boycott on April 1, 1933, the Third Reich could have immediately and legally interned as many of the nearly 500,000 German Jews as it wanted. Since the Basel Congress of 1897, world

Jewry had made it clear that it was indeed cooperating politically worldwide and was certainly the political group with the best international political connections. Wilson, for example, appointed Louis Brandeis as a judge of the American Supreme Court and had no objection to his chairman of the American Zionist movement, even until his death in 1941. Would Wilson have allowed the leader of a Polish party to hold such a high post while continuing to chairman of Polish party? The creature trodden on in 1933 was not world Jewry, but Germany.

In 1939, the six remaining concentration camps (there had temporarily been a few more in 1933) held 21,000 prisoners, including 3,000 Jews. In the U.S., over one million people were in prisons at that time, including political prisoners. Comparisons between German and American camps (Macos, Colorado, and Germfask, Minnesota) during WWII show that conditions in the German camps were more humane, especially in terms of work standards and rations. There were also more fatal accidents in American camps. All of these camps had nothing to do with the camps for the hundreds of thousands of U.S. citizens of Japanese origin or Japanese expatriates. The camp at Tule Lake, a dry lake in a desert area, became most famous because of some atrocities that occurred there. A massacre of a large number of Japanese women occurred here (see Morton Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed*, Chicago 1949).

The Jewish historian at New York University T. L. Jarman, in his book *"The Rise and Fall of Nazi Germany"* (New York 1956) declared that Germany, on the eve of the war imposed on it by England and Poland, had been an open and normal society in a way that the USSR had never been. This statement by Jarman, who makes no secret of his Jewish rejection of Hitler, simply reflects an ambition to be objective in Ranke's sense.

About Shirer's pamphlet

We have seen that Porter Sargent congratulated William Shirer on the objectivity of his manuscript *Berlin Diary*. He was startled, however, when he read it in print - it was published by the Jewish publishing house Knopf. Sargent was the first to realize that dealing with Knopf had completely turned Shirer around, not only in terms of the book, but in terms of his entire

professional development. Sargent did not live to see the publication of Shirer's *Aufstieg und Fall des 3. Reiches* (Cologne 1961) (see here also D. L. Hoggan, "Contra Shirer," offprint of *Deutsche Hochschullehrerzeitung*, - Tübingen 1961). The only politicians from the Weimar period whom Shirer praises are Communists and pro-Communists. The rest, even people like Noske and Scheidemann are condemned as reactionaries. All the leading politicians of the Third Reich are not only condemned, but compared to unsavory figures from the animal kingdom. Roosevelt and

his policy of unconditional surrender are praised in the highest terms as the best possible thing for Germany.

When this nefarious product of joint Communist and Jewish propaganda appeared in New York, for example, thousands of advertising stickers were also affixed to telephone poles in San Francisco, as a starting signal, so to speak, for a five-year uninterrupted campaign of publicity from the pulpit, on radio, and on television. University colleagues were invited to write favorable reviews. When H. E. Barnes read a favorable Shirer review by Walter Dorn (Ohio State University), an old friend who had collaborated on a volume of Langer's *The Rise of Modern Europe* series and approached him about it, he received the typical reply that he, Dorn, had not read a single page of this "filthy book," but had praised it so as not to jeopardize his own position.

It was not until Professor Klaus Epstein (Notre Dame University, Indiana) read my "Contra Shirer" that the academic adulation of Shirer suddenly ended. Epstein reviewed the Shirer book in 1962 for the U.S. journal *American Political Science Review* (2/1962), which was sponsored by both the Jews and the Catholic Church, and declared that the academic glorification of such a journalist must stop, who demands that the Radical Marxists have seized all power immediately in 1919 and eliminated all other parties. And this journalist even now glorified Roosevelt's policy of unconditional surrender, which even a moderate cosmopolitan of the ilk of Anne Armstrong (*Unconditional Surrender*, Rutgers New York 1961) called unprecedented and barbaric. And as if by magic, the academic glorification of Shirer was over.

Shirer then came back down to earth and argued that even President Wilson in 1919 wished to see only Marxists in the German revolutionary government. The policy of unconditional surrender was not communist, he said, since it had been rejected even by Stalin as foolish. But it was of no use. Epstein had spoken. And since there was no more praise for Shirer from academia, sales of the Shirer book dropped to practically zero. He tried his luck a few years later with another book - he wanted to go after the French fascists. But there was no market for it. This case also shows that clothes make the man, as the Andersen fairy tale says. Even today, someone has to see it first and say it. If unexpected and unsolicited help, which includes authority, then the problem is solved (see also J. Epstein, *Operation Keelhaul*, New York 1972).

The fate of the Jews in Eastern Europe

Walter Sanning (*Die Auflösung des osteuropäischen Judentums*, Tübingen 1986) demonstrates that many Polish Jews left the country between the 1931 and 1939 censuses due to harsh anti-Jewish Polish policies. We have seen that many Jews who fled from the western part to Stalin during the German-Soviet invasion of Poland were shipped by him in open railroad cars to northern Russia.

Birobaidjan, the Soviet counterpart to Israel in the Siberian Amur region, was allowed to develop relatively well under Stalin. But Stalin preferred a mixed population. And after 1939, he was cautious about sending more Jews there. On the other hand, he needed Jewish technicians for his war industry. Therefore, he took most of them along with the relevant factories when the Red Army withdrew in 1941.

Sanning points out that many Jews died because of the harsh conditions on the journey to the Urals. But this is to be blamed on Stalin, not Hitler. The Jewish population in other European countries such as Romania, Hungary and Greece was also exaggerated; in reality it was not so high at the time of Hitler.

A classic example of this numbers game came to light at the Nuremberg

Trials in 1946. The Joint Jewish Distribution Committee had just declared that there were only 60,000 Jews left in Rest Poland, that is, in Poland without the eastern territories occupied by Stalin. Then there were the incidents in the city of Kielce in southern Poland. There the Poles claimed that the Jews were getting the best new housing because of a program that was heavily controlled by Jews. Then they also created a program to pacify the Poles But the latter responded with anti-Jewish riots in which many Jews were killed. Then, within two weeks, another 80,000 Jews left Poland, arriving mostly as D.Ps (displaced persons) in West Germany.

At about that time, the director of the Frankfurt State Library showed me lists showing that the postwar Jewish population in the western part of Germany was higher than the Jewish population in 1933 in Hitler's Germany. Some of these Jews, of course, later emigrated America At 18 million, the Jewish population there is stronger than it ever was in Russia. The U.S. Jews constituted the largest Jewish population in any country ever in the history of Judaism, including ancient Greece and Rome. Why the Jewish population in Israel barely exceeds three million after more than a century of Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine is another question.

Poland's losses in the Second World War

Regarding German-Polish relations under Hitler as well as Soviet-Polish relations under Stalin, one book deserves special mention. It is Clifford Barnett's *Poland, its People, its Society, its Culture* (Yale University Press 1958). The book brings very accurate data on population size. It shows that German and Russian losses of men were far higher than those of the Poles; Polish losses were lower than those of the French in the war of 1870-71, despite the 15,000 officers Stalin had killed (Katyn) and the Polish losses of Anders troops in Italy. Even the English, who managed to keep their losses of soldiers lower than in World War I - they also lost >only< 30 000 people in the bombing raids while German losses in the bombing raids were about 990 000 - had higher human losses than the Poles

In the 1944 Bor Komorowski Uprising in Warsaw, the Poles were treated honorably by the Wehrmacht, although the Germans could have shot all prisoners as partisans under international law Moreover, their losses were

not too high. Western Poland was under German rule for almost six years. During this time, young Poles committed numerous acts of sabotage and burglaries. Punishments were usually not drastic, and executions were rare. Although the Poles had repeatedly claimed to be the number one victim par excellence - recently they have been talking about some seven million victims, probably topping the six million Jews - Barnett, a fluent Polish speaker, based on his own research in Poland, dismisses this claim as wild Polish exaggerations; exaggerations that have been common in Polish history. Barnett's research finds large losses in the younger age groups among Germans and Russians, but hardly among Poles. As for Sanning, it is clear to Barnett that much of the Russian losses are due to Stalin himself, especially since 1936. One is reminded of that cartoon in which one Russian soldier says to another, "I wish we had a war so our losses would go down!"

In sum, Barnett finds it somehow ironic that Poland was so richly compensated at the end of the war, even though it suffered the least and contributed little to the Allied victory. Barnett estimates that the non-Polish territory ("eastern Poland") taken by Stalin was only 10 percent of what the Poles were allowed to appropriate from Germany. The British once rewarded Mussolini with a Sahara strip. Mussolini took it, of course, but said, "I am not a collector of deserts." Everyone in England, and not only in Germany and Hungary, understands the expression "Polish economy." "Going blue" for boozing is proverbial in Poland. The novels of Stefan Zeromski (*Ashe*, etc.), in which people spend a whole winter just visiting each other, are very famous.

In a densely populated Europe, northern Hungary, the Sudetenland, southeastern Finland, a large part of the Baltic States, East and West Prussia, Pomerania, Poznan-West Prussia and Silesia were allowed to be depopulated, and then these areas were thinly populated with primitive, lazy and incompetent people. This process can only be called a crime. The whole thing is also reminiscent of J. M. Keynes' book on Versailles (*The Economic Consequences of the Peace Treaty*, Munich 1920).

East Germany and the Expulsions

There are now countless books about the expulsion of Germans from East Germany, and rightly so. One of the best is probably Charles Wassermann's

book *Europe's Forgotten Territories* (Copenhagen 1960). This book reflects a grand bicycle tour in 1959, thirteen years before Willy Brandt attempted to legally cede all these territories from Lyck in East Prussia to Gliwice in Upper Silesia to the Poles, which of course he had no right to do. The bicycle tour was undertaken fourteen years after the Second World War. And yet, in fact, nothing had been done economically to rebuild the almost empty country. Even the high standing coal mining industry in Upper Silesia had experienced a gradual decline. The pictures that stand out most show thousands of able-bodied young Poles just hanging around, seemingly content to do nothing. The experience gained shortly after World War I, the silting up of the lower Vistula after a few years of Polish administration, should have been a clear indication of what would happen in this Stalin puppet state.

Corrections in favor of Germany

In the long run, what will be remembered more in connection with the Third Reich are the intellectual achievements, the land reclamation, the medical progress, improvement of health care, improvement of the urban and rural environment, the progress in education, the construction of the best highways in the world, the brilliant achievements in painting, sculpture and architecture - the Diplomatic House and the House of German Art, be it as characteristic examples than concentration camps, which were no worse than those of the British and Americans in this century; in any case, they were more humane than fifty camps of Tito or the thousand camps of Stalin (these are estimates of Robert Conquest, the expert on Stalin's purges; see his book *Harvest of Death*. Munich 1987). to see why such a legacy should contribute nothing to the German and European future

If one considers the proverbial contempt for international law in England and especially US America, then the attitude and stance of the Bismarck Empire, the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich in this area look truly refreshing. Moreover, they contributed greatly to the advancement and preservation of civilization.

Germany first of all, in the seventy-four years of her unity in modern times, from the founding of the Reich on January 18, 1871, to the arrest of the

Dönitz government by the British on May 23, 1945, is not to be blamed for the two English wars into which she reluctantly entered. The Franco-German war of 1870/71 was unnecessarily declared by the French Foreign Minister Comte de Gramont. It has been mentioned before that Bismarck, when acquiring his modest colonies, always consulted the English first to avoid unnecessary friction. He made unexpected concessions to the U.S. on the Samoa issue in 1899 so as not to jeopardize good relations.

*International Violations
the International Court of Justice*

Germany and also the U.S. were among the signatories to the treaties (1899 and 1907) that led to the World Court. We have seen President Reagan contemptuously flout a decision of that body when it ruled in favor of Nicaragua and against the U.S. in mining the Pacific ports. The plan for a nonpolitical, nonmilitary customs union with Austria (1931) was close to the heart of Weimar Chancellor Heinrich Brüning. When the World Court, under French pressure, ruled that the planned customs union constituted a treaty violation (Versailles/St. Germain), Brüning abandoned the project.

Contrary to media propaganda, Hitler committed no international legal violations between the time of his appointment by Hindenburg on January 30, 1933, and the legally sound countermeasures against the Poles on September 1, 1939. Graham Stuart, who wrote the official history of the U.S. State Department and for whom the Stanford Political Science Library is named, classified Hitler's actions against Poland thus.

Although an additional volume would be necessary to deal with the legality of Hitler's foreign policy, we have already dealt with one main event, namely the invasion of the Rhineland (1936). Legally permissible countermeasures against the French violation of the Locarno Treaty. The refusal of the disarmament conferences (1932 -1934) either to disarm or to grant arms equality justified Hitler's withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933 (see Paul Rassinier, *Die Jahrhundert-Provokation*. Tübingen 1989, pp. 65-85). Rearmament since 1935 was a legitimate response to coercion; this is also confirmed in the Anglo-German naval agreement of June 18, 1935.

Even though Hitler declared that it was unlawful for Roosevelt to deny Germany helium while giving it to other states, even though he disliked Roosevelt's henchman in New York, the Jewish-Italian mayor Fiorello LaGuardia, because of his foul-mouthed remarks about Mussolini, Hitler nevertheless always treated Roosevelt politely and tactfully as part of his policy of a secure and strong Germany - until the foolish Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. With that attack, U.S. domestic resistance to FDR suddenly dissolved, and Roosevelt was able to enter the long-sought European war. Even Hitler's Reichstag speech of April 28, 1939, in which he politely corrected some of the incredible blunders in Roosevelt's insulting note of April 15, 1939, was that of a fine gentleman, was polite and conciliatory throughout. Wilhelm II possessed the same tact and politely refrained from any criticism of Teddy Roosevelt's incredibly inane 1910 speech in the Berlin Assembly Hall. Hitler and the Kaiser, as well as Bismarck, were eager to advance their country's interests.

Fritz Tobias, who is a member of the SPD, has proved this for years in his books and articles (see Fritz Tobias, *Der Reichstagsbrand*, Legende und Wirklichkeit. Rastatt 1962; with U. Backes et al: *Reichstagsbrand*. Auflösung einer historischen Legende. Munich 1986) that Hitler had nothing to do with the arson of the Reichstag fire in Berlin on February 27, 1933. Hitler's communist, Jewish and some reactionary adversaries were all unsuccessful in their attempt to pin it against Chancellor Dollfuß because of the uprising of Austrian National Socialists on July 25, 1934. Dollfuß, the little ultramontane Austrian dictator, was accidentally shot by the desperate insurgents. That Hitler demanded high visa fees for leaving Austria until the agreement on July 11, 1936, in order to bring Austrian officials to the negotiating table, was perfectly in order. Other countries also resorted to such measures. Similarly, the incident in the Spanish Civil War in which Hitler ordered the battleship "Deutschland" to shell the port facilities of Almeria was a legitimate countermeasure against Red Spanish air attacks on the German ship on the high seas. And since Franco had been recognized as an equal belligerent to Juan Negrin and the other Red Spanish leaders, Hitler's limited aid, unlike the more massive Italian aid, was not illegal under the

prevailing law Moreover, there was foreign interference and aid on both sides throughout the war. During the Italian-Abyssinian War, Hitler observed what Anthony Eden called the highest possible neutrality. So the German slate is almost completely clean compared to that of the British and Americans.

U.S. war profiteers

Both the Nye Congress Report and the book by H. C. Engelbrecht (he also wrote one on Fichte) and F. C. Hanighen (he wrote a treatise on the Mexican General Santa Anna) *Merchants of Death - a Study of the International Armament Industry* (New York 1934) rightly point out, in my opinion, that in America it was primarily the well-funded groups around D. Rockefeller and J. P. Morgan who made the personal profits possible for the individual armament firms - there are too many to mention; after all, there were 25,000 new American millionaires as a result of the First World War. A Wall Street speculatorlike Baruch made his profits primarily on the stock market The Congressional Record, however, as well as Engelbrecht and Hanighen, do not emphasize enough the role of a powerful and powerful president, who, however, was powerful not so much because of his personality as because of the fullness of power his office erroneously gave him. The Nye Report, as seen in *Merchants of Death*, gives the picture of a president who was a more or less harmless professor and who was unable to deal with these powerful, acquisitive forces. Today this may seem so, but on the basis of our previous study of Wilson's attitude as well as his possibilities as a result of the expert advice offered to him, the matter looks different.

A few hypothetical examples will probably suffice to underscore the necessary responsibility of political leaders. The examples touch on the Bismarck Empire as well as the Third Reich.

We have already noted that C. C. Tansill, in his book on Wilson's War (1938), misperceives and even distorts the problem of personal responsibility and influence based on his approach. John Dos Passos does not fall into this error as much in his book on Wilson's War (1964). Does anyone seriously believe that three-time presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan, who

firmly believed in the benefits of American neutrality and who knew international law very well, would have allowed himself to be maneuvered into a war by partially criminal actions of the British propagandists, Rockefeller, Baruch, J. P. Morgan, and the individual arms profiteers like DuPont? Wouldn't the same be true of the fighter Bob LaFollette, who would have entered the White House in 1914 in place of Wilson, had it not been for the treasonous and lying actions of a Teddy Roosevelt? And finally, if Jim Farley or Robert Taft had moved into the White House in 1940 instead of FDR, would anyone suppose that fifty American destroyers would have been delivered to the British who were at war?

At the beginning of the 20th century, the time of James Robinson's *New History* - he had invited Karl Lamprecht to lend prestige to his school - there was a great deal of sympathy for Marxism in particular and for a managed economy in general. Robinson liked individuals, including top executives, as the result of impersonal events. He liked to cite Tolstoy's commentary on the final chapter in *War and Peace* - had anything happened to Napoleon, General Pichegru would have taken his place and carried out his fateful task just as neatly. In this way, the importance of an outstanding personality is diminished. The main thesis in Sidney Hook's book *The Hero in History* (New York 1939) is that there are no heroes in history, but that they are cheap actors pretending to be more than they really are.

The role of US presidents

Certainly Wilson and his chief disciple FDR were cheap actors who wanted to be heroes. With the exception of Roosevelt's greed for bloodshed, this statement describes them both very well. But this also raises the question: does the office make the man, or does the man make the office?

1787, the "Founding Fathers" - which sounds like a description of the founding of English Freemasonry in the early 18th century - in Philadelphia, under the chairmanship of George Washington, worked out what immediately turned out to be a tremendously powerful presidency, even though at that time the administration of the entire U.S. was lighter than that of the city of New York today. It is certainly instructive that the U.S. Constitution of

1777 knew no presidential office. Merrill Jensen, in *The Articles of Confederation* (New York 1955), convincingly demonstrated, and later stood up to his critics, that the 1777 Constitution would work better than the present one, with its powerful presidential office created only to do General Washington a favor.

Certainly no one claims that Ronald Reagan is a strong personality, especially after he had to ask two losers (Kissinger and Nixon) if he could visit the German military cemetery in Bitburg. But his office is so powerful that he indeed looks good and dangerous.

Given the level of industrialization and national prosperity the United States had achieved by 1914, debtor nation or not, an accurate historiography cannot ignore the president's role in neutrality policy. Lobbies and interest groups have always played a role in political decisions. In foreign policy, however, only the president could decide whether neutrality policy was rightful or wrongful.

In August 1914, Bryan, who was still Wilson's Secretary of State at that time, had recommended that an embargo be placed on war supplies all belligerents. He had also proposed an embargo on American loans to all belligerent nations. These policies had been called for earlier by Senator Bob La Follette to spirited applause in the Senate.

If one should suppose that the policy proposals of Wilson's Secretary of State would have encountered legal difficulties if implemented, it should be remembered that such a policy was pursued by Roosevelt under pressure from the American Catholic Church during the Spanish Civil War (1936 - 39). The legality of these policies was never questioned. Moreover, the policy proposals of Bryan and La Follette were reflected in large measure in the neutrality legislation of the U.S. Congress of 1934 - 37. Roosevelt signed these laws - the last in the session before his infamous Chicago speech of October 5, 1937. The U.S. Supreme Court also never questioned these laws.

This evidence suggests that it was entirely within Wilson's power for his Secretary of State's policy of neutrality according to law. The fact that he followed the advice of a Baruch, Rockefeller, and Morgan and pursued a

fraudulent, dishonorable, and illegitimate pseudo-neutrality policy cannot lead the historian to place the blame solely on the three self-serving advisors, since Wilson had been appropriately and properly advised beforehand and had sufficient time to reconsider not the American stock market speculators, bankers and armament manufacturers, but Wilson himself who is the chief culprit

Bryan did not indulge in any self-deception in thinking that it would be easy to convince Wilson of the right policy, for he had

learned much since the time he mistakenly supported Wilson against Champ Clark of Missouri at the 1912 Democratic convention in Baltimore. The following year, Bryan discovered a book in novel form written by Edward Mandell House, but it was a kind of political testament. Its title, *Philip Dru, Administrator*. Bryan said all his hair stood on end when he read it. The hero solved the labor and class problem, intervened in a war, and went to Europe to found the League of Nations

Although both Wilson and House then assured Bryan that the book was pure fantasy, and Wilson added that his interest (in 1913) was in domestic reform (see Roosevelt at Chautauqua in 1936), it became clear to Bryan that with the Wilson administration was the danger of irresponsible and unlawful worldwide interference. By the time England launched World War I in 1914, Bryan had long regretted that he had allowed himself to be duped by House into supporting Wilson at the Baltimore caucus sharing what Clark was supposed to have said about Bryan. The House lie was, "Bryan may think I drink like a fish, but I know he eats like a pig."

Thus, as is so often the case, small cheap tricks can produce great effects in world history, for Clark, who unlike Teddy Roosevelt and Wilson was a genuine progressive, later let it be known that he would have pursued a Bryan-LaFollette style policy of neutrality had he become President

Another example of the president's ability to pursue legitimate policy in the area of foreign affairs uninfluenced by lobbies, bankers, and the wishes of "merchants with death" is the Japanese preemptive strike against China in 1931 after the balance in that area had been upset as a result of the Soviet victory in the eight-month Manchurian War. The upset balance was that

which had been established in 1907 and 1910 by treaties between Russia and Japan under British supervision. The USSR, of course, claimed all of Tsarist Russia's rights under these treaties, although it had stopped accepting Chinese reparations from the Boxer Rebellion for propaganda reasons. This forced the USA to do likewise (see J. Christopher, *Conflict in the Far East*, New York 1949).

At the time of Herbert Hoover's election as president (1928), Henry Stimson, a schoolmate of Roosevelt's from the Nobel school of Groton represented a significant power factor in the Republican Party Hoover made him his secretary of state. But unlike England, the U.S. State Department is by no means dependent on the president (see Graham Stuart, *The History of the United States Department of State*, Washington, D. C., 1967).

first dispute between Hoover and Stimson was sparked by Hoover's "good neighbor tour" of Central America nations between his election in 1928 and his inauguration in 1929. On that occasion, Hoover promised that there would be no interference in domestic affairs during his presidency as there had been with Teddy Roosevelt in 1904-and as there had been again in that decade under Reagan in Nicaragua, Guatemala, San Salvador, Costa Rica, and Bolivia. Stimson objected, but Hoover reminded him that under the Constitution all Cabinet members were dependent and that he had the right to make his own foreign policy.

Stimson attempted to use the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) against the USSR in 1929, but was sarcastically rebuffed by Soviet Foreign Minister Chicherin. Hoover rejected Stimson's demand for economic sanctions against the USSR. In 1931, the same thing played out between Stimson and the Japanese, and, of course, regardless of what the League of Nations, of which the U.S. was not a member, did. Again and more vehemently than before, Stimson demanded economic sanctions against Japan, but Hoover refused. If Hoover had been President instead of Roosevelt in 1941, war with Japan would have been unthinkable. Hoover repeatedly emphasized this several occasions.

The point in each case is a decent president: in the nearly 56 years since Hoover left office, there have only been presidents who despised

international law: FDR and all his >disciples<, such as Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and especially Reagan. To note that it is the >man< and not the system that allows the bankers and the "merchants with death" to do their business. The problem is that the U.S. never knew a democratic way to vote out its president after LaFollette failed to create a general primary election system based on the individual states by interposing the apparatus of the political oligarchy. Anyone who claims that the U.S. political system is democratic is either a naïve ignoramus or a blatant liar.

The example of Robert Taft (see above) clearly underscores this. Taft would have been elected in 1952 had it not been for the apparatus of the old political oligarchy. With Taft's election, the FDR era would have ended once and for all. There is no doubt that in matters of political freedom the American system is as unfree as any other that has been developed.

I remember well a visit to the summer residence of William L. Langer in August 1952 - it was the time of the Robert Taft tragedy. I had previously taught at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, then lectured for three years in Munich, and was now on my way to the site of my new job, the very pro-Communist History Department at the University of California at Berkeley. Langer and I hoped to break their monopoly there, for all thirty members of the Department endorsed the choice of Adlai Stevenson, the companion and bosom friend of the still-moving Eleanor Roosevelt. She was delighted that Taft was disappointed, and she did not mind that a pro-Communist "Republican" was elected.

Langer's summer home was in Gloucester, Massachusetts. We were swimming, already well out in the bay, when he asked me a typical question - Langer had not yet left for his first trip to postwar Germany: "Are those American fools over there trying to teach the Germans democracy?" "Yes," I replied immediately. "Damn," Langer said. "The Germans know a thousand times more about democracy than we do, and they've had a lot more opportunities to try it out, too." So much for the question between imagination and truth.

I remember an article I wrote about Germany at the request of the *United States Department Bulletin* (12/1949). They published it. But it had been edited in

such a way that it had become completely unrecognizable. So much for American truth and democracy. And if the president is both capable and sincere - this has been the case only twice, and that was with presidents who have been in office only once: John Quincy Adams (1825 - 1829) and Herbert Hoover (1929-1933) - then I know of no one who expects to see another. So the only remedy is to abolish the office of the President, clean out Congress and put Congressmen in charge of overseeing the bankers, the stock speculators, and the "merchants of death." I honestly believe that all of this has already been tried. Moreover, the steady decline of both public and private education in the United States over the last fifty years makes everything much worse. Therefore, many are rejoicing; that the claws of the American eagle will eventually be clipped by luxury, waste, corruption and general economic incompetence so that the eagle will stop tearing the rest of the world to pieces due to its own economic incompetence. Then, as the eagle slowly flies home, the red bear it has supported for decades will likely do the same.

The destruction of the Bismarck Empire, the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich by the Americans - the Bismarck Empire was destroyed by Wilson; the Weimar Republic perished from the Great Depression triggered by Coolidge-Mellon at the request of Montagu Norman of the "Bank of England"; the Third Reich was destroyed by FDR - does not place the responsibility for unstable German systems of government in the 20th century on the German people or their political leaders

The dependence of the USA on England

Hitler believed that the Bismarck Empire was invincible. And it seemed invincible, too, had Wilson not foolishly entered the war, which was none of his business and thousands of miles away. Wilson, and to a lesser extent McKinley's Secretary of State John Hay, created American dependence on England, which was later still replaced by the worse dependence on the USSR under FDR (see on this George Crocker, *Pacemakers of the Soviets*, op. cit.).

The dependence on England created by Wilson led the U.S. Treasury

Secretary and copper millionaire Andrew Mellon, with the approval of President Calvin Coolidge, to agree to bail out the "Bank of England" president. This had been created by Chancellor of the Exchequer Winston Churchill in 1925 when he fixed the English pound sterling at the pre-war rate of \$4.85. As a result, English exports overseas were reduced by the higher prices. This prompted their president Norman to ask the American Federal Bank to lower the interest rate in a way that was out of touch with reality. This made British goods cheaper, but it also made American loans cheaper. In 1927, when Norman was in the USA, there were already cheap purchases of shares. By 1929, the stock market had gone completely off the rails, and this led to the biggest stock market crash in American history.

This resulted in losses of over \$40 billion within a few weeks. This in turn was reflected in the number of unemployed, which accounted for one third of the workforce in the USA. Due to the high interest rate policy for American bonds, this also led to half of the workers in Germany becoming unemployed. The memory of inflation only a few years earlier and the collapse of the monetary system in 1923 led the German authorities to adopt a cautious inflationary policy that was even more ineffective than the measures taken in the United States against the economic crisis. Hitler's and Nazi decision to address the economic crisis earned the public support and also the votes necessary for Hindenburg to appoint him Reich Chancellor.

FDR's fault

F.D. Roosevelt, who was an even greater warmonger than Churchill, bears more responsibility than anyone else for the destruction of Germany in World War II. It was the worst destruction of a major nation in any war in world history, far surpassing that of Japan. More people were killed in Allied bombing of Dresden than in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; Japan, unlike Germany, was also not divided. Compared to the destruction of Germany, the destruction of the Confederate States of America, which was completed in 1865, is more modest- at that time it was a state with eight million inhabitants, while Germany was a state with over eighty million inhabitants.

Roosevelt's first step in this direction was his alliance with Stalin in 1933, which took place under the guise of diplomatic recognition. This is confirmed by the first U.S. ambassador William C. Bullitt, but also by the Soviet press on the occasion of their obituaries at Roosevelt's death (see *Pravda* of April 13, 1945: "President Roosevelt was the best ally that Marshal Stalin and the USSR ever had ...").

In Germany, a political struggle to the death was taking place between Stalinist Bolshevism and National Socialism. This fact was known to FDR. FDR further knew that Bolshevism since Lenin had been an ideology aimed at expansion and extension, at world revolution. The leap from American non-recognition of the Soviet Union to alliance with Stalin would thus inevitably encourage Soviet expansionism and increase the prospects of a warlike confrontation between Hitler and Stalin. At the same time, Roosevelt was shrewd enough to keep his alliance with Stalin secret from the British, especially after the Labour government under MacDonald was replaced in 1935 following the overwhelming election victory of the Conservatives under Stanley Baldwin - the last election until Churchill was then again voted out by the electorate during the Potsdam Conference 1945.

Roosevelt knew that England would never have started World War I after the Sarajevo murder had there been a strong and independent U.S. president like La Follette instead of a pro-English president who could be manipulated. Roosevelt, who needed England to start World War II as much as the English needed the Poles, knew that the English would never start a world war if they realized that they could be crushed between Roosevelt and Stalin. For this reason, Roosevelt concealed his disdain for the British Empire from Churchill before they first met after Pearl Harbor.

Although Roosevelt wished Chamberlain luck in his three meetings with Hitler in September 1938, in order to keep up appearances and be in good standing, he immediately joined Stalin's policy and denigrated the Munich Agreement in the first months after its ratification by the British and French parliaments. He also had his diplomats in Warsaw (Biddle) and Paris (Bullitt) constantly fomenting unrest and inciting war against Germany. And that Churchill's English critics said that the alternative to the agreement was war

was nothing but warmongering. That Hitler himself wanted peace is shown by how quickly he signed the German-English treaty of friendship offered by Chamberlain, regardless of whether Chamberlain was sincere or not (on this see Keith Feiling *The Life of Neville Chamberlain*, London 1947).

In the meantime, FDR had begun educating Americans for World War II. The prelude was his speech of October 5, 1937. Although opinion polls still showed that 80 percent of the people in the U.S. were opposed to war because of Hitler's skillful policies, this gives a skewed picture, as was shown in the rapid collapse of the "America First Movement" (see above) after Pearl Harbor. The public had been visibly crushed by flood of false propaganda by FDR and his accomplices since 1937, by the constant Jewish propaganda since 1933, and by English propaganda since 1939. This prompted Charles Lindbergh, in his speech at Des Moines on October 31, 1941, to declare that the possibilities for peace would be significantly increased and even secured if these three major forces would stop fomenting war. Undoubtedly, he was thinking primarily of FDR and his accomplices because their propaganda was by far the most deadly and effective. Moreover, it received all the funding it needed from the government. Roosevelt was also a much more shameless liar than most other presidents. Hoover had to realize this during the 1932 campaign, when four fake Hoover biographies accused him of atrocious and despicable crimes during his worldwide work as a mining engineer. Moreover, statements were put in his mouth that were not his style - for example, "If I am not re-elected, grass will grow in the streets of a hundred American cities." Anyone who knew Hoover as I did knew that he could not have said such a thing. It was a similar story with FDR's lies about Hitler.

Roosevelt, who in the 1920 campaign - he was then running as the Democratic candidate along with Cox - boasted of having written a constitution for Haiti in a single night in 1915 as then Under Secretary of State in the Navy Department then imposed by U.S. naval forces, as occupiers, cannot be accused of excessive empathy. He claimed that Dakar, before it was taken by the de Gaulle French with English support - Dakar had never been occupied by German troops - was like a dagger aimed right into the "heart of

Brazil," and this despite the fact that the whole Atlantic lay between them. On the other hand, he had ridiculed Hitler's correct observation that Benesch's-Czechoslovakia, which had an official military alliance with Stalin, was a potential Soviet aircraft carrier in Central Europe. FDR also lied when he spoke of an existing German plan to occupy the state of Iowa. At the Nuremberg trials, it was established that there was not a shred of evidence of German military plans for territories across the Atlantic-unlike Roosevelt's plans long before Pearl Harbor (see Wedemeyer, op. cit.)

As early as October 1940, FDR and his Secretary of War, Stimson, in conjunction with their new peacetime defense constitution which Roosevelt had advocated since the 1920s, had a plan for sending ten million American troops across the Atlantic to take France. The details for this plan were ready before Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, in a speech to the "Massachusetts Institute of Technology" on October 31, 1940, Roosevelt declared, "I keep telling them that their sons will not be sent to foreign wars!" He then told his speechwriter, Robert Sherwood, "I am tired of telling the same old lie." (see Sherwood, op. cit.).

Thomas Bailey (*The Man in the Street*, Stanford 1949) argued that the reason FDR had no inhibitions about constantly lying to Americans about his own as well as Hitler's and Stalin's plans was because, although of only average intelligence, he felt himself a member of the plutocratic elite. FDR felt that the mass of poor average citizens, who according to Ferdinand Lundberg (*America's Sixty Families*, New York 1938) had only a few pieces of furniture and what clothes they wore, were dumbed down because of their poverty and therefore could not be educated by respectable means to decide what was best for them. This placed FDR in stark contrast to the populist La Follette.

Although Roosevelt, like Wilson frequently used the term popular government, he hated it. He preferred to see himself in the role of a ruler endowed with dictatorial powers a par with Dictator Vargas of Brazil. Therefore, for Roosevelt, lies and deception were quite ordinary adjuncts to a Machiavellian policy he enjoyed, to which Machiavelli's *II Principe* had counseled that his primary occupation was waging war. In a

private conversation in 1940, Roosevelt said, "Hitler can't even cross the Channel. He can do us no harm." Roosevelt's primary preoccupation was not defending the United States, but only waging wars of aggression.

The three German forms of government

We can identify similarities and differences between the three German forms of government compared here. The three are certainly more similar than the Federal Republic (since 1949), the German Democratic Republic (since 1949) and the Republic of Austria (since 1947) - a neutral state with strong Russian reservations due to the peace treaty of 1955. In contrast to the USA-affiliated FRG and the Soviet-affiliated GDR, Austria has had no occupying troops since 1955.

Although the GDR, along with Hungary, are the two most prosperous Soviet satellite states, the GDR is thoroughly militarized and trimmed for military action just like the USSR and unlike Hungary. The FRG, on the other hand, which unlike Austria is not demilitarized, depends far more on its foreign occupiers, especially the United States. Also, the FRG is repeatedly asked to make considerable payments to the U.S. and Israel - the GDR paid nothing so far to Israel, which Moscow calls an imperialist robber state.

These three parts of Germany are, on the surface, more divided and further apart than has ever been the case in Germany's history. But behind the façade distorted by foreign imperialism is the common experience of the Third Reich. As soon as American influence is gone, and it will be in the foreseeable future because of the financial collapse of the United States, which no satellite will be able to stop, then these old ties will be stronger, and Germany will come together again.

One of the common features of the three older forms of government compared with each other distinguishes them from the three younger ones is, of course, nationalism, which was a powerful force that Bismarck used to create the Second Reich of the Germans. This nationalism was also evident in the support for historical revisionism (after the Dictate of Versailles, among other things) in the Weimar Republic, and independently of its revolutionary

beginning. This nationalism reached its peak under Hitler with the attempt to secure once and for all Germany's position as a united major European power. Then, in the course of World War II, came the notion of saving all of Europe from the predatory imperialism of the U.S. and the USSR. Another commonality was the continuing pride in the German economy, German agriculture, and German industry (see Gustav Stolper, *A History of the German Economy*, New York 1941). Many institutions functioned without interruption in all three forms of government. The constitutional monarchy, a liberal republic, and the National Socialist welfare state of capitalist design indeed represent a bewildering ideological diversity of systems. All three functioned excellently regardless of their differences.

Prospects for the 21st century

To define Germany's role in the 21st century, one need not look far. Regardless of all economic and technological factors, the German focus in the coming century must be on German lore. Erwin Guido Kolbenheyer was right when he said that a sea of propaganda prevented even intelligent people from seeing clearly. But this is about to change. The once prosperous America as the money-giving nation par excellence is on the brink of ruin and has become the largest debtor nation. In 1987, the U.S. debt burden was \$262 billion with an annual trade deficit of \$150 billion. difficult to imagine that in the course of 100 years an American renewal, let alone a worldwide one, can take place, given the demoralization, disease, and inferior productivity of a large segment of the American population. Meanwhile, the USSR, where Russians now make up only 30 percent of the population, has problems with insurgents and restive peoples in the southern parts all the way to the borders in the Far East. And since the usual American aid is likely to disappear in the near future, the USSR will have supply shortages; not least because the collective farm economy as well as industry are functioning poorly.

The 21st century could possibly be the century in which the Russians are eliminated in Asia, where they never had any business being.

The days of the British Empire are long gone, and the British Commonwealth is little consolation. For nearly 50 years, England has

depended on significant American aid. It is a kind of foreign unemployment program that many Englishmen take for granted, but which may soon lead to a bitter awakening in view of the difficulties of American industry as well as American trade.

For its part, Japan, the glittering trading power to the east, will also have its own problems to deal with if the U.S. market slips away from it alongside other markets. It is doubtful whether China can absorb all this, but the Chinese market offers the best opportunities for the Japanese.

It may be necessary for the EC to exclude England if it continues to come up with unnecessary difficulties every year - as, for example, in the matter of German beer. In any case, without American help, England becomes an unpredictable factor

Germany maintains excellent relations with France and Italy, the other two countries from Charlemagne's legacy. And it seems that trade exchange within the EC cannot be prevented. In any case, the inevitable decline of both the USA and the USSR will provide the appropriate framework for Germany's renewal and unity by its own efforts, as in the era of Bismarck, and not as a gift from another power.

At a historians' meeting in Illinois in 1955, I asked former Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg (1934-1938), who was then teaching at St. Louis Catholic University, how he, as the ultramontane opponent of Hitler's-1938 *of Austria* about a postwar "annexation" of Austria to the FRG-GDR. The former Austrian dictator thought for a while, then smilingly answered that he had no objections to it. Of course, under the terms of the Austrian Neutrality Treaty of 1955, such a development is out of the question, but Schuschnigg knew as well as anyone that the phrase that treaties must be honored (*pacta sunt servanda*) is subject to the formula that an agreement is valid only as long as the circumstances that led to it (*rebus sic stantibus*).

There is much to suggest that before the end of this century the three German territories mentioned above will be united. There are also reasons to believe that the present low birth rate in the Federal Republic, except that of foreign workers, will rise again just as it did in Vichy France under Petain from 1942. That Germany will regain its leading role by the 21st century,

given the decline of the USA and the USSR, seems inevitable. An irony of history may then lie in the fact that Israel will become dependent on German foreign aid. Germany might be willing to do so in return for Israel's willingness to give up some of its ambitious plans, namely, occupation of Syrian territory, control of Lebanon, the desire for Jerusalem as its capital, and the development of its own nuclear force. Germany would probably also be unwilling to allow Israel to trade in its foreign arms supplies

That a strong, reunited Germany would be a considerable peace factor in the modern world goes without saying. This role was played by both Bismarck and Wilhelm II in the Second Reich. Hitler, too, could have become such a stabilizing peace factor if England had allowed it (before World War II) or if he had won a quick peace (victory over the Russians in 1941 and no Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor). There are enough reasons to believe that the world will get used to Germany's new role (which, by the way, has been Germany's traditional role since the Middle Ages) before the 21st century has progressed further. People will rub their eyes when they read the false and spiteful propaganda against Germany in World War I and World War II. Also, the treatment of Germany by the USA, the USSR and England will be seen as unbelievable.

Outlook

When one examines the history of Germany in the first half of the 20th century in the context of world history, one is inevitably overcome by a feeling of satisfaction at the achievements made by Germany in what must be regarded as one of the most difficult periods in history for Germans and all other people. If there has been human misconduct, then each and every misconduct has been outweighed a hundredfold by personal bravery, heroism, sense of duty and selfless love for the German national community. The people who fought so well will one day rebuild Germany and lead it to new heights.

Helmut Sündermann (loc. cit.) was right in 1965 when he said that the strange world of the victors of the Second World War was somehow frozen.

His judgment is still to a large extent correct today. But Herbert Grabert (*Sieger und Besiegte*, loc. cit.) is also right when he points out that both victors and vanquished in this world are subject to the constant test of *clio*, as Fichte expressed so eloquently at the time of the Napoleonic occupation of Prussia. If one is patiently and wisely devoted to a cause, a victory can also arise again from a defeat. The time when yesterday's vanquished can free himself from the clutches of yesterday's victors is fast approaching. Isn't today's Germany far ahead of the 1945 oppressors in experience and ability?

It is now time for a new era in German history, but not an era based on the nihilistic notion of the "grace of zero". An era based on the German mainstream itself, from which it has been diverted by foreign interference.

Germany has much to give to the world in many areas. But this is still only possible if the Germans are allowed to decide their own destiny and also to enjoy the hope that can be derived from it.

A bankrupt America, like another Russia, will soon be ready for the occupying forces to withdraw from Central Europe. May this process be followed by a happy and prosperous reunification of Germany, which will then last forever this time.

Afterword of the publisher

The present work is the last of the great American historian David L. Hoggan. Shortly before his death, which suddenly called him away on August 7, 1988 after a busy life, he was able to finish it and send it to us for translation and publication.

After his important monographs on historical questions of the 20th century, especially on the causes and questions of guilt of the Second World War, Hoggan turned more to the philosophy of history in his last works and considered the events of our century in a larger overall view and in comparison with other epochs of European history. In doing so, he never lost sight of the central event of the 20th century: the crushing of the German Empire by the Anglo-Americans in both world wars.

From the wealth of his historical knowledge and personal questioning of many contemporary witnesses, Hoggan has compiled in this volume interesting thoughts and reflections on the German and European history of the last hundred years. As in all his books, he does not shy away from making well-founded judgments and expressing in all clarity where the actual threads to events were spun behind the scenes of world history.

His unwavering commitment to historical truth made him the founder of scientific revisionism after World War II. On the basis of his studies, he became a courageous defender of Germany in rejecting accusations of war guilt. Both contributed to the fact that he was often hostile, that his professional career was shattered, and that he had to make great personal sacrifices. Nevertheless, he was not deterred, but remained until his early end a herald of historical truth against the falsifications of war propaganda and re-educators in the U.S. as well as in Germany.

David L. Hoggan was born in Portland, Oregon, on March 22, 1923. He served in the U.S. Army during World War II and subsequently studied history. He received his doctorate from prestigious Harvard University in 1948 with a

dissertation on *collapse of German-Polish relations in 1939*. After briefly teaching at the famous Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Boston, he spent 1949 to 1952 as an assistant professor and member of the rector's staff at the Amerika-Institut at Munich University. Here he dealt more thoroughly with the German fate in our century and perfected his German language skills. He married a German woman. Even then he opposed the incipient obsession with guilt the Germans and tried to enlighten the academic youth about the real circumstances that led to the world wars.

In the following decade, Hoggan was a professor of history at American universities in Berkeley (California), Carthage (Illinois), and San Francisco, and later at Menlo College. Continuing his dissertation work, he produced his major work, *The Forced War. The Causes and Originators of World War 2*, - which was published by our publishing house in 1961 and is now in its 14th edition. With this book of about 900 pages, of which alone more than 50 pages indicated literature, Hoggan founded scientific revisionism and created its standard work, which is still valid after more than 30 years. Even *Der Spiegel* (13. 5. 1964) had to admit that it was equipped "with the most detailed list of sources ever added to a work about the outbreak of war in 1939". And the famous American historian Professor Harry Eimer Barnes wrote in 1962 (in Herbert Grabert, ed., *Im Kampf um die Wahrheit*, Tübingen 1962, p. 33): "Hoggan's work, now first published in German, is not only the first comprehensive, source-based account of the prehistory and causes of World War II, it will also remain for a long time the authoritative work in this field. It surpasses even the second volume of Prof. Fay's justly vaunted *Origins of the World War* knowledge and scholarship."

After the first approving reviews in the Federal Republic of Germany (e.g. *Die Welt* of February 3, 1962; *Deutsche Zeitung* of February 10, 1962), the West German media and many historians between Munich and Hamburg, caught up in the delusion of re-education, then fell upon Hoggan and his work as if in a coordinated chorus and tried to make it contemptible. *Der Spiegel* (18th volume, No. 20, May 13, 1964) even ran a 17-page cover story on Hoggan and his work, as well as an extensive interview with the historian.

Already one year after the publication of Hoggan's work, the Tübingen

contemporary historian Hans Rothfels sounded the alarm at the 25th Assembly of (West) German Historians in Duisburg in 1962 and complained: "It has become known from several small towns that Hoggan's book has been sent by a local notability to the school principal with a cover letter categorically demanding that it henceforth form the basis of the history lessons in the upper school. It is already in many a teacher's library." And since such things, of course, could not be torn down and tolerated - because otherwise the main justification of re-education would have been shaken too soon - in the sixties West German ministers of education even ordered that Hoggan's work be removed from school libraries - the modern way of burning by making undesirable books inaccessible to readers ex officio - and educators who pointed out Hoggan's work or recommended it to their students were disciplined

The public defamation of the historical researcher, who stood up for historical truth, reached a climax when he came to West Germany on a lecture tour in the spring of 1964. On this occasion, he was to receive the "Leopold Ranke Prize," endowed with 10,000 DM, from the "Society for the Promotion of Historical Research" in Düsseldorf in the Knights' Hall of Burg Castle on the Wupper for his services to contemporary historical relief of Germany. Under political pressure, however, the castle administration withdrew its promise to provide the hall at short notice, so that the award ceremony had to take place in the inn "In der Straßen" in the town of Burg. The German Federation of Trade Unions had organized demonstrations in Burg against the American friend of the Germans.

The "Ulrich von Hutten Prize" of the "Gesellschaft für Freie Publizistik" (GFP), endowed with 5000 DM, was to be presented to the American on May 9, 1964 in the Königssaal of Heidelberg Castle in a festive setting. After the protest of some young historians from Heidelberg, who declared: "Hoggan's book is ... worthless for contemporary historical research," the North Baden district president Munzinger refused to rent the hall, so that the chairman of the GFP, the publisher Curt Vowinkel, had to move the event at short notice to a Neckar ship, on board of which the U.S. historian then gave his lecture on the river between Heidelberg and Neckargemünd and was able to receive the prize.

Under its president Dr. Herbert Böhme, the "Deutsches Kulturwerk europäischer Geistes" had rented the Herkules Hall of the Munich Residenz in order to honor Hoggan there after his lecture with the presentation of a "Candelabrum for Historical Truth". However, the responsible Bavarian Palace Department then revoked the agreement that had been made. After the Munich "Künstler-Haus" also refused a hall for political reasons, the event finally took place in the large hall of the Hacker Keller on Theresienhöhe. Each time, a corresponding smear campaign ran in the regional press against Hoggan and his work.

The Düsseldorf Rhine-Ruhr Club had also invited the American professor to give a lecture. However, when an inquiry to the Bonn Ministry of the Interior revealed that it was opposed to Hoggan and did not want his discharge from Germany, the respected club, which was otherwise so proud of its liberal tradition, immediately fell over and withdrew its invitation to the scientist. The otherwise so cosmopolitan Park Hotel in Düsseldorf did not even allow Hoggan to hold a press conference in its rooms, where he wanted to answer questions from media representatives. In this way, all West German "democrats" were quite united in their intolerance of the foreign historical researcher, including the then Federal Minister of the Interior, Höcherl, who spoke out against Hoggan in the Bundestag in response to an SPD question.

It was equally significant that for decades no publisher in the USA or Great Britain could be found to publish the original English edition. Several occasions, negotiations broke down after print commitments had already been made, when the publishers in question subjected such political and economic pressure from various sides that they had to withdraw from the project, as was the case with the Devin publishing house in New York which had planned to publish the work in the fall of 1964 under the title "When peaceful Revision failed. The Origins of World War II." not until 1989 that the English-language edition appeared under the title *The forced War. When peaceful Revision failed, published by the* Institute for Historical Review in Costa Mesa, California.

The whole absurdity of the conditions in West Germany in the field of

contemporary history research and its historiography becomes clear if one compares these events around Professor Hoggan of 1964 with the revisionist efforts in the Weimar Republic after the First World War. When at that time in 1926-27 the American historian Professor Harry Elmer Barnes, later a friend of Hoggan, came to Germany and after corresponding publications (among others, *Genesis of World War*, 1926; German edition: *Die Entstehung des Weltkrieges. An Introduction to the War Guilt Problem*, 1928) lectured here to refute the recognition of sole war guilt for World War I extorted from the Germans in Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, the acting Reich President Paul von Hindenburg sent his aide-de-camp to meet him at the reception. Barnes then spoke to an enthusiastic German audience of university professors and students in the Auditorium Maximum of major German universities, such as Berlin and Munich, was also celebrated in the media for supporting the Germans in their justified rejection of the war guilt charge, and received public honors.

David L. Hoggan wrote further works in the following years, which were also initially published in West Germany by our publishing house, such as *France's Resistance to the Second World War* in 1963; *The Unnecessary War* appeared in 1976 (2nd edition already in 1977). Hoggan presented an overall view of the last two centuries in his two-volume work *The Blind Century*, Part 1 of which, *America - the Messianic Calamity*, appeared in 1979, while Part 2, - *Europe - the Lost World Center* came out in 1984. In the U.S., publications included *The Myth of the >New History* (New York 1965, 2nd edition Los Angeles 1985) and *Falsehood in Peacetime. The Genocide of Mirage* (Los Angeles 1969). Hoggan dealt with the question of the mass exterminations in the East, which the Germans were accused of, as early as 1969 in the book *The Myth of the Six Millions* (Los Angeles 1969).

In numerous articles, also in our quarterly journal *Deutschland in Geschichte und Gegenwart* as in its predecessor, the *Deutsche Hochschullehrer-Zeitung*, Hoggan has furthermore commented on problems of contemporary history. With all this he has not only made a name for himself as a pioneer of scientific revisionism in contemporary history research, but has also rendered outstanding services to the honor of the German people.

Because of his unvarnished presentation of the reasons and backgrounds that led to World War II, especially the incessant warmongering of U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in the 1930s, Hoggan was then systematically expelled from American universities by influential groups. His teaching and research contracts were not renewed, so that the highly qualified scientist eventually found no suitable employment and fell into economic hardship. But in spite of all the obstacles that were put in his way, and in spite of all the hostility, he did not deviate from the path of a historian guided solely by the ethos of the scientist, and remained true to his duty as a historian striving for objectivity. He not only renounced the applause of the general public but also sacrificed his career because he did not want to follow the spirit of the times like most others. He took it upon himself to live in insecure and cramped conditions because he did not want to betray the principles of his science.

Hoggan could still experience how revisionism slowly began to assert itself, even how - for example in the West German "Historikerstreit" (Historians' Controversy) 1986 onwards - the general call of the specialist scholars for "revision" of the previous far too one-sided and - truth-distorting historical picture of the re-educators set in. Even before that, there had been rehabilitation for him from West German academic circles when in number 22 of the respected professional journal *Der Staat* (1983, pp. 107-123) the Bochum political scientist Professor Dr. Helmut Rumpf, who had distinguished himself through several books and professional articles, especially on the legal situation of Germany, wrote an article about the recent historiography on National Socialist foreign policy. In it, the scholar criticized that "authoritative and most influential works" previous West German contemporary history research "were written by political enemies, ideological opponents, and victims of the Hitler system, be they contemporaries, emigrants, or descendants," and that the general portrayal of the Third Reich period "was borne by all too understandable passions and hateful value judgments," so that it "deprived itself of success by prematurely introducing value judgments. Then Rumpf devoted a chapter of his remarks to David L. Hoggan and stated in it (see also DGG 83/4, p. 38):

"The book by the American historian David L. Hoggan, *Der erzwungene Krieg - die Ursachen und Urheber des Zweiten Weltkrieges* (1962, 11th ed. 1977), has played a unique role in the historiography of the origins of World War II: much less because of its justifiably controversial content than because of the outraged opposition it has found, especially and notably among German historianspolemic unleashed against this bookparadigmatically demonstrates the profound difference between the ideology and tendency of German historiographyafter the Second and after the First World

Whereas after World War I historical accounts of the origins of the war thatcounteredthesis of Germany'ssole guilt, such as the work of the American Sidney B. Fay, were gratefully welcomed and cited with praise, Hogganattempt to do so after World War II earnednothing but opprobrium and shame from German historians belonging to the guild. In 1962the *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte* had his book trashed by Gotthard Jasper, then a research assistant at the Institute for Political Science in Erlangen, along with A. J. P. Taylor's work on World War II, after Hans Rothfels had given the cue. Hermann Graml published an entire anti-Hoggan monograph at once, and Hans Adolf Jacobsendismissedhima footnotehis standard work*Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik 1933-1938* (1968) as >completely uselessand scientifically worthless<most prominent spokesman among the German authors whowelcomedHoggan's historiographical exoneration offensivealbeit with reservations, was probably Frank Thiess, author of novelistic works of history, who concluded his review in a major southwest German daily with the words: >Nevertheless ...we have Hoggan to thank for his work, and even the despisers of Hitler shouldnot deny their respect toan achievementaccomplishedwith scholarly care, rare nobility, and exemplary justice by an American for Germany.<

Re-read after 20 years, Hoggan will notdeniedrespect either for his extensive multilingual study of records (including Slavic languages) or for his pursuit of justiceHe has permanently tarnishedglowing image of British love of peace and selfless appeasement of the German dictatordemonstrating the cool wartime determination with whichBritish foreign policy from mid-1939 onward backed Polish nationalism against German Nazism in the

conflict over German Danzig Ultimately, British foreign policy was also power politics and had to become increasingly so if it wanted to put a stop to National Socialist expansion."

Hoggan was not only a herald of historical truth and a researcher of the past. He also followed current political events critically and was not afraid to predict developments for the future. In his letters and personal statements, as well as in several passages of this book, he expressed his firm confidence that the reunification of Germany was imminent - at a time when no one dared to hope for what then occurred in a few historic weeks in central Germany in the fall of 1989. He was also convinced sooner or later his beloved Germany would again play an important role internationally and would be generally recognized, while for various reasons he saw a black future for the Soviet Union as well as for his home country, the USA. Already two years after his death we can state that with his future prospects for Germany he correctly foresaw real development which at his time must have seemed completely unreal. In this, too, we would like to see a confirmation that Hoggan was a great historian whose gaze penetrated to the hidden causes and sources of history.

With David L. Hoggan, the German people have lost a great defender of their honor and a sincere friend. In the *Deutsche National-Zeitung und Soldaten-Zeitung* at the end of November 1963, Hoggan had declared about his position on Germany: "Looking very closely at the life of Germany in the 20th century, I can only say that if I were not born an American, I would like to be a national German and be very proud to belong to such a great, outstanding people."

He is still widely misunderstood, and the major mass media took no notice of his death, let alone dedicating a tribute or an honorary obituary to this man so deserving of Germany's future. But his work will outlast the petty hostilities of the guilt-obsessed German re-educators and prevail against the anti-scientific silence. May the present book, as his personal conclusion of his struggle for the historical truth, find attentive readers and reach wide circles also of the younger generation so that the falsification of the historical reality in the first half of our century, carried out for decades with all means, will

finally come to an end May it thus contribute to the spiritual recovery of our people, on which David L. Hoggan placed such great expectations.

Tübingen, June

17, 1990 Wigbert Grabert

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Poland's quest for territorial expansion

The goals of Polish national agitation at the end of the last century were unambiguous. The rebirth or resurrection of Poland, a new independent or autonomous Polish Empire, a Poland from sea to sea (i.e. from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea) were popular leitmotifs in the Polish press of the time. In their "Polenspiegel" Franz Wagner and Fritz Vosberg compiled a representative cross-section of these press opinions in 1908 (new edition Struckum 1989). The press opinion reproduced below is intended to document the general will to expand, which took on even more aggressive features in the 20th century, up to the outbreak of World War II (see Werner Fuchs, "Selbstzeugnisse polnischen Eroberungswillens," Struckum 1988):

Przegłond W, No. 1 of January 1899

The preservation of the eastern provinces, where the Polish population resides, is of the greatest interest to the Prussian monarchy, it is a vital question for it. A powerful state cannot reconcile itself to the possibility, even in the distant future, of losing an important part of the country with about 7 million inhabitants, including more than 3 million Germans. The moment when the Polish national movement spread to the masses of the people and spread over apparently long Germanized provinces, when the national consciousness awoke on the whole second and broad line from Mysłowitz to Putzig, the Prussian policy had to set itself two goals; the Germanization of the Polish population within the borders of Prussia and the prevention of the foundation of an independent Polish state, in general of the settlement of the relationship of the Poles with Russia. It has turned out that the Polish population is increasing faster than the German one and that the power of the Polish people is growing not only numerically but also in cultural-political and economic terms; the Polish element is in every respect stronger in Prussia now than it was 30 or even 50 years ago (sic!) not only stopped the progress of Germanism in the Eastern Marches, but has also begun to regain the lost positions, to conquer (sic!) whole parts of the country, such as Upper Silesia and Prussian Masovia. It has even come forward aggressively (sic!) in the field of economic relations by forming Polish workers' settlements in the capital of Prussia and Germany ... The Prussian policy has got into a situation of no way out towards the Polish population. It cannot secure possession of

the eastern provinces by making concessions to Poles, for if it were to win over even the local Polish population, it would not stop the natural aspiration of our national policy, namely, the unification of all formerly Polish parts of the country. Prussia, or even Germany, cannot voluntarily renounce the eastern provinces, not only with regard to the 3 million Germans residing there, but even more with regard to its territorial position. The loss of these territories would be a death blow to the power of Germany ... The Polish question has not only for Prussia, but also for the whole united German Reich the character as we described it above. A policy whose quintessence is the Hakatist program has zealous supporters in Saxony, Bavaria, and on the Rhine. We must therefore wage a struggle not only with Prussia, but also with the whole of Germany, not with individual parties, but with the whole of German society, a struggle to the death. The vital interest of both nations comes into consideration here, the struggle is waged for our national future and for that of German power ..Germany cannot entertain the thought of losing the eastern territories of the Prussian Monarchy with a German population of several million, and since she knows well that if the decision were left to the natural development of things, it would in the future give victory to the Poles, she must strive by all means, *per fas et nefas*, to weaken Polishness or at least to preserve a certain national equilibrium. From this point of view, German policy is a defensive one (sic!), although it makes use of aggressive means ... Germans are not suppressed in the Ostmarken, but they are threatened in what they possess on the basis of the annexation. We are all the more pleased to note this defensive character of German policy, since in politics as well as in armed combat, the one who defends himself usually loses ...

The preservation of the national weight in the Prussian part would be tantamount to the halting of our development, because everything that develops must grow. Our political activity, therefore, must create conditions not only securing, but also accelerating the growth (them!) of the Polish element, but the struggle, which is waged on our western borders, is not a matter of one part, but of the whole nation. "Poor is Poland without Poznan." Poor indeed would be the future Poland for which we live and act, the Poland which we certainly will not live to see, but which our children and grandchildren will see - not only without Poznan, but also without Silesia (sic!), without access to the sea, that is, without Danzig and Königsberg (sic!) ... We are forming a force which is growing and which represents a real danger to the power of the German state, if not now, then certainly for the future. We must avoid such types of struggle in which

numerical superiority and state organization secure victory We must therefore proceed for our national cause on legal ground, within the framework of the Prussian and German constitutions, as long as this is possible (!). The provinces now belonging to Prussia are a necessary condition for the coming into being of the Polish Empire, just as they are today the main condition for the preservation of German-Prussian power. There can be no question of a compromise in this matter. We must not repeat it at every opportunity, but firmly and always believe that Poland cannot exist without these parts of the country, that even if it were to come into existence in other borders have to take steps to regain these provinces (sic!)

The 14 points of Wilson

(Congressional Message of January 8, 1918)

We have entered this war because violations of rights have occurred which touched our lifeblood and would make the life of our own people impossible if they were not stopped and the world secured once and for all against their recurrence. What we are asking for in this war, then, is nothing special to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe for the life of man; and especially that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like ours, desires to live its own life, to determine its own institutions, to be assured of justice and civility on the part of the other peoples of the world, as opposed to violence and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in reality sharers in this interest, and we, for our own part, see very clearly that if justice is not done to others, it will not be done to us.

The program of world peace, therefore, is our program, and this program, the only possible program in our opinion, is this:

I. Open peace treaties, openly reached, according to which there should be no more private agreements of any kind, but only diplomacy, which always proceeds frankly and in the face of publicity.

II. Complete freedom of navigation on the seas outside territorial waters, equally in peace and in war, except when the seas are wholly or partially closed by virtue of international action for the implementation of international alliances.

III. The greatest possible elimination of all economic barriers and the establishment of equality of terms of trade among all those nations which consent to peace and ally themselves to its maintenance.

IV. Reasonable assurances, given and received, national armaments will be reduced to the lowest level consistent with homeland security

V Free, frank, and wholly impartial disposition of all colonial claims, founded on strict adherence to the principle that in deciding all such questions of suzerainty the interests of the populations involved must have just as much weight as the equitable claims of the government whose legal title is to be decided.

VI. evacuation of all Russian territory, and such settlement of all questions touching Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world, so as to give her an uninhibited and unencumbered opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and to assure her a sincere

welcome into the society of free nations under self-chosen institutions of state; and more than a welcome, also succor of every kind which she may need and herself desire The treatment to be accorded Russia on the part of her sister nations in the coming months is the acid test of their good will, of their understanding of her needs as distinct from her interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be cleared and restored without any attempt to limit the supremacy which she has in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this one will serve to restore confidence among nations in those laws which they themselves have established and fixed for the conduct of their relations with each other. Without this healing act, the whole structure and validity of international law will be forever impaired.

VIII. All French territory is to be released and the parts into which an incursion has taken place restored, and the injustice done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has endangered the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, is to be rectified in order to secure peace again in the interest of all.

IX. A rectification of Italy's borders is to be accomplished along precisely identifiable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among nations we wish to see protected and secured, shall be granted the freest opportunity of independent development.

XI. Romania, Serbia and Montenegro should be cleared, occupied territories returned; Serbia should be granted free and safe access to the sea, and the relations of the various Balkan states with each other should be settled through friendly negotiations along existing historical lines of affiliation and nationality; and international guarantees of political and economic independence and territorial inviolability of the various Balkan states should be established

XII. Turkish parts of the present Ottoman Empire should be guaranteed a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities, which are at present under Turkish rule, should be guaranteed undisputed security of life and a thoroughly undisturbed opportunity for independent development and the Dardanelles should be opened permanently under international guarantees as a free passage for the ships and trade of all nations

XIII. independent Polish state shall be established, encompassing the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, to which free and safe access to the sea guaranteed, and whose political and economic

independence and territorial inviolability guaranteed by an international covenant

XIV. A general union of nations must be formed with special federal treaties for the purpose of granting mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial inviolability to large and small states alike.

We have certainly spoken in terms too clear for any doubt or question to remain. One clearly evident principle runs through the whole program I have outlined. It is the principle of justice for all peoples and nationalities and their right to live together under equal conditions of freedom and security, whether they are strong or weak. Unless this principle is made the foundation, no part of the edifice of international justice can stand. The people of the United States could act on no other principle; and for the vindication of that principle they are willing to lay down their lives, their honor, and all that they possess. This greatest and last of all wars for human liberty has now reached its moral climax, and our people are prepared to stand the test of their own strength, their own highest aims, their own probity and devotion.

Roosevelt's Chicago Speech on October 5, 1937.

I am pleased to have been able to come to Chicago once again, and especially to have another opportunity to participate in the dedication of such an important charitable work.

In my travels across the continent, I have seen much evidence of what reasonable cooperation between local authorities and the federal government can accomplish. Tens of thousands of Americans have greeted me and made me understand with every look and word that in the last few years their material and spiritual well-being has made great strides

But when I saw with my own eyes the flourishing farms, the splendid factories, and the bustling railroad traffic, when I saw the happiness and security and peace that prevail in our great country, I was almost inevitably compelled to compare our peaceful conditions with quite different scenes that take place in other parts of the world.

Since the people of the United States, in the present circumstances, in the interest of their own future, must also think of the rest of the world, I, as the responsible Chief Executive, have chosen this great city in the center of the country and this solemn occasion to speak on a subject which is essential to ourselves.

political situation in the world has worsened more and is now capable of instilling serious concerns and fears in all those peoples and countries who wish to live in

peace and harmony with their neighbors

Some fifteen years ago, when over sixteen nations solemnly pledged never again to take up arms in furtherance of their national and political aims, the hopes of mankind for a lasting era of peace rose to the highest heights. The high expectations embodied in the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the hopes for peace aroused by that pact have recently given way to a creeping fear of coming catastrophe. The regime of violence and international lawlessness we encounter today actually began only a few years ago.

It began with unjustified interference in the internal affairs of other peoples or occupation of foreign territory in violation of existing treaties, and now a stage has been reached when the very foundations of civilization are seriously threatened. The landmarks and traditions that marked the development of civilization toward lawfulness, order and justice are gradually being shattered.

Without any declaration of war, without any warning, without any justification, the civilian population, including women and children, is ruthlessly murdered by aerial bombardment. In so-called peacetimes ships are attacked by submarines without cause or warning. Peoples foment civil war - and take sides - in foreign lands that have never harmed them. Peoples who demand freedom for themselves deny it to others.

Innocent peoples and countries are cruelly sacrificed for a greed for power and a desire for domination that know no sense of justice and no human considerations.

As one writer wrote the other day, "Perhaps we are approaching a time when men, reveling in the technique of murder, will rush upon the world with such frenzy that all precious things will be in danger, every book, every picture, every harmony, all the treasures accumulated under two millennia, everything small, everything delicate, everything defenseless - that everything will be lost, destroyed, or utterly obliterated."

If something like this happens in other parts of the world, let no one imagine that America will escape, that it can expect pardon, that the Western Hemisphere has no attack to fear, that it can continue to preserve quietly and peacefully the traditions of morality and civilization.

When that day comes, "there will be no security to be expected from arms, no help from authorities, no response from science. The storm will rage until all the blossoms of culture have been beaten to the ground and all human beings have been dissolved into immense chaos".

If that day is not to come - if we are to have a world in which we can breathe freely and live in harmony, without fear - then the peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort to uphold the laws and principles that are the only sure foundations of peace.

Peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort to take a stand against these breaches of treaty and this contempt for human feelings that create a state of

international anarchy and insecurity that cannot be escaped simply by isolation or neutrality.

All those who love their freedom and also grant their neighbors the right to be free and live in peace must work together for the victory of law and morality, so that peace, justice and confidence prevail in the world. It must be restored that people believe in the given word and in the value of a signed treaty. It must be considered a fact that moral conduct is as important for a nation as it is for the individual.

The other day a bishop wrote me the following: "I think it is very necessary for someone to protest in the name of the simplest humanity against the latest method of subjecting the civilian population, especially women and children, to the horrors of war. Perhaps many who call themselves realists will consider such a protest futile. But are not the hearts of the people perhaps so filled with horror at these superfluous sufferings that this inner strength could be mobilized in sufficient measure to mitigate such atrocities in the future? Though, God forbid, it may be twenty years before the united protest of the civilized world against this barbarity asserts itself, surely powerful voices can bring the day nearer"

In the modern world there exists, both technically and morally, an inevitable solidarity and interdependence which do not allow any nation to isolate itself completely from the economic and political upheavals in the rest of the world, especially when these upheavals do not appear to be going to sleep but are continuing. Neither within a country nor between countries can stability and peace prevail unless everyone subscribes to the same laws and moral guidelines. International anarchy destroys the foundations of peace, endangers the immediate or future security of any nation, large or small. Therefore, it is vital for the American people to regain respect for international treaties and to preserve international morality.

The peoples and countries of the world in their vast majority want to live in peace. They want to see the barriers to trade removed. They want to concentrate their efforts in industry, agriculture, and business on the manufacture of products that will increase prosperity and thus the national wealth - instead of striving for the production of weapons, war planes, bombs, machine guns, and cannons that have only one purpose, the destruction of human life and useful property.

In the countries that cannot do enough in their rearmament efforts because they are dealing with attack plans, and likewise in the other countries that fear an attack on their borders and on their security, a large part of the national income is used directly for armament purposes, between thirty and fifty percent.

For us in the United States, the percentage is a much lower one - eleven or twelve.

How fortunate we must consider ourselves that the present circumstances allow us to use our money for the construction of bridges and roads, for the building of dams, for reforestation, for soil melioration, and for many other useful works, instead of creating enormous standing armies and vast war supplies.

But we are forced to look to the future. Peace, freedom and security for ninety percent of the world's population are threatened by the remaining ten percent who are on the verge of dismantling the entire international legal order. The ninety percent who want to live in peace, in accordance with laws and moral principles that have become almost universal over the centuries, can and must find a way to impose their will.

The problems we are dealing with today are undoubtedly of a universal nature. This is not just a matter of violations of individual provisions in specific treaties; this is a matter of war and peace, of international law, and especially of the principles of humanity. Admittedly, clear breaches of treaties have occurred, especially as far as the provisions of the League of Nations, the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty are concerned. But at the same time there are problems of the world economy, of general security and of humanity.

Of course, the world's conscience must understand how important it is to eliminate injustice and to give way to well-founded complaints. At the same time, however, the world's conscience must be awakened to the outrageous need to protect the sanctity of treaties, to respect the rights and freedoms of others, and to put an end to all acts of aggression.

Unfortunately, it seems to be true that the epidemic of general lawlessness is becoming more and more widespread.

When a contagious disease begins to spread, the community prescribes isolation of patients to protect their own health from the epidemic.

I am determined to pursue a policy of peace and to use all available means to keep war away from us. It should really be inconceivable that in this modern world and in view of all past experience a nation could be so foolish and reckless as to create the danger of a general world war by invading and occupying, in defiance of all treaties, the territory of other peoples who have actually done nothing to it and who are too weak to protect themselves adequately. But this is precisely what today threatens world peace and the prosperity and security of every single country.

A nation that refuses to be lenient and respect the freedom and rights of other nations cannot maintain its strength in the long run and enjoy the trust and respect of others. No nation forgives itself or harms its own position if it is willing to settle all difficulties amicably, if it shows great patience and respects the rights of other nations.

War - whether declared or not - is contagious. It can engulf states and peoples far removed from the original theater of war. We are determined not to get involved in war, but there is no effective insurance against the devastating effects of war and against the risk of being drawn into it. We are taking all measures appropriate to minimize our risk, but in a confused world where trust and security have collapsed, there can be no complete protection.

If civilization is to live on, the principles of the Prince of Peace must be restored.

The shaken trust between people and people must be brought back to life.

And most important of all, the will for peace of peace-loving peoples must be so clearly manifested that those nations tempted to break their treaties and violate the rights of others will desist from their plans. Positive efforts are necessary to preserve peace.

America abhors war. America hopes for peace. Therefore, America is making every effort to cooperate in the cause of peace.

(From: *Roosevelt Speaks. The President's War Speeches.* Stockholm 1945)

Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938

Agreement
between Germany, the United Kingdom, France and
Italy
met in Munich, September 29, 1938

Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, taking into account the agreement already reached in principle with respect to the cession of the Sudeten German territory, have agreed upon the following terms and conditions of such cession and upon the measures to be taken thereafter, and by this agreement declare themselves individually responsible for the steps necessary to secure its fulfillment.

1. The evacuation will begin on October 1.
2. The United Kingdom, France, and Italy agree that the evacuation of the area will be completed by October 10, without destruction of any existing facilities, and that the Czechoslovak Government will be responsible for carrying out the evacuation without damage to designated facilities
3. The details of the evacuation will be determined by an international committee composed of representatives of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Czechoslovakia.
4. The staged occupation of the predominantly German territory by German troops begins on October 1. The four sections of territory designated on the attached map will be occupied by German troops in the following order:

The area section designated I on October 1 and 2, the area section designated II on October 2 and 3, the area section designated III on October 3, 4 and 5, the area section designated IV 6 and 7

The remaining territory of a predominantly German character will be immediately determined by the above-mentioned international committee

and occupied by German troops by October 10.

5. The international committee referred to in § 3 will determine the areas in which a plebiscite is to be held. These areas be occupied by international formations until the conclusion of the plebiscite. The same committee will determine the modalities under which the plebiscite is to be held, taking the modalities of the Saar plebiscite as a basis. The Committee will also fix the date on which the plebiscite will take place: this date, however, must not be later than the end of November.

6. The final determination of the boundaries will be made by the International Committee. This Committee is authorized to recommend to the four Powers, Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, in certain exceptional cases, minor deviations from the strictly ethnographic determination of the zones to be transferred without referendum.

7. Provision is made for a right of option for transfer to and withdrawal from the ceded territories. The option must be exercised within six months from the date of conclusion of this Agreement. A German-Czechoslovak committee will determine the details of the option, consider procedures to facilitate the exchange of the population, and clarify fundamental questions arising from this exchange.

8. a period of four weeks from the date of the conclusion of this Agreement, the Czechoslovak Government will lift its military and police units from the Sudeten Germans who desire such release. Within the same period the Czechoslovak German prisoners serving prison sentences for political offenses

Munich, September 29, 1938

gez. Daladier, Mussolini, Hitler, Chamberlain

Churchill's Speech on the Munich Agreement

(Speech in the House of Commons, October 5, 1938)

... First of all, I want to say something that everyone does not want to take note of or forget, but which nevertheless must be stated: namely, that we have suffered a total defeat, not mitigated by anything and that in the process France has suffered even more than we have. The utmost that my very honorable friend the Prime Minister has been able to secure through all his tremendous efforts, through all the great efforts and mobilizations that have taken place in our country, and through all the anxiety and tension that we have gone through here, the utmost that he has been able to extract for Czechoslovakia in the matters under discussion, is that the German dictator,

instead of robbing the food from the table, is now content to have it served to him course by course.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer [Sir John Simon] said that this was the first time that Hitler had ever been made to retreat to any extent - those, I think, were his words. We really shouldn't waste any more time, after all these long discussions about the difference between the positions reached at Berchtesgaden, at Godesberg, and at Munich can be summed up - if you will allow me to vary the parable - in a few words: 1 pound was demanded at gunpoint. When it was handed over, two pounds were demanded at gunpoint. Finally the dictator agreed to take 1 pound, 17 shillings and 6 pence, and the rest in assurances of good intentions for the future.

Now I come to the matter to which I have just been reminded from a point in the House: saving the peace. No one has more determined, uncompromising champion of peace than the Prime Minister. Everyone knows that. Never has there been such passionate and bold determination to preserve and secure peace. That is absolutely true. Nevertheless, I am not clear why at this critical moment the danger that England and France might become involved in a war with Germany was so great, when in fact these countries were prepared throughout to sacrifice Czechoslovakia. The conditions which the Prime Minister brought home could, I believe, with ease have agreed upon at any time during the past summer through ordinary diplomatic channels. And I will say only this: I believe that if the Czechs had been left to themselves and told that they could expect no help from the Western powers, they would have been able to obtain better terms than they have now obtained after all the terrible turmoil; they could hardly have been worse.

These examples [Czechoslovakia, Danube states, Poland] are typical. You will see day after day, week after week, a complete alienation of these areas. Many of these countries, fearing the rise of Nazi power, already have pro-German politicians, ministers and governments; but there was always in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia a powerful popular movement looking toward the Western democracies, hating the idea of arbitrary rule imposed on them by a totalitarian system, and hoping that resistance be made. All that has gone overboard. We are talking about countries that are far away. But what will be, I ask, the situation of France and England this year and next? What will be the situation on the western frontier, of which we are the declared guarantors? The German army is at present stronger in numbers than the French, though by no means so well developed and accomplished

Next year it will be much larger and much better developed. Freed from all cares in the East, in safe possession of sources of aid which will substantially lessen, if not entirely eliminate, the horrors of a naval blockade, the rulers of Germany will be faced with a free choice in which direction to turn. Should the Nazi dictator make up his mind to turn westward, which may easily happen, France and England will have to regret very bitterly the loss of this excellent army of old Bohemia, of which it was estimated last week that at least thirty German divisions would be required for its destruction.

Can we close our eyes to the great change that has occurred in our military situation, can we close our eyes to the great dangers that threaten us? We are, I believe, about to add four battalions to the British Army in the course of four years. No less than two of them have already been raised. And there are now at least thirty divisions to be charged to the French front now, besides the twelve divisions captured when Austria was devoured. Many people think, doubtless in good faith, that they have merely surrendered the interests of Czechoslovakia while I fear have to convince ourselves we have seriously impaired and perhaps mortally endangered security, even the independence, Great Britain and France. It is not merely a question of surrendering the German colonies, as we shall certainly be asked to do. Nor is it merely a question of our losing influence in Europe. More than that is at stake. One must consider the character of the Nazi movement and the form of rule it implies. The Prime Minister cherishes the desire for friendly relations between our country and Germany. There are no difficulties at all for friendly relations between the peoples. Our hearts go out to the German people. But the people is powerless. However, there can never be friendship with the present German government. We must maintain diplomatic and correct relations with it; but never can there be friendship between British democracy and the Nazi power, that power which tramples Christian ethics under foot, intoxicates itself on its advance with a barbarous paganism, boasts of its lust for aggression and conquest, draws strength and perverse pleasure from persecutions, and, as we have seen, use of the threat of murderous violence with pitiless brutality. Never can this power be a reliable friend of English democracy.

I find intolerable the thought that our country might fall into the power, into the sphere of influence, of Nazi Germany, that our existence should depend on its good will or its discretion. To prevent this, I have tried my utmost to urge the preservation of every bulwark of defense: first, the timely creation of an air force superior to any other within the range of our shores; second, the gathering of the collective strength of many nations; third, the

conclusion of alliances and military agreements, all within the framework of the League of Nations statutes, in order thereby to gather forces which might at least put a barrier to the upward development of this power. All was in vain. One position after another was undermined and abandoned under fine-sounding and apparently plausible excuses

We do not want to be led down a road that will make us a satellite of the Nazi German system of domination of Europe. In a few years, perhaps already in a few months, we face demands to which we will undoubtedly be invited to submit. These demands may concern the surrender of territories or the surrender of freedom. I foresee and predict that this policy of submission will involve restrictions on freedom of speech and discussion in Parliament and in public meetings, and restrictions on freedom of the press, for they will say - yes, I hear it now sometimes - we cannot allow the Nazi system of dictatorship to be criticized by ordinary English politicians. Then, after the press has been put under control, partly a direct one, but more effectively an indirect one, after every organ of public opinion has been poisoned and chloroformed to the point of docility, then we shall be led to further stages of our journey.

I have let my eyes wander to find what measures can be taken to protect us from the advance of Nazi power and to secure the life forms that are so dear to us. What is the only way open to us? The only way open to us is that we regain our old insular independence by achieving that superiority in the air which we have been promised, that security in our air defenses which we have been told we possess, and that we thus make our country an island again. With all the gloomy prospects, this shines out as the overwhelming fact. Immediately everything must be mustered to bring about an armament the like of which the world has never seen, and all the auxiliary forces of our country, all its united strength, must be made serviceable to this task. I read with great satisfaction that Lord Baldwin said in the House of Lords yesterday that he would begin the mobilization of industry tomorrow. But I think it would have been better by far if Lord Baldwin had said that two and a half years ago, when there was a general demand for the creation of a War Supply Department.

I would not spare my honorable friends sitting behind the government bench, whom I have to thank for the patience with which they have listened to what I have to say, the reproach that they bear the responsibility for all this; for if they had given the tenth part of the applause which you gave on the occasion of the price of Czechoslovakia to the small group of deputies

who were concerned about the timely initiation of our rearmament, we would not be in the situation in which we find ourselves today. The honorable Members on the other side of the House and those on the Liberal Party benches have no right to throw stones. I remember that for two years I was subjected not only to the disapproval of the Government, but also to their decided displeasure. Lord Baldwin has now given the signal, belated as it is; and the least we can do is to follow it.

Finally and at long last, it is no longer a secret what has been going on in the Air Force and in the mobilization of our air defenses. All this, as my honorable and brave friend, the Member for the Abbey District, said, has been perceived by thousands of people. You can form your own opinion about the character of the indications that the ministers have persisted in giving us on these matters. Who dares to claim today that we have achieved air parity with Germany? Who today claims that our air defenses are appropriately manned and armed? We know that the German General Staff is well informed about these matters; but the House of Commons has not hitherto taken seriously its duty to investigate and prosecute. The Home Secretary [Sir Samuel Hoare] said yesterday that he would welcome an inquiry. Much of what has been done does credit to the Government authorities. But as to the state of vital affairs we wish to be informed. I have called repeatedly during the last three years for a secret session in which these matters could be thoroughly gone over, or an inquiry by a special parliamentary committee, or some other method. I now demand that when we meet again in the fall, this be considered as a matter in which the Government takes Parliament into its confidence; for we have a right to know where we stand and what measures are being taken to secure our position.

By no means do I begrudge our loyal, brave people, who were ready to do their duty, whatever the cost, who never so much as batted an eye under the tension of the last week - I certainly do not begrudge them the natural, spontaneous outburst of joy and relief at the moment when they heard that they would not be further put to this severe test; but let them know the truth. Let it know that gross negligence and grave deficiencies exist in our defenses; let it know that we have suffered, without war, a defeat the consequences of which will be with us for a long distance; let it know that we have passed a terrible milestone in our history, with the whole European equilibrium upset, and that now the terrible judgment has been passed upon the Western democracies: "They have weighed you in a balance and found you too light." Do not think that this is the end. This is the beginning of the reckoning,

merely the first sip, the first foretaste of the bitter drink that will be set before us year after year, unless in a magnificent recovery of our moral health and martial strength we rise anew and stand boldly for liberty as in ancient times

(From Winston S. Churchill: Speeches 1938-1940, Europa-Verlag, Zurich 1946)

From Chamberlain's speech in Birmingham

March 17, 1939

It has been asserted that the occupation of Czechoslovakia was the direct result of my visit to Germany last fall; and since the result of these events was the rupture of the Munich agreements, this proves that the motives for those visits were mistaken in the first place. It is said that since this was the personal policy of the Prime Minister, the responsibility for the fate of Czechoslovakia must rest on his shoulders. This is a totally untenable inference ... Now I have never denied that the conditions I was able to secure in Munich were not those which I myself would have desired. But as I explained at the time, I was not dealing with a new problem. It was something that had always existed since the Treaty of Versailles, a problem that should have been solved long ago if only the statesmen of the last twenty years had had a more generous, comprehensive, and enlightened conception of their duty. It had become like a long-neglected evil, and surgical intervention became necessary to save the life of the patient ...

I really do not need to defend my trips to Germany last fall, because what was the alternative? Nothing we could have done, nothing France could have done, nothing Russia could have done, would have been able to save Czecho-Slovakia from invasion and annihilation. Even if we had subsequently gone to war to punish Germany for her action, and if we had been victorious in the end after the appalling losses inflicted on all the belligerents, we could never have restored Czecho-Slovakia as it had been shaped by the Treaty of Versailles .

But now we are faced with a completely different problem. According to the proclamation issued yesterday in Prague, Bohemia and Moravia have been annexed to the German Reich. Non-German inhabitants, which of course include the Czechs, will be subordinated to the German Protector in the German Protectorate. They have to submit to the political, military and economic needs of the Reich. They are called states with self-government, but the Reich takes over their foreign policy, their customs and excise duties, their bank reserves, and the equipment of the disarmed Czech army. And perhaps the

Eerie: we hear again of the emergence of the Gestapo, the secret state police, and of the familiar story of mass arrests of prominent personalities with the consequences with which we are all familiar ...

Who can prevent his heart from turning in sympathy to the proud and brave people who have so suddenly become a victim of this invasion, whose

freedoms have been curtailed and whose national independence is gone? What happened to the declaration of "no more territorial claims"? What has become of the assurance that "we do not want Czechs in the Reich"? How much consideration has been given to the principle of self-determination, about which Herr Hitler discussed so heatedly with me in Berchtesgaden, when he demanded separation of the Sudeten area from Czechoslovakia and its incorporation into the Reich?

Now we are told that this seizure of territory had become necessary because of unrest in Czecho-Slovakia ... If there was unrest, was it not fomented from outside? And can anyone outside Germany take seriously the idea that they were a danger to this great country?

Another set of questions must arise almost with necessity in ourselves and in others, and perhaps even in Germany itself. Germany, under her present regime, has given the world a series of unpleasant surprises. The Rhineland, the annexation of Austria, the separation of the Sudetenland - all these things excited and outraged the public opinion of the whole world. However, no matter how much we might object to the methods used in each of these cases, something could be said in favor of necessity of changing the existing situation.

But the things which have occurred this week in utter disregard of the principles laid down by the German Government itself seem to belong to a different category, and they must suggest to us all the question: "Is this the end of an old adventure, or is it the beginning of a new one?" "Is this the last attack on a small state, or is it to be followed by others?" "Is this even a step toward attempting to dominate the world by force?"

These are difficult and serious questions. I do not intend to answer them tonight ... Indeed, with the lessons of history in mind, it seems incredible that there could be such a challenge. I feel bound to repeat that while I am not prepared to bind our country by new obligations unspecified and operating under conditions not foreseeable, no greater mistake could be made than that of believing that our nation, because it considers war a senseless and cruel thing, has so lost its marrow will not face to the exhaustion of its strength such a challenge, should it ever come. For the Declaration I have, I am convinced, not only the support, sympathy, and confidence of my fellow citizens, but I shall have the approval of the whole British Empire and of all other nations who, while they prize peace highly, prize liberty still more highly.

(From: Jacques Benoist-Mechin, *Geschichte der deutschen Militärmacht 1918/1946*, 7: *Wollte Hitler den Krieg*, Oldenburg-Hamburg 1971)

The Atlantic Charter

In the summer of 1941, U.S. President F. D. Roosevelt increasingly pressed for his country's entry into the war. After having exchanged secret telegrams with Churchill for two years, Roosevelt, as president of the still neutral U.S., met with Churchill off Newfoundland on August 12, 1941, to discuss the U.S. entry into the war in person. As a result of the debate, the "Atlantic Charter" was announced to the public on August 14, 1941 containing general war aims and later unkept promises of peace

The text of the "Atlantic Charter" reads (after: Heinrich von Siegler, Dokumentation zur Deutschlandfrage, Bonn-Wien-Zürich, vol. 1, 2nd ed. 1970, pp. 2-3):

The President of the United States and Prime Minister Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom, met at sea.

They considered the dangers threatening world civilization from the policy of military rule based on conquest adopted by the Hitler Government of Germany and other governments allied with it; they further clarified the steps which their two countries intend to take for their security in view of these dangers. They agreed on the following joint declaration:

The President of the United States and Prime Minister Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom, after joint discussion, deem it proper to make known certain general principles of the national policy of their two countries, upon which they base their hopes for a better future for the world:

1. Their countries do not seek any territorial or other enlargement;
2. They do not wish to see territorial changes that are not in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;
3. They recognize the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they desire that sovereign rights and self-government be restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;
4. They will endeavor, with due regard to their existing obligations, to assist all States, great or small, victorious or vanquished, to have access on equal terms to the commerce or raw materials of the world necessary to their economic prosperity;
5. They wish to achieve fullest cooperation between all nations in the economic field with the aim of ensuring for all an elevated standard of work, economic progress and social security;

6 They hope that after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, a peace will be established which will enable all nations to live in safety within their own borders and which will guarantee that all people in all countries of the world can live their lives free from fear and want

7. Such peace should enable all people to cross the seas and oceans without hindrance;

8. They believe that for reasons both factual and ideal, all nations of the world must come to renounce use of force Since peace cannot be maintained in the future if nations which threaten or may threaten to attack outside their borders continue to maintain their land, sea, and air armaments, they believe that until a more comprehensive and lasting system of general security is established, the disarmament of such nations is essential They will likewise support and encourage all other feasible measures the crushing burden of armaments on peace-loving peoples

To this end, it was announced (Vertrags-Ploetz II, Bielefeld 1953, p. 385) that the Charter was not to benefit Germany. On September 24, 1941, at a meeting of the Inter-Allied Council in London, other Allies agreed to the "Atlantic Charter." On January 1, 1942, a number of other states backed the Atlantic Charter in a joint declaration. The declaration reads (after: Heinrich von Siegler, loc. cit., pp. 3-4):

Joint Declaration by the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland, South Africa, and Yugoslavia.

The 26 Governments signatory hereto having subscribed to a common program, the objectives and principles of which are set forth in the Joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of August 14 August, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter, and believing complete victory over their enemies is necessary for the defense of life, liberty, independence, and religious freedom, for the preservation of human rights and justice in their own as well as in other countries, and being at present engaged in a common struggle against savage, brutal forces which seek to subdue the world, they declare:

1. Each government undertakes to use all its military and economic forces against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with whom it

is at war

2. Each government pledges to cooperate with governments signed herein and not to make a separate armistice or peace with its enemies

This declaration may be joined by other nations that are or will be providing material aid and assistance in the struggle to defeat Hitlerism.

This declaration was joined in the following years (according to: Vertrags- Ploetz, loc. cit., p.386): Mexico, Philippines, Ethiopia, Iraq, Brazil, Bolivia, Iran, Colombia, Liberia, France, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Paraguay, Venezuela, Uruguay, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia. The contents of the "Atlantic Charter" were not intended to apply to Germany from the outset. In particular, Churchill declared 22. 2.1944 before the British House of Commons (after Churchill: Second World War IV, p. 318):

example, to apply the Atlantic Charter to Germany in the sense of a legal basis or to exclude territorial changes and border adjustments in the case of hostile countries. We will not accept any arguments put forward by Germany after the last war, claiming to have capitulated on the basis of Wilson's Fourteen Points

The Berlin Declaration of June 5, 1945

After the military surrender, the Reich government under Reich President Dönitz continued to operate in Flensburg-Mürwik. On May 10, 1945, an Allied commission in Mürwik established official contact with her and paid her military and protocol honors. On May 23, 1945, the Reich President and the Reich Government were arrested under dishonorable and degrading circumstances, imprisoned and prevented from continuing their work.

On June 5, 1945, the Allies officially took over the administration and governmental authority in all of Germany through the "Berlin Declaration" and established an Allied Control Council for this purpose. Reich President Dönitz protested against this measure from captivity and, referring to international law and the surrender made only for the military sphere, pointed out the legitimacy of his government, which was only prevented from exercising its office by the force of the victors

The German people were informed of the decisions taken on June 5, 1945, by "Proclamation No. 1" (Establishment of the Control Council) of August 30, 1945, and by "Proclamation No. 2" (Additional Demands Made on Germany) of September 20, 1945 (according to: Vertrags-Ploetz, Teil II, Bielefeld 1953, p. 407). The text of the "Berlin Declaration" reads (according to: Official Gazette of the Control Council in Germany, Supplement No. 1):

A. The Four-Power Declaration

Declaration in view of the defeat of Germany and the assumption of supreme governmental authority with respect to Germany by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and by the Provisional Government the French Republic

The German forces on land, sea and air have been completely defeated and have surrendered unconditionally, and Germany, responsible for the war, is no longer capable of resisting the will of the victorious powers. Thus the unconditional surrender of Germany has taken place, and Germany submits to all demands which may now or later be imposed upon her

There is no central government or authority in Germany capable of assuming responsibility for the maintenance of order, for the administration of the country, and for carrying out the demands of the victorious powers.

Under these circumstances it is necessary, without prejudice to subsequent decisions which may be taken with respect to Germany, to make arrangements for the cessation of further hostilities on the part of the German forces, for the maintenance of order in Germany, and for the administration of the country, and to proclaim the immediate demands with which Germany is obliged to comply.

The representatives of the Supreme Commanding Authority of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the French Republic, hereinafter: Allied Representatives, acting with the authority of their respective Governments and in the interest of the United Nations, accordingly make the following declaration

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic hereby assume supreme governmental authority in Germany, including all powers of the German Government, the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, and the governments, administrations, or agencies of the Länder, cities, and municipalities. The assumption for the purposes aforesaid of said governmental power and authority shall not effect the annexation of Germany.

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic will later determine the boundaries of Germany (and the legal status of Germany [according to Keesing's Archiv der Gegenwart, XVth Jahrgang 1945, Essen 1949, p. 257]) or of any territory which at present forms a part of German territory

By virtue of the supreme governmental power and authority thus assumed by four Governments the Allied Representatives proclaim the following demands arising from the complete defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany, with which Germany is bound to comply:

Article 1

Germany and all German authorities of the Army, Navy and Air Force and all forces under German command shall immediately cease hostilities against United Nations forces on land, sea and air in all theaters of war.

Article 2

a) All German or German-controlled armed forces, including land, antiaircraft and naval forces, the Schutzstaffeln, the Sturmabteilungen, the Secret State Police and all other units and auxiliary organizations equipped with weapons, wherever they may be located, will be completely disarmed by handing over weapons and equipment to the local Allied commanders or to officers to be named by the Allied representatives.

b) At the discretion of the Supreme Commander of the armed forces of the Allied State concerned, pending further decisions, the personnel of the formations and units of all the armed forces referred to in paragraph (a) shall be declared prisoners of war and shall be subject to such regulations and instructions as may be determined by the Allied representatives concerned.

c) All forces referred to in paragraph (a), wherever they may be located, shall remain at their respective posts pending instructions from the Allied representatives.

d) In accordance with instructions to be issued by the Allied Representatives, the said forces shall vacate all territory lying outside the German frontiers (as of December 31, 1937).

e) Civilian police detachments, to be equipped with hand weapons only for the purpose of maintaining peace and order and performing guard duty, shall be designated by the Allied Representatives.

Article 3

a) All military, naval, and civil aircraft of every type and nationality located in Germany and in territories and waters occupied or controlled by Germany will remain on the ground or on the water or on board until further orders are issued. Aircraft in Allied service are excepted.

b) All German or German-controlled aircraft which are on or over territory and waters outside the German area of power shall immediately proceed to Germany or to any other place to be designated by the Allied Representatives.

Article 4

a) All German and German-controlled surface and submarine warships, naval auxiliaries, merchant vessels, and other watercraft, wherever they may be at the time of the making of this declaration, and all other merchant vessels of any nationality in German ports, shall remain in or proceed immediately to such ports or bases as the Allied representatives may designate. The crews of the said vessels will remain on board until further instructions are given.

b) All ships and other vessels of the United Nations at the disposal of Germany or under the control of Germany at the time of the making of this Declaration shall

proceed to such ports or bases as shall be determined by the Allied Representatives, and at such times as shall also be determined by the Allied Representatives. It is immaterial whether the title has been transferred according to prison judicial or other procedures.

Article 5

a) All or any of the following items in the possession of German forces or under German command or at German disposal shall be kept intact and in good condition at the disposal of the Allied representatives and for the purposes, at the times, and in the places designated by the latter:

I. all arms, ammunition, explosives, implements of war, war supplies, and all other war materials of any kind;

II. All surface and submarine warships of any category, naval auxiliaries or merchant vessels, whether afloat, laid up for repair, or under construction

III. all aircraft of any type and all equipment and devices used for aviation and air defense;

IV. all facilities and objects of transport and communications on land, at sea and in the air

V. All military installations and facilities, including airfields, seaports, seaports of war, stockyards, permanent and temporary land and coastal fortifications, forts, and other fortified areas, and plans and drawings of all such fortifications, installations, and facilities;

VI. all factories, industrial plants, establishments, research institutes, laboratories, testing laboratories, technical documents, patents, plans, drawings, and inventions which are intended or suitable for the production of the objects and equipment designated under I., II., III., IV., V. above, or for promoting their production or use, or for supporting warfare in general

b) To be made available to Allied representatives upon request:

I. the labor, supplies, and operating facilities necessary to maintain or operate each of the six categories identified in (a) above; and

II. all information and documents which may be required in this connection by the Allied Representatives.

c) At the request of the Allied representatives, all means and facilities shall be provided for the transportation of Allied troops and services with their equipment and supplies on railroads, roads, and other land routes or by sea, waterways, and air. All means of transportation shall be maintained in good repair and the necessary labor, supplies, and operating facilities shall be provided for this purpose.

Article 6

a) The German authorities shall turn over to the Allied representatives, in accordance with a procedure to be prescribed by the latter, all members of the armed forces of the United Nations who are prisoners of war for the time being under their

control, and shall furnish complete lists of the names of such persons, indicating the places of their confinement in Germany or territories occupied. Pending the release of such prisoners of war, the German authorities and the German people shall protect their persons and property and provide them with sufficient food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and money in accordance with their rank or official position.

b) The German authorities and the German people shall in like manner care for and release all other members of the United Nations who are imprisoned, interned or subjected to any restrictions and all other persons who are imprisoned, interned or subjected to any other restrictions for political reasons or as a result of National Socialist acts, laws or orders discriminating as to race, color, creed or political opinion

c) The German authorities shall, at the request of the Allied Representatives, turn over command of places of confinement to officers to be designated for that purpose by the Allied Representatives.

Article 7

The relevant German authorities give the Allied representatives:

a) all information concerning the armed forces referred to in paragraph (a) of Article 2; in particular, they shall furnish forthwith all information required by the Allied Representatives concerning the numbers, position, and disposition of such forces, both within and without Germany;

b) complete and detailed information on mines, minefields, and other obstacles to movement by land, sea, and air, and on the safe passages associated with them. All such passages will be kept open and clearly marked; all mines, minefields, and other dangerous obstacles will be rendered harmless as far as possible; and all aids to navigation will be restored to service. Unarmed German military and civilian personnel with the necessary equipment will be made available and used for the above purposes and for the removal of mines, minefields, and other obstacles in accordance with the instructions of the Allied representatives.

Article 8

The destruction, removal, concealment, transfer, sinking, or damage of military, naval, aeronautical, naval, harbor, industrial, or similar property and installations of any kind, and of all records and archives wherever located, is prohibited. Exceptions may be ordered only by Allied representatives.

Article 9

Pending the bringing about of supervision of all means of communication by the Allied Representatives, all radio and long-distance communication facilities and other wire and wireless means of communication on land and water controlled by Germany shall cease to transmit; exceptions may be ordered only by the Allied Representatives.

Article 10

The armed forces, dependents, ships, and aircraft, and the military equipment and other property of any other State in a state of war with any of the Allies, located in Germany, controlled by Germany, and in German service or at German disposal, shall be subject to the provisions of this Declaration and to all proclamations, orders, commands, or instructions which may be issued pursuant thereto.

Article 11

a) The principal Nazi leaders named by the Allied Representatives and all persons named from time to time by the Allied Representatives or described by rank, office or position as being suspected of having committed, ordered or aided and abetted war or similar crimes shall be arrested and turned over to the Allied Representatives.

b) The same shall apply to all those members of any of the United Nations who are alleged to have acted contrary to the laws of their country, and who may at any time be named or described by rank, office, or position by the Allied Representatives.

Article 12

The Allied representatives will station forces and civilian agencies in any part or even all parts of Germany as they see fit.

Article 13

a) In the exercise of supreme governmental authority in Germany, assumed by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and by the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the four Allied Governments will take such measures as they deem necessary for future peace and security complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany

b) The Allied Representatives will impose upon Germany additional political, administrative, economic, financial, military, and other demands resulting from the complete defeat of Germany. The Allied Representatives, or the persons or departments duly authorized thereto, will issue proclamations, orders, decrees, and instructions to establish such additional demands and to carry out the other provisions of this Declaration. All German authorities and the German people shall unconditionally comply with the demands of the Allied Representatives and shall fully obey all such proclamations, orders, decrees and instructions.

Article 14

This declaration shall come into force and effect on the day and at the hour hereinafter specified. In the event of failure on the part of the German authorities or the German people to comply punctually and fully with their obligations herein or hereafter imposed, the Allied representatives shall take such measures as they may

deem expedient.

Article 15

This declaration is drawn up in English, Russian, French and German. The English, Russian and French versions are solely authoritative.

Berlin, June 5, 1945

18.00 Central European Time.

B. Establishment of the Control Council

Statement by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Provisional Government of the French Republic on the Control Procedure in Germany of June 5, 1945

1. During the period when Germany is fulfilling the basic demands resulting from the unconditional surrender, supreme authority in Germany will be exercised by the Commanders-in-Chief of Great Britain, the United States, Soviet Russia, and France on instructions from their Governments, each in his own zone of occupation and jointly in all matters affecting Germany as a whole. The four Commanders-in-Chief together constitute the Control Council. Each Commander-in-Chief is assisted by a political adviser.

2. The Control Council, whose decisions must be unanimous, shall provide for adequate uniformity of action by the individual Commanders-in-Chief in their respective zones of occupation and shall take decisions by mutual agreement on all essential questions affecting Germany as a whole.

3. Operating under the Control Council are a Standing Coordinating Committee, composed of a representative of each of the four Commanders-in-Chief, and a Control Staff, consisting of the following departments (subject to change based on practical experience): Army, Navy, Air, Transportation, Political, Economic, Financial, Reparations and Reimbursement, Internal Affairs and Intelligence, Legal Prisoners of War and Forced Trafficked, Labor Each department has four heads, one appointed by each of the four powers Departmental staffs may consist of both civilian and military personnel and, in special cases, may include members of other United Nations appointed in a personal capacity.

4. The functions of the Coordinating Committee as well as the Control Staff are to advise the Control Council, to carry out its decisions and forward them to the appropriate German authorities, and to supervise and control the day-to-day activities of these authorities.

5. Liaison with the other principal interested Governments of the United Nations shall be established by the appointment by those Governments of military missions (which may include civilians) to the Control Council. These missions shall have access to the controlling agencies through the appropriate official channels.

6. Organizations of the United Nations, if authorized by the Control Council in

Germany, shall be subordinate to and responsible to the Allied Control Apparatus.

7. The administration of the Greater Berlin area is headed by an Inter-Allied Authority, which operates under the direction of the Control Council and is composed of four commanders, each of whom acts in turn as chief commander. They are assisted by a staff of clerks who supervise and control the activities of the local German authorities.

8. The arrangement set forth above shall apply to the period of occupation following the German surrender, within which Germany shall fulfill the basic requirements resulting from the unconditional surrender. A regulation for the subsequent period will be the subject of a special agreement.

C. Establishment of the occupation zones

Determination on the part of the Government of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Provisional Government of the French Republic concerning the zones of occupation in Germany of June 5, 1945

1. Germany shall be divided for occupation purposes into four zones within its boundaries as they existed on December 31, 1937, one to be assigned to each of the four Powers as follows:

- an eastern zone of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;
- a northwestern zone to the United Kingdom;
- a southwestern zone to the United States of America;
- a western zone France.

The occupation forces in each zone shall be under the command of a commander-in-chief to be designated by the responsible power. Each of the four Powers may, at its discretion, occupation forces under the command of its Commander auxiliary units from the forces of any other Allied Power which has been actively engaged in military operations against Germany

2. The territory of Greater Berlin is occupied by troops of each of the four powers. For the purpose of jointly directing the administration of this territory, an Interallied Authority (Russian Kommandantura) will be established, consisting of four commanders appointed by the respective Commanders-in-Chief.

D. Determination by the Governments of the United Kingdom, United States of America, the USSR and the Provisional Government of the French Republic of consultations with the Governments of other United Nations

By the decision concerning the defeat of Germany, executed at Berlin on June 5, 1945, the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States, and the French Republic assumed supreme authority in Germany. The Governments of the Four Powers hereby declare that they intend to consult the Governments of other

United Nations concerning the exercise of this authority.

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Scanner corrections 035: deutsche - german
077: equipped - equipped
093: ultimately - ultimately
109: österreichischen - österreichischen
137: German losses - German losses
141: Putzi Hanfstängl, the - Putzi Hanfstängl, the
152: verpflichtet - obligated
186: Lnie - line
196: World conquest - World conquest
200: demilitarized - demilitarized
208: two-day - two-day
220 (footnote): support - support
228: Eintritt - Entrance
229: Footnote not indexed
234: Footnote on Heß missing
238: Joffre - Joffe
257: World Conquest Intentions - World Conquest Intentions
275: american-russian - american-russian
281: Friend feelings - Joy feelings
282: devilish - devilish
286: *The Rise* - "*The Rise*
301: irresponsible - irresponsible
305: Collidge - Coolidge (2 times)
358: Schutztaffeln - Protection squadrons